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Abstract
In this dissertation I individuate and discuss Richard Feynman’s overall spacetime
view. I argue that the absorber theory of radiation, the path integral formulation
of quantum mechanics and quantum electrodynamics, all share the overall spacetime
view as a common conceptual framework. Even though this framework changed with
the different theories, its most general form can be characterized as the looking at
physics phenomena in their spacetime entirety. I show how the absorber theory of
radiation is based on the intertwining of past and future within a closed system
of absorbers and emitters. I show how the path integral formulation of quantum
mechanics considers all the possible configurations within the initial and final states. I
address how the overall spacetime view fits with Feynman diagrams and perturbation
theory. Such a conceptual framework, I maintain, led Feynman to look at quantum
phenomena from a new and revolutionary perspective, and to the formulation of one
of our best scientific theories.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The main objective of this dissertation is to reconstruct the philosophical intuition
that led the physicist Richard Feynman to develop the absorber theory of radiation,
the path integral formulation of quantum mechanics and the Feynman diagrams.
This intuition, in its most general form, corresponds to the idea that the dynamics
of some quantum phenomena does not have to be studied by looking at the system’s
infinitesimal time evolution from initial to final state. Rather, some phenomena are
better accounted for if we consider the initial and final states and evaluate whatever
happens in-between as happening all-at-once.
Quantum mechanics is an exceptionally well-tested theory, and one of the greatest
accomplishment of our scientific enterprise. It has been successfully applied to chemistry and to the understanding of how the elements of the periodic table interact; it
has been used to study the sun and how stars produce energy; it was fundamental in
developing some world-changing technologies such as lasers, computers and machines
for medical diagnosis (such as the MRI). However, despite its successes and precise
predictions, the theory remains fundamentally mysterious in the type of reality it
describes. It is astoundingly good at making predictions, but it does not tell us how
the things it predicts come to happen. As odd as it may be, the interpretation of
quantum mechanics is still an unsolved problem, even though it traces back to the
very beginning of the theory —for example: Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics in 1925
and Schrödinger’s wave mechanics in 1926. Yet, philosophers and physicists are still
debating (among other things) the measurement problem, the superposition principle,

1

the reality of the wave function and, in general, the foundations of such a successful
and yet mysterious theory.
It is against this backdrop that the present dissertation reconstructs the evolution
of Feynman’s overall spacetime view and, although this is not enough to solve the
interpretative problems of quantum mechanics, I believe Feynman’s view makes an
important step in the right direction. Notably, Feynman did not offer a clear and
in-depth analysis of his view, which led to various interpretations that span from
instrumentalism to weak forms of realism. It is thus the purpose of this dissertation
to present a cohesive narrative of the evolution of Feynman’s view, and to discuss its
philosophical relevance. What will emerge from the first three chapters of this dissertation —each corresponding to a step in the evolution of the overall spacetime view—
is the necessity of revising some of the classical concepts we use to describe the physical world. More specifically, Chapter 2 will discuss the notion of classical radiation,
Chapter 3 will question the concept of trajectory and Chapter 4 will addresses how
the notion of quantum event diverts from its classical counterpart. Finally, Chapter 5
will address how to interpret the scientific understanding that Feynman gained from
the use of the overall spacetime view.

1.1

The Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation begins with Feynman’s attempt to explain the radiative damping
of an accelerated electric charge; this attempt resulted in the formulation of the absorber theory of radiation, for which the radiative damping is explained via advanced
radiation emitted by the absorbers that received the initial radiation of the source.
Radiative phenomena are thus explained by considering the entirety of the physical
system (absorber-emitter) and the intertwining of past and future within its boundaries.
After formulating his new theory of classical electrodynamics, Feynman attempted
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the quantization of the theory and, even though it proved unsuccessful, he ended up
with a new formulation of quantum mechanics based on an action principle: the
path integrals formulation of quantum mechanics. I will argue that this formulation
of non-relativistic quantum mechanics comes with a change in the overall spacetime
view: from a view that emphasizes the role of future conditions onto the present, to
a view that also considers all the possible configurations of a quantum system. The
case discussed in Chapter 3 is that of a quantum particle moving from an initial to a
final spacetime point. To calculate the probability amplitude of the system, the path
integral method sums over the probability amplitude of all the possible trajectories
that the particle can traverse. The chapter will also discuss in what sense the total
ensemble of quantum paths is weakly non-reducible to the single possible trajectories.
To do so, I will comment on some attempts to reduce the total ensemble of possible
trajectories to a single path and show, unsurprisingly, that at best we can reduce it
to subsets of possible trajectories. I will then show that not all the trajectories that
contribute to the probability amplitude are ‘physically possible’, since some of them
are non-differentiable. The consequence is a form of (weak) non-reductionism, for the
physically possible trajectories are necessary but not sufficient to calculate the total
probability amplitude of the system.
Chapter 4 reconstructs the development of Feynman’s quantum electrodynamics
and Feynman diagrams. Roughly speaking, not only ought one to consider all the
possible trajectories, but also all the possible interactions that can occur between the
initial and final states of the quantum system. More specifically, the chapter focuses
on the use of spacetime boundaries — which will later lead to the use of asymptotically free states— that define the limits of the physical events. The second aspect
reconstructed in the chapter is the application of one of the pillars of the absorber
theory of radiation to the theory of positrons. Feynman, as a matter of fact, modifies
the hole-theory by Dirac and posits that positrons are electrons moving backward in
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time. This changes the narrative of the positron-electron pair creation with that of
electrons being scattered backward and forward in time.1 The intertwining of past
and future is a clear heritage from the absorber theory of radiation. Moreover, this
reinterpretation of the positron reinforces the way Feynman looks at quantum phenomena: not from a step-by-step perspective, but rather from what he defines as the
‘bird’s eye view’ —in this case, by looking at the total charge of the system. The
chapter concludes with the discussion of Feynman diagrams and how each term of
the perturbative expansion is associated with a pictorial diagram. The scattering
amplitude is thus calculated by taking into account all the terms of the expansion
and thereby all the diagrams.
Finally, Chapter 5 of the dissertation discusses the type of understanding that is
implicit in the overall spacetime view. To do so, I will begin with (De Regt 2017)’s
account, and with the concept of intelligibility of a theory. Intelligibility consists
of a cluster of values (for example: visualizability) that makes a given theory more
usable to scientists. In De Regt’s view a phenomenon is scientifically understood if
there is an explanation to that phenomenon that is based on an intelligible theory.
However, in the chapter I argue that Feynman tried to understand the phenomena and
through that understanding he was able to develop his quantum electrodynamics. The
overall spacetime view and the visualization of physical processes contributed to such
understanding. I will also emphasize that both the understanding and visualization
are only partial, in that they do not constitute a one-to-one representation of physical
reality.
In what follows I will summarize some of the philosophical consequences of the
overall spacetime view, but to do so, I need to discuss a caveat first. The caveat is
that Feynman was neither very detailed nor clear about his philosophical perspectives,
1

Wheeler, in a letter to Feynman, will push the theory to its limits and suggest that the entire
universe could be constituted by a single electron moving backward and forward in time.
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especially if we compare him to some founding fathers of quantum mechanics such as
Heisenberg and Schrödinger. This makes the reconstruction of the overall spacetime
view much more difficult, especially with respect to the question as to what extent
Feynman believed that physical reality behaves the way described by the different
instances of his view. This is precisely why this dissertation can be characterized
as a work in the field of both history and philosophy of science: it reconstructs the
development of a philosophical concept (the overall spacetime view) in the theories
of classical electrodynamics, path integrals and Feynman diagrams.
The philosophical lesson that can be drawn from the discussion on the overall
spacetime view is that similarly to how special and general relativity brought about
a revolutionary conception of space and time, quantum mechanics presents us with a
revolutionary conception of the dynamics of quantum systems. Feynman calls ‘customary view’ the idea, typical of classical (Hamiltonian) mechanics, that systems
move from an initial to a final state guided by a dynamical equation. The role of the
dynamical equation is to evolve the system from its present state to its infinitesimal
time subsequent in a recursive manner. With Feynman’s quantum mechanics, the
customary view is challenged and a new perspective is suggested. To calculate the
relevant properties of the quantum system (usually the transition/scattering amplitude) the entire system ought to be taken into consideration, from its initial to its
final state, and all its possible evolutions need to be accounted for by the equations.
The new perspective (the overall spacetime view) becomes especially evident with
the path integral formulation of quantum mechanics (Chapter 3) and with Feynman
diagrams (Chapter 4). However, as I will present in the following chapters, the overall
spacetime view assumes different forms in different theories.
In sum, the dissertation focuses on the reconstruction of Feynman’s quantum
electrodynamics starting from the absorber theory of radiation and through the path
integral formulation of quantum mechanics. In that, the dissertation emphasizes the
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evolution of the intuition that accompanied Feynman in developing each of these
theories: from the intuition that the future can affect the present, to the idea that all
the possible trajectories ought to be considered in the calculation of the probability
amplitude, to the view that all possible interactions need to be accounted for within
the initial and final states of a quantum electrodynamic system. This intuition, which
evolved with the different theories, I call it: ‘the overall spacetime view’.2 In what
follows I will spell out the concept in more detail and I will relate it to the different
chapters of the present dissertation.

1.2

Overall Spacetime View

The second chapter of the dissertation develops and discusses the concept of overall
spacetime view with respect to the absorber theory of radiation, i.e., with respect
to the attempt by Feynman (and Wheeler) to develop an alternative formulation
of classical electrodynamics. The theory makes use of the time-symmetric solutions
to Maxwell equations in order to explain the radiative damping of an accelerated
charged particle as the advanced response of the absorbers re-emitting the radiation
of the source. Thus, I characterize the first instance of the overall spacetime view
(the chapter refers to it as ‘overall process view’) with the following two clauses:
• The micro-dynamic laws of electromagnetic radiation ‘depend’ on both the past
(retarded radiation) and the future (advanced radiation) of both emitters and
absorbers.
• The interaction between absorbers and emitter is essential to the radiative phenomena.
2

To be precise, Feynman already uses the expression ‘overall spacetime view’ in his theory of
positrons: (Feynman 1949b)
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The first clause indicates how Feynman foresaw the possibility that some physical
processes do not move forward-in-time only and, even though he does not provide a
full-fledged philosophical account of time in physics, this feature will remain in the
theory of positrons.
In addition, the chapter discusses the intertwining of past and future in relation
to the Newtonian and Lagrangian scheme. The former is characterized by the finegrained study of how a given physical system evolves in time ‘step-by-step’ and it is
for the most part associated with hyperbolic partial differential equations. Indeed,
the solution to those equations is provided by the specification of the initial data of
the system (usually, the value of the function at the initial point and its derivative)
and by evolving those data into infinitesimal time subsequent states. Therefore, the
solution to the equation is constructed in such a way that only the past of the system
influences the future.
The Lagrangian scheme, on the other hand, makes use of the action of the system
which, in the case of a classical particle moving along a trajectory, is calculated along
the entirety of the path: from the initial to the final state. As defined in (Wharton
2014, p. 3):
One sets up a (reversible) two-way map between physical events and
mathematical parameters, partially constrains those parameters on some
spacetime boundary at both the beginning and the end, and then uses
a global rule to find the values of the unconstrained parameters and/or
a transition amplitude. This analysis does not proceed via dynamical
equations, but rather is enforced on entire regions of spacetime ‘all at
once’.
The ‘all-at-once’ of the previous quote is represented by the set of past and future
interconnections between particles. As described in (Wheeler and Feynman 1945,
p. 181): “past and future of all particles are tied together by a maze of interconnec7

tions. The happenings in neither division of time can be considered to be independent
of those in the other”. The constraints posed by the absorber theory are such that the
universe is a complete absorber and there can not be radiation without absorption.
This latter constraint, I have translated it as the necessity of having interactions
between absorbers and emitters.
With the path integrals formulation of quantum mechanics (Chapter 3), the constraints are now represented by the initial and final states of the quantum system and
the maze of interconnections is now given by the summing of the different transition
amplitudes of each possible trajectory within the boundaries. There is a substantial
change in the nature of these interconnections: in the case of the absorber theory
they are still separable and distinguishable, but, in the case of the path integrals, the
different possible trajectories are not separable from the whole, and this constitutes
a form of bottom-up holism.
I characterize bottom-up holism as that view for which, to determine a given
property of the whole, the properties of the parts are not sufficient. With respect
to path integrals, this means that the probability amplitude of the system is not
solely determined by the probability amplitudes of the single possible trajectories.
Or, to be more specific, it is not enough to sum over the probability amplitudes of
the physically possible trajectories to obtain the total probability amplitude. One
also ought to sum over the probability amplitudes of trajectories that are physically
not possible —for example non-smooth and ill-behaved paths. The chapter discusses
the problem of treating ill-behaved paths as physical possibilities. I will suggest that
we can interpret the non-differentiable paths as genuine ‘quantum trajectories’ and
thus that the very notion of trajectory would become scale-dependent and in need of
some conceptual revision.
In the chapter, I also discuss two accounts that attempt to reduce the total ensemble of possible trajectories to subsets of physically possible paths. The first account is
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advanced by (Wharton 2016) and the main idea is that even though it is not possible
to reduce the ensemble to a single real trajectory, it is nonetheless possible to group
the various paths in subsets of non-interacting real trajectories —due to the cancellation process of the different single probability amplitudes. I argue that, although the
grouping seems possible, some of the ill-behaved paths remain and thus we cannot
reduce the ensemble to classical physical possibilities.
The second attempt to reduce the ensemble is suggested by (Gell-Mann and Hartle 2012) and it consists of a modified version of the decoherent history interpretation
of quantum mechanics. While this accounts admits, at least in principle, the possibility of fine-graining the ensemble to a single trajectory, it also requires that these
trajectories can be assigned a negative probability. Furthermore, the single trajectory
would escape testing and observations, for the latter are proper of the coarse-grained
histories only —where a coarse grained history is a set of fine-grained histories defined
as sets of alternatives at successive times and expressed as sets of ad-hoc projector
operators. Because of these two reasons, I argue that the account does not rule out
holism.
In Chapter 4, I focus mostly on the historical development of Feynman diagrams
and on the last form of the overall spacetime view —i.e., on the necessity of considering not only all the possible trajectories, but also all the possible interactions. I will
reconstruct the use by Feynman of a spacetime boundary to limit the quantum event
under consideration and show how this will translate into the use of asymptotically
free states. It is within these states that the process of scattering happens and all the
possible events need to be accounted for to calculate the proper scattering amplitude.
The last chapter of the dissertation (Chapter 5) discusses the type of scientific
understanding provided by the overall spacetime —especially as discussed in Chapter
4. Starting from the view on scientific understanding and intelligibility offered in (De
Regt 2017), I will argue that Feynman was not trying to understand a theory and
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its equations, but rather he was using visualization and the overall spacetime view to
understand the quantum phenomena. However, I will also maintain that Feynman
diagrams can not be considered as a one-to-one representation of quantum processes,
and that the understanding provided by visualization and overall spacetime view is
only partial. As a consequence, while the overall spacetime view played an important philosophical role in the formulation of Feynman’s quantum electrodynamics, it
cannot be considered as a truthful representation of the quantum world.
In the conclusions to the dissertation I will briefly look at Feynman’s late works
and comment on whether his commitment to the overall spacetime view changed
with time. The section is relegated to the conclusions, since a deeper analysis would
require a new historical work on the development of the diagrams and a closer look
at the relationship between Feynman and Dyson.
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Chapter 2
The Philosophical Underpinning of the
Absorber Theory of Radiation
2.1

Introduction

The chapter advances the idea that the absorber theory of radiation —by (Wheeler
and Feynman 1945) and (Wheeler and Feynman 1949)— is based on a different way
of looking at electrodynamic phenomena. Generally speaking, this consists of looking
at radiative phenomena in their entirety, rather than at the evolution of a given state
from one instant of time to its subsequent. The point is not entirely new: for example
(Blum 2017) has shed light on a ‘paradigm shift’ occurred between the 1930s and
1940s during which quantum field theory moved from being a theory of instantaneous
quantum states to a theory of scattering. In his historical reconstruction, Blum also
points out that the notion of an ‘overall process’ is a common theme among the
various attempts to formulate a relativistic quantum theory:
What all these formulations had in common was that in some sense
they problematized the quantum mechanical notion of an instantaneous
state and tended toward replacing it with a focus on overall processes.
This stemmed from the relativistic need to treat space and time on the
same footing and the consequent tendency of relativity towards a block
universe view (Blum 2017, p. 2)
This notion of overall process is thus associated with terms such as “overall space-
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time point of view” (Schweber 1986, p. 393) and with the idea that some phenomena
divert from what (Wharton 2015) defines as the Newtonian scheme, where things
evolve step-by-step and always forward in time. The point of the present chapter
is to specify what this notion of overall process amounts to in the context of the
absorber theory and to embed it into the philosophical literature.
The general intuition behind the absorber theory is that both retarded and advanced radiations, as well as the presence of the absorbers, ought to be accounted to
understand the total radiation. I call this intuition ‘overall process view’ (for short:
overall process) and I define it as:1
Overall Process View (of the absorber theory of radiation):
• (i) The microdynamic laws of electromagnetic radiation ‘depend’ on
both the past (retarded radiation) and the future (advanced radiation) of both emitters and absorbers.
• (ii) The interaction between absorbers and emitter is essential to the
radiative phenomena.
The first clause refers to the space-time character of the overall process view.
Namely, to describe a radiative phenomena one does not ‘simply’ apply the initial
conditions of the system to the dynamics laws. As we will see below, the absorber
theory is a theory of action-at-a-distance that does not only demand knowledge of
the past of the system (or of its initial conditions), but also of its future.2 The second
clause amounts to the claim that the mutual interaction of source and absorbers
constitutes the radiative phenomena. The stronger claim that all radiation emitted
by a source ought to be absorbed is debatable and it will be discussed in section 5.
1

For the sake of clarity: the idea of overall process is what constitutes the philosophical underpinning of the theory.
2
The point is also made clear in (Blum 2017) when he reconstructs the use of Fokker’s action in
Wheeler and Feynman’s theory.
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With respect to the terms ‘retarded’ and ‘advanced’, they refer to the fact that
the total electromagnetic field induced by an accelerated charge is represented by
the one-half advanced plus one-half retarded Liénard-Wiechert solution of Maxwell’s
equations. In other words: according to the mathematical formalism, the equations
of wave propagation have a retarded and an advanced solution where the former
describes a wave at (r, t) caused by a source which lies in the past of t, and the latter
describes a wave at (r, t) whose source lies in the future of t. However, since it is
only the retarded solution that is observed in nature, the advanced solution is usually
discarded as nonphysical. In the absorber theory of radiation, on the other hand, part
of the total radiation of an accelerated source depends on the future response of the
absorbers which arrives at the source at the time of the initial acceleration. Thereby,
there is no ad-hoc discarding of the advanced solution, and the total radiation depends
on both the past and the future of both emitter and absorbers. We will discuss the
details in section 3.
Furthermore, the absorber theory of radiation falls under the category of ‘direct
action theory’. Thereby, it modifies the classical field picture of classical electrodynamics in that fields are not independent entities providing a background for particles
interactions. Thus, the use of terms like ‘field’ and ‘radiation’ becomes either ambiguous or seemingly contradictory with the direct action theory. To avoid the confusion,
I will resort to the view suggested in (Kastner 2020, pp. 1–2) according to which
the absorber theory does not thoroughly dispose of the concept of fields, but rather
it makes the existence of fields dependent on the presence of a given particle. “[...]
[T]he concept of ‘field’ is taken as still physically applicable in the form of a potential
describing the strength of an interaction between sources. However, it does not constitute an independently existing medium [. . . ] It differs from the standard notion of
‘field’ in that its existence is contingent on the existence of the charges that are its
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source.”3
After having presented the theory, I will suggest that the initial intuition of
Wheeler and Feynman played a role in Feynman’s subsequent theories, such as, for
example, the path integrals formulation of quantum mechanics. Afterward, I will
consider a reinterpretation of the absorber theory by (Price 1991), which was originally meant to solve the problem of the time (experimental) asymmetry in Wheeler
and Feynman’s work. I will then show that the overall process view is at least partly
incompatible with Price’s reinterpretation of the absorber theory. Finally, in the last
section I will introduce a connection between the overall process view and the broader
philosophical debate on holism. In a separate appendix, I will briefly address some
attempts to solve the time-asymmetry problem.

2.2

The Idea Behind the Theory

The absorber theory of radiation was developed in two famous works: (Wheeler
and Feynman 1945) and (Wheeler and Feynman 1949), and its original drive was to
explain the so-called radiative damping for electrodynamics. The problem the two
physicists tried to address was that: a charge undergoing an acceleration emits a field
and such field acts on the space surrounding the particle as well upon the particle
itself. As Feynman reconstructed on his Nobel lecture (Feynman 1966, p. 2):
Well, it seemed to me quite evident that the idea that a particle acts
on itself, that the electrical force acts on the same particle that generates
it, is not a necessary one —it is sort of a silly one, as a matter of fact.
And, so I suggested to myself that electrons cannot act on themselves,
they can only act on other electrons.
3

For example, a different view seems to be held in (Bauer et al. 2014), where the fields in the
absorber theory are taken to be only phenomenological descriptions on a macroscopic level and the
use of fields-based language is a matter of convenience.
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The radiating accelerated particle has a sort of inertia that needs to be accounted once
you calculate the emitted radiation. In other words: when an electron is accelerated, it
changes its momentum, but not all the ‘acceleration energy’ goes into the momentum
variation. Part of the energy is emitted in form of a radiation. The resistance of the
source to the acceleration is called radiation resistance or radiative damping. One
can interpret it as a form of inertia of the source to accelerate. As expressed in:
(Feynman 1966, p. 3)
Then I went to graduate school and somewhere along the line I learned
what was wrong with the idea that an electron does not act on itself.
When you accelerate an electron it radiates energy and you have to do
extra work to account for that energy. The extra force against which this
work is done is called the force of radiation resistance.
It follows that even though such inertia-type-of-force diverges to infinity for point-like
electrons, it cannot simply be discarded due to the principle of conservation of energy.
To solve the problem, Feynman worked with Wheeler and focused on a relational
principle for which: given a radiating (accelerated) charged particle, this will affect
a second particle that will in turn radiate back to the source. A relevant problem
then emerges: if the radiation resistance is caused by the second particle, how can
it reach the first particle at the moment of acceleration? From a mathematical and
physical point of view, the answer to the question is to use the advanced and retarded
solutions of Maxwell’s equations. The general idea is represented in Figure 1:
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Figure 2.1 Scheme of the retarded and advanced interactions between a source (S), an
absorber (A) and a target particle (C)

Imagine a source (S) being surrounded by an absorbing wall ten light-seconds
away. Then imagine a test charge one light-second on the right of the source. The
idea behind using the retarded and advanced solutions to Maxwell’s equations can
be summarized by the following conditions:
(S(t=0) A)ret = +10s

(2.1)

(A(t=10) S)adv = 10s − 10s = 0s
(A(t=10) S)ret = 10s + 10s = 20s
(A(t=10) C)adv = +10s − 11s = −1s ≡ (−)(S(t=0) C)adv = −1s
(A(t=10) C)ret = +10s + 11s = 21s ≡ (S(t=20) C)ret = +21s

What (2.1) expresses is the time relations of the advanced and retarded interactions of
the source (S). At t = 0s the source is accelerated and emits a radiation that reaches a
particle of the wall (A) at time t = +10s.4 The particle of the absorber emits at time
t = +10s advanced and retarded waves that reach the source at time t = 0 and t = 20s
respectively. Then, the advanced interaction of the absorber (A) with the test charge
4

The notation 10s stands for ‘ten seconds’ and the sign (+) represents retarded (forward in
time) radiation and the sign (−) represents advanced (backward) radiation. The formula is meant
to give an intuitive idea of how advanced and retarded fields interfere and cancel each other.
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(C) happens at the same time as the direct advanced interaction between the source
and the test charge (that is at t = −1). These two interactions, Feynman argues, are
equal and opposite and hence cancel out. Ultimately, the retarded interaction from
the absorber and from the source acts on the test charge at the same moment t = 21s
(but this time the interactions have the same sign and hence add up).
The formal proof of the theory is divided in four derivations and I intend to provide
a more detailed overview in the following sections. By means of an introduction, it
is enough to point out that the radiative force acting upon the source is given by the
superposition of the advanced interactions of the absorber particles —as expressed by
the condition: (A(t=10) S)adv = 10s − 10s = 0s in (2.1). It follows that, to account for
the total radiation and hence to replace the traditional “field-picture”, one needs to
consider advanced and retarded interactions —of both the source and all the absorbers
surrounding the source. We then return to the overall process intuition, i.e., if we
consider the ‘forward-in-time’ interactions only, we are not able to account for the
electron’s radiation.

2.3

Derivations of the Theory

As mentioned above, looking at the derivations of the absorber theory should help understanding its relational character and the consequent necessity of considering both
the advanced and the retarded fields. The purpose, as imagined by Feynman, was
to provide an empirically equivalent theory of radiation that did not use the concept
of fields. In such a way, the ‘infamous’ self-interaction —which causes mathematical
divergences— would fade away, replaced by the backward (advanced) reaction of the
absorber to the source’s original radiation.
Let’s consider the radiation force for an accelerated charged particle as calculated
by Abraham and Lorentz:
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Frad =

2q 2 v̈
3c3

(2.2)

which is equivalent to the formulation given in (Wheeler and Feynman 1945,
p. 158):
A charged particle on being accelerated sends an electromagnetic energy and itself loses energy. This loss is interpreted as caused by a force
acting on the particle given in magnitude and direction by the expression
2(charge)2 (time rate of change of acceleration)
3(velocity of light)3

(2.3)

Then, starting from (Tetrode 1922), the two physicists developed a theory for
which the absorber plays a fundamental role in the mechanism of radiation. As
addressed in (Wheeler and Feynman 1945, p. 160):
Using the language of the theory of action-at-a-distance, we give the
idea the following definite formulation:
1. An accelerated point charge in otherwise charge-free space does not
radiate electromagnetic energy.
2. The fields which act on a given particle arise only from other particles
3. These fields are represented by one-half the retarded plus one-half the
advanced Lienard-Wiechert solutions of Maxwell’s equations. This
law of force is symmetric with respect to past and future. [. . . ]
4. Sufficiently many particles are present to absorb completely the radiation given off by the source.
Definitions (1) and (2) state the relational nature of the absorber theory. For there
cannot be any radiation unless there is something to absorb it and given that each
field comes from the reaction of another particle, the theory naturally requires the
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relation between source and absorber. Definition (3) corresponds to the mathematical
core of the theory. The necessity of taking into consideration both the advanced and
the retarded radiations of a charged particle needs not only to be justified, but also
to be proven equivalent to the experimental observations. Definition (4) is needed,
especially for the fourth derivation, to reinforce the relational character of the theory
and to account for the absence of residual advanced fields that are not measured or
observed by the experiments.
Wheeler and Feynman (1945) present four derivations of the theory in which:
the first one considers the particles of the absorber to be taken far from each other,
derivation II evaluates the field of the absorber in the vicinity of the source to show
that the field compensates the advanced field of the source and gives the proper
retarded field. Derivation III takes into account arbitrary velocities and, as it does
not concern us here, I will not comment on it. The last derivation provides a general
approach for deriving the proper radiation —under the assumption expressed by
definition (4).

2.3.1

Derivation I

Let’s consider a source with charge +e which undergoes an acceleration A and emits
a retarded radiation which reaches a particle of the absorber ek at distance rk and at
time rk /c. The field emitted by the source, due to the disturbance is (Wheeler and
Feynman 1945, p. 161):
−(eA/rk c2 ) sin(A, rk )

(2.4)

The field in (2.4) causes a particle of the absorber to undergo an acceleration

Ak = −

ek eA
sin(θ)
mk rk c2

where θ is the angle between the acceleration A of the source and rk .
The field produced by the acceleration of the absorber particle is half advanced
and half retarded. The advanced component will reach the source (e) at the moment
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of the original acceleration and it will exert a force of magnitude equal to the integral
over the distance r of (Wheeler and Feynman 1945, p. 160):
(2Ae2 /3c3 )(2πN e2k /mk c)drk

(2.5)

where the factor N considers all the particles of the absorber. However, Wheeler
and Feynman pointed out that (2.5) does not accord with experimental data. That
is because: (i) the reaction depends on the nature of the absorber (because of mk );
(ii) the radiative force is proportional to the acceleration, rather than to its time
derivative and (iii) the integral diverges to infinity as the number of particles of the
absorber increases.
However, for the absorber is composed of many absorbing particles, one needs to
consider that the radiation is the product of both the proper field of each absorber
and also of the interaction between these fields. To account for such an interaction,
Wheeler and Feynman add a refractive index n = 1 − 2πN e2k /mk ω 2 to the formula
(2.5), thereby obtaining the reactive force of the absorber (Wheeler and Feynman
1945, p. 161):
(2e2 /3c3 )A

Z ∞
0

n

o

(2πN e2k /mk c)drk × exp (−irk 2πN e2k /mk cω)

(2.6)

which, by considering one single Fourier component of the acceleration, reduces to
(Wheeler and Feynman 1945, p. 162):
(total reaction) = (2e2 /3c3 )(−iω A)

(2.7)

= (2e2 /3c3 )(dA/dt)
The distribution of the various particles of the absorber determines a phase lag that
leads to the cancellation of the advanced component of the absorbers reaction and
the advanced component of the source’s radiation.
The first derivation has shown that from calculating the advanced reaction of the
absorber particles it is possible to obtain the original radiative force (2.2). It follows
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that the radiative damping of the source comes from the advanced reaction of all the
particles of the absorber. Thus, the study of the phenomenon of radiation (at least
in this formulation) needs to consider not only the immediate present of the source,
but also the advanced reaction of the absorber. In other words, the derivation hinges
on the fact that both accelerated sources and absorbers emit a half-advanced and
half-retarded radiation. This particular time-symmetry, I addressed it as the first
leg of the overall process view: (i) the microdynamic laws of radiation depend on
both the past and the future of emitters and absorbers respectively. Thus, applied to
the radiative damping, it reads: the radiative damping of an a accelerated source (in
the absorber theory of radiation) depends on half-advanced (future) and half-retarded
(past) radiation of both the source and the absorbers.
I conclude the comments on the first derivation with a quote from (Wheeler and
Feynman 1945, p. 162) that emphasizes the importance of (2.7):
We conclude that the force of radiative reaction arises, not from the
direct action of a particle upon itself, but from the advanced action upon
this charge caused by the future motion of the particles of the absorber.

2.3.2

Derivation II

The second derivation shows that the advanced field produced by the absorber, when
summed with the radiation emitted by the source (which is half advanced and half
retarded), gives rise to the total disturbance (or total retarded field) measured by the
experiments
F =−

2e2 v̈
2ev̇
+
3c2 r
3c3

(2.8)

where the second term is the radiative damping and the first is equivalent to (2.4).
For the second derivation, let’s consider a source located at the center of a spherical
cavity of radius R and let’s evaluate the strength of the radiation at some distances
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r << Rcav .5 The particles of the absorber are now not necessarily free and therefore
one needs to account for the dispersion of the radiation in terms of a complex function
p(ω) which tends to 1 when the binding between the particles is weak.
The equation of motion of a particle of the absorber medium is (Kamat 1970,
p. 477):
mk r̈k = ek p(ω)E

(2.9)

Now, the advanced field of the absorber reduces at the source to:
(2e/3c3 )(dA/dt)

(2.10)

which, when multiplied by the charge of the source, gives the radiative damping.
let’s now consider the Fourier component of the acceleration (assumed to be periodic) such that:

A = A0 exp(−iωt)

(2.11)

At some wavelengths of distance (> r), equation (2.10) reduces to (Kamat 1970,
p. 479):6
"

iω(n − ik)r
eA0
− 2 exp −iωt +
2rc
c
(

)

eA0
iω(n − ik)r
+
exp
−iωt
−
2rc2
c
(

)#

sin2 χ
(2.12)

where χ is the angle between A and r, ω is the frequency and (n − ik) is the refraction
index. Equation (2.12) accounts for the total advanced radiation emitted by the
absorbers which takes the form of half retarded minus half advanced the radiation
emitted by the source. The formula (2.12) is presented by (Wheeler and Feynman
5

To be precise: the term r is the distance between the point of evaluation of the field and the
source
6

I have adjusted the notation to be consistent with that of Wheeler and Feynman
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1945, p. 164) in the form:7
− 1/2(eA0 /2rc2 )exp(iω/c − iωt)

(2.13)

+ 1/2(eA0 /2rc2 )exp(−iω/c − iωt)

(2.14)

The superposition of the advanced radiation emitted by all the absorbers will
look like a spherical wave collapsing onto the source. The concept is expressed by the
phrasing in (Wheeler and Feynman 1945, p. 165):
 
total
disturbance
  proper advanced

 

 converging on  =  field of source
 

 

itself
the source



field
apparently
converging
on
source

 

 
 +  actually composed of parts convergent 

 

 
on individual absorber particles
(2.15)




For the second and the third term in (2.15) have opposite signs —to be more precise
they are out of phase— they interfere destructively. Consequently, the advanced
components of the radiations (emitted by either the absorber or the source) get
cancelled with each other. Once the advanced fields coming from the absorber have
passed over the point charge, they will start looking like a retarded field coming
from the source, although they actually are fields converging on the single particles
of the absorber. These ‘apparently-diverging-fields’ will add up (as the direction is
the same) with the half retarded radiation emitted by the source, producing the full
retarded radiation. As (Wheeler and Feynman 1945, p. 166) phrased it:






 total disturbance

 diverging from


source

  proper retarded
 
 =  field of source
 
 
itself







  field apparently diverging from source 

 
 +  actually composed of parts converging 

 

 
on individual absorber particles
(2.16)

The third term refers to the part of the advanced field of the absorber which is now
diverging from the source.8
The second derivation has reconstructed —starting from the results of the first
one— the total retarded disturbance measured by the experiments. The important
aspect, at least from a philosophical point of view, is the relational character that the
7

In the original work, Wheeler and Feynman derive the factor 1/2 on a separate paragraph.

8

The first to notice that the phrasing was somehow ambiguous was (Leeds 1994).
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theory takes. The total retarded radiation emitted by the source is only apparently
such. As a matter of fact, one needs to consider the radiative component which is
apparently coming from the source but which is actually converging on the absorber
particles. The total radiation diverging from the source is then constituted by the
(constructive) interference between the proper retarded field of the source and the
response of the absorbers converging onto the source. Therefore, the theory accounts
for the total radiation by making the role of both absorbers and source fundamental
—this is in accord with the first point of the theory of action-at-a-distance for which
an accelerated charge does not radiate in a free-charge space.
While derivation one has pointed out the necessity of considering the time-symmetry
of both absorbers and emitter, the second derivation has emphasized the relational
character of the absorber theory. The latter is what I have addressed as the second
point in the definition of the overall process view: the interaction between absorbers
and emitters is a constitutive one, where the interaction is represented here by the
interference between the proper radiation of the source and the response of the absorbers.
I will not discuss the third derivation as it generalizes the argument to fast-moving
particles and hence it does not concern us here. The fourth derivation, on the other
hand, is the most general one and also the most discussed one among the philosophers
of science (see, among others: (Ridderbos 1997), (Price 1991), (Frisch 2000), (Davies
1977)).

2.3.3

Derivation IV

Let’s now consider a charge a surrounded by a complete absorber (for which each
particle is labeled k), which means that it is not possible to have a radiation that is
not absorbed.
X
k

Fret +

X

Fadv = 0 outside of the absorber

k
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(2.17)

As it is not possible for a retarded component of a field to destructively interfere
with the advanced component of the same field, it follows that each component of
the previous formula has to be zero separately:
X

Fret = 0

(2.18)

Fadv = 0

(2.19)

k

X
k

Also, as we are under the assumption that the absorber is a completely absorbing
medium, the following also holds:
X

(Fret − Fadv ) = 0 everywhere

(2.20)

k

The consequence of the complete absorbing assumption is that the field exerted on
the ath particle (the source) by the absorbing particles is given by (Wheeler and
Feynman 1945, p. 169):
1 k
k
Fret
+ Fadv
2
2

X 1
k6=a



(2.21)

The formula can be broken into three components:

X
X 1
1 k
1 a
1 a
k
k
k
k
Fret
+ Fadv
Fret
+
Fret − Fadv
=
−
Fret
− Fadv
2
2
2
2
k6=a
k 2

X 1
k6=a







(2.22)

The second term on the right corresponds to the radiative damping which, in turn,
can be expressed as coming from the advanced response of the absorber (see derivation
I):


ea

1 a
1 a
Eret − Eadv
=
2
2


2e2a dA
3c3 dt

!

(2.23)

Because of the complete absorber assumption, the third term of equation (2.22) is
equal to zero: (1/2)

P

k

k
k
(Fret
− Fadv
) = 0. The first term

P

k6=a

k
Fret
corresponds to

−(2ev̇)/(3c2 r) which is the usual retarded field, due to the force accelerating the
emitter. Thereby, the relational aspect of the theory becomes evident because the
sum is over all the particles of the absorber. Furthermore, the relational aspect yields
that there is no self-action of the source. What follows is that to account for the
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phenomenon of radiation, both the emitter and the absorbers are necessary while the
self-action is ruled out (which was Wheeler and Feynman’s original point).
To sum it up: I have argued that the four derivations employ the overall process
intuition, namely, (i) the microdynamic laws of radiation depend on both the past and
the future of both absorbers and emitters, (ii) the interaction between absorbers and
emitters is needed to account for radiative phenomena. The two points were made
evident in the first and the second derivation respectively, while the fourth derivation
encompasses them both. As a matter of fact, in equation (2.22), both absorbers and
emitter are centered on half-advanced and half-retarded radiations (corresponding to
(i)). Furthermore, because the total retarded radiation depends on the sum over all
absorbers’ particles, the relation between absorber and emitter becomes constitutive
of radiative phenomena (which corresponds to (ii)).
What about the advanced components? The advanced component of the field gets
cancelled by the advanced component of the radiation emitted by the source, for they
have opposite signs. This is because the superposition of the advanced components
of the absorber response will form a spherical wave converging on the single absorber
particles, thereby destructively interfering with the advanced component of the source
which will form a spherical wave converging on the source. Wheeler and Feynman
(1945, pp. 169–170) conclude that: “[. . . ]we have shown that the half-advanced, halfretarded fields of the theory of action at a distance lead to a satisfactory account of
the mechanism of radiative reaction and to a description of the action of one particle
on another in which no evidence of the advanced fields is apparent.”

2.4

The Philosophical Underpinning

The main debate around the absorber theory of radiation involved the temporal
symmetry endorsed by the Maxwell’s equations and the phenomenological asymmetry
of radiation measured by the experiments. In other words, the main issue that authors
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such as (Ridderbos 1997), (Price 1991), (Frisch 2000), (Davies 1977) tried to address is
the ‘symmetry breaking’ happening from the laws of micro-dynamics to the empirical
data.
This sections provides: first an analogy between the philosophical underpinning
of the theory and the so-called Lagrangian schema proposed by (Wharton 2015).
The purpose of the analogy is to further flesh out the intuition of overall process
and to suggest that a similar intuition was applied by Feynman in his path integrals
interpretation of quantum mechanics. Second, I will briefly consider how the overall
process intuition can relate to the philosophical debate about holism.

2.4.1

Analogy Between Overall Process and Lagrangian Schema

I have anticipated earlier that the philosophical underpinning of the absorber theory of radiation —what I have called overall process view— is twofold. First, the
presence of the absorber is essential if we are accounting for phenomena of radiation.
As presented by (Pegg 1975, p. 173): “The presence of the absorber is essential for
the calculation to work. For example, it will not work in an empty universe surrounding the electric charge.” It is then fundamental that some interaction occurs
between absorbers and emitter. Such an interaction is represented (at the level of
electrodynamics) by the mutual interference of retarded and advanced radiation in
the way explained in the previous sections. This brings us to the second aspect of the
philosophical underpinning: the time-symmetry of both absorbers and emitters. As
it was made clear in the rehearsal of Wheeler and Feynman derivations, the emitter
is centered on a radiation that is half advanced and half retarded and the response
of the absorber is likewise half advanced and half retarded. Having to consider both
the past and the future of both absorbers and emitters is what constitutes the second aspect of the philosophical underpinning. To clarify these aspects further, let’s
consider an analogy with the Lagrangian schema as opposed to the Newtonian one,
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proposed in (Wharton 2015).
In his recent work, (Wharton 2015) ascribes Newtonian mechanics to a general
scheme (Newtonian schema) of computing solutions to dynamics equations. According to such a schema, the universe is taken to be a computational mechanism which
inputs a given initial state and outputs another state (of a given system). A similar
concept was expressed in (Smolin 2009, p. 23):
The separation of scientific explanation into laws and initial conditions leads to one of the most universal and powerful notions in physics
—the notion of configuration space. This is the space of all possible configurations, or states, of the system. In classical and quantum physics
we assume that this space exists a priori and outside of time, and that
it can be studied independently of the laws of motion. These laws then
specify the rules for how the point that describes the initial conditions in
configuration space evolves in time. We call this the Newtonian schema
for explanation.
Wharton (2015, pp. 1–2) further clarifies the concept of Newtonian schema as
represented by three steps: “1) map the physical world onto a mathematical state, 2)
mathematically evolve that state into a new state, 3) map the new mathematical state
onto the physical world”. The main feature I wish to emphasize here is the step-bystep character of the schema. In classical physics, we would take the initial velocity
and position of a particle, we would apply a force on that particle and by means of
Newton’s law we can construct the trajectory the particle traverses instant-by-instant
(or as I have called it: step-by-step). As addressed in Feynman (2017, pp. 51–52):
“Newton’s law tells us what happens at one time in terms of what happens at another
instant. It gives from instant to instant how to work it out, but in space leaps from
place to place.”
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However, the development of quantum mechanics, argues Wharton, poses a new
set of challenges to the Newtonian schema. Heisemberg’s uncertainty principle, the
probabilistic nature of the theory, the measurement problem (and so on), they all
make the use of Newton’s laws ‘inadequate’. Therefore, another schema is suggested,
one that differs “in the philosophy and qualitative ideas involved” (Feynman 2017,
p. 52). Instead of taking the initial values of (say) position and velocity and construct
the classical trajectory step-by-step, we can take the initial and final position and
study how the average of the difference between kinetic and potential energy varies.
We call the latter quantity Lagrangian and its integral action (S). The classical
trajectory, constructed by means of Newton’s law, is the one for which the action is
an extremum, i.e.: δS/δx(t) = 0.9 We thus have a different way of solving physical
problems, one that is called by (Wharton 2015): Lagrangian schema.
The main (philosophical) difference with respect to the Newtonian schema is the
‘all-at-once’ way of looking at the evolution of the given system. For the quantity
action is assigned to the overall trajectory, that is from its initial to final point, it
means that the future path of the particle ‘influences’ the path already traversed (and
vice-versa). In other words: the difference between past and future ‘fades away’:
“[a]nd because of the time-symmetric way in which the constraints are imposed,
there’s no longer any mathematical difference between the past and the future; both
constraints directly map to the real world, without further manipulation” (Wharton
2015, p. 6).10
What is the connection, one might ask, with the absorber theory of radiation? The
‘all-at-once’ analysis of a phenomenon represented by the Lagrangian schema shows
9

The one stated above is known as the principle of least action. See, for example: (Feynman
1948c).
10
A (almost) straightforward way of applying this new schema to quantum mechanics is by
means of Feynman’s path integrals (Feynman and Brown 2005) where: the probability amplitude
of a particle going from an initial to a final point is calculated by summing over all the possible
trajectories within the boundary conditions and where to each trajectory a classical Lagrangian is
assigned. More on this: (Feynman 1966), (Kent 2013) and (Wharton 2016).
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some similarities with the type of intuition at play in the absorber theory of radiation.
Roughly speaking, if we were to apply the Newtonian schema to radiative phenomena,
we would consider the source as emitting a radiation and then the absorber (if any)
would radiate it back. In this picture, the radiative damping would have to come
from either self-interaction —which is what Wheeler and Feynman tried to avoid—
or if it was caused by the response of the absorber, it would occur at a time later than
the original acceleration of the source. From the Lagrangian schema perspective, on
the other hand, the phenomenon of radiation would be considered ‘all-at-once’, that
is: we would set some boundary conditions and study the phenomenon in such a
way that the response of the absorber has some influence on the initial emission of
radiation by the source. The similarity is that the radiative damping in the absorber
theory of radiation comes from the advanced response of the absorber. Thus, the
influence of the future on the past —grounded on the time-symmetry of both emitter
and absorbers— as well as the relational character of radiation —in terms of the
interference between the radiation emitted by the source and absorbers— yield an
analogous fading of the distinction between past and future pointed out by Wharton.11
The purpose of presenting the derivations of the theory in the previous sections,
and of the analogy presented above, was to emphasize the character of the theory
both in terms of the time-symmetry of both absorbers and emitters and in terms of
their respective interactions. The use of advanced fields to account for the radiative
damping conflicts with the picture of nature represented by the Newtonian schema
—for which the future does not influence the past. The following quote further
11

There is tension between the terms ‘all-at-once‘ and ‘overall process’ in that a theory that is
time symmetric and posits future boundary conditions can endorse a static ontology. In this latter
case, usually known as block worldview, it becomes problematic to justify any dynamical process.
More on this in (for example): (Kastner 2017). The analogy with the Lagrangian schema clarifies
that the dynamism implied by the ‘process’ language is only ostensible and it does not necessarily
refer to an ‘unfolding dynamical process’. Nonetheless, whether the absorber theory endorses a block
worldview of the universe and how to reconcile it with the asymmetry of radiation goes beyond the
scope of the present chapter.
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highlights the point: (Wheeler and Feynman 1945, p. 181):
Pre-acceleration and the force of radiative reaction which calls it forth
are both departures from that view of nature for which one once hoped, in
which the movement of a particle at a given instant would be completely
determined by the motions of all other particles at earlier moments. [. . . ]
past and future of all particles are tied together by a maze of interconnections. The happenings in neither division of time can be considered to be
independent of those in the other.
The view of nature mentioned in the first part of the quote has the same features
as the Newtonian schema addressed by (Wharton 2015). The second part of the
quote, instead, strongly emphasizes the relational nature of the new theory as well
as the need to consider both future and past interactions among the particles. This
was made evident, for instance, in the first derivation when the radiative reaction
was calculated by using the advanced reaction of the absorbers. A similar intuition
is what characterizes the Lagrangian schema: to analyze the evolution of a system
by calculating the average of the difference between the kinetic and potential energy
of the whole (overall) classical trajectory.
Is it possible to further characterize the similarity between the Lagrangian schema
and the overall process view of the absorber theory? Although it is not the main purpose of the present chapter, I wish to give a suggestion toward a possible answer.
This, I believe, comes from the type of boundary conditions at play in the two views.
To be noted that there seems to be not much agreement on the role that boundary
conditions play in science. For example, (Paksi 2014) argues that they are arbitrary
conventions and instrumental tools that help finding some physical laws. Wilson
(1990, p. 566), on the other hand, argues that they represent claims about “how
a certain portion of the universe interacts with its surrounding along their natural
boundaries”, and thus they are not fully ‘freely-choosable’. Lindsay (1929) focuses on
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the role of boundary conditions in physics and divides them into two classes: initial
and general. The former corresponds to the initial conditions of the system in terms
of, for example, specific positions in space and time or past history of the system. An
example would be the solution to Newton’s second law for which to calculate the dynamics of a moving particle the initial position and momentum are needed. General
boundary conditions, on the other hand, correspond to “fundamental restrictions
on the type of behavior of a physical system, expressible by a mathematical relation among a set of physical quantities characteristic of this system” (Lindsay 1929,
p. 466). An example of the latter type would be to set the behavior of a moving
fluid colliding with a surface (continuity condition). Another example would consist
of setting the condition that within a boundary S no radiation is propagated outside
of S into the future (complete absorber condition). Independently of the philosophical account we prefer, with respect to the role of boundary conditions in science
—nonetheless granted that they play an important role— we can draw a similarity
between the ones used by the Lagarangian schema and the absorber theory.
I have mentioned that to study the dynamics of a system by means of Newton’s
second law, one needs two constants, i.e., the initial position and momentum of the
system at a given time. To ‘choose’ these quantities allows us to calculate the position
of the system at a subsequent time (this corresponds to the ‘step-by-step’ dynamics
mentioned above). To solve problems with the Lagrangian schema, on the other hand,
we need to set the initial state of the system (position and momentum at initial time)
as well as the final state. With the Lagrangian schema we calculate the classical
trajectory of a particle by finding the path that minimizes the quantity action. As
summarized in (Wharton 2015, p. 4):
To summarize the Lagrangian Schema, one sets up a (reversible) twoway map between physical events and mathematical parameters, partially
constrains those parameters on some spacetime boundary at both the be32

ginning and the end, and then uses a global rule to find the values of
the unconstrained parameters. These calculated parameters can then be
mapped back to physical reality.
In this case, the parameters are the values of the action and the global rule is the
stationary value that the action takes within the boundaries. By means of the global
rule, it is then possible to calculate the evolution of the function (say) q(t) which can
be mapped back to the physical trajectory of the classical particle. The important
aspect is that the Lagrangian schema sets the boundaries on both the initial position
and time of the said particle and also on its future. Similarly, the absorber theory
sets a boundary condition with respect to the future radiation outside of the boundary. This was made evident in derivation IV when we have assumed the complete
absorption of future radiation. With respect to the overall process view, the complete absorption amounts to a requirement similar to the second clause of the overall
process view.12
The Lagrangian schema and the overall process view of the absorber theory of
radiation both use some ‘future-type’ boundary conditions which are imposed on the
system. This is also what makes them different from the Newtonian schema —for
which it is enough to set the initial conditions of momentum and position at a given
time. It would be interesting to see if this suggestion can be made more precise by,
for example, looking at the mathematical form of the differential equations involved.
This seems a promising direction for a broader account of the overall process view,
one that includes electromagnetism in general, thermodynamics, diffusion phenomena
and so on.13 However, I will leave these considerations to later works.
Before I move to the next section, two (intertwined) points seem to be relevant:
12

To be more precise, the absorber condition is a stronger requirement than the presence of
interaction between absorbers and emitters. More on this in Section 5.
13

I will say more on the boundary conditions of the absorber theory in the appendix.
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First, that the philosophical underpinning of the absorber theory of radiation and
the Lagrangian schema introduced by Wharton, although similar, are not identical.
Second, that the philosophical debate on Lagrangian mechanics is not limited to
(Wharton 2015). With respect to the latter point, both variational principles, the
principle of least action and the path integral formulation of quantum mechanics, have
been frequently discussed by scientists and philosophers, among others: (Terekhovich
2018), (Lanczos 2012), (Yourgrau and Mandelstam 1979). Also motivated by the
historical contiguity, I will thus consider Feynman’s path integrals and suggest that
an intuition similar to the one of the absorber theory was applied to path integrals
as well.
With respect to the first point: although similar, the overall process view considered in the absorber theory of radiation is not the same as the Lagrangian schema.
The similarity rests on the idea of looking at physical phenomena from a ‘bird-eye’
point of view or from the use of a ‘future-type’ boundary condition. However, the
theory of radiation proposed by Wheeler and Feynman does not use the classical
Lagrangian. Historically, the classical Lagrangian was employed by Feynman in his
subsequent work on path integrals. As I will briefly reconstruct below, the philosophical intuition is a similar one and, I suggest, it is what guided Feynman in building
his interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Nonetheless, although the quantization of the absorber theory of radiation does
not directly lead to path integrals, others tried to extend it to quantum mechanics.
While in the next section I will focus on path integrals —because of its continuity
with the absorber theory— I will say more on other extensions to quantum mechanics
in the appendix dedicated to the asymmetry problem.
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2.4.2

Form Absorber Theory to Later Works

After reformulating classical electrodynamics with his absorber theory, Feynman
moved to quantum mechanics —or to be precise, he attempted to quantize the absorber theory so as to derive quantum mechanics. From (Feynman 1966, p. 5):
We also found that we could reformulate this thing [the absorber theory] in another way, and that is by a principle of least action. Since
my original plan was to describe everything directly in terms of particle
motions, it was my desire to represent this new theory without saying
anything about fields. It turned out that we found a form for an action
directly involving the motions of the charges only, which upon variation
would give the equations of motions of these charges.
The principle of least action mentioned by Feynman is one which describes paths
of particles through space-time.14 The description of these paths by means of such
an action was opposed to what the physicist calls the ‘customary view’:
In the customary view, things are discussed as a function of time in
very great detail. For example, you have the field at this moment, a
differential equation gives you the field at the next moment and so on; a
method, which I shall call the Hamiltonian method, the time differential
method (Feynman 1966, p. 7).
The customary view mirrors (for field theory) the Newtonian schema we considered
above: the ‘discussion’ of a function in great detail mirrors the ‘step-by-step’ perspective that was emphasized by (Wharton 2015).
In general, the work on the absorber theory left the physicist with different possible formulations of classical electrodynamics and with “the overall space-time point
14

The principle is Fokker’s action principle, see: (Wheeler and Feynman 1945).
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of view” (Feynman 1966, p. 8).15 Nonetheless, quantum mechanics in those days
was formulated in terms of Hamiltonian operators, thus in terms of a ‘step-by-step’
dynamics of quantized fields.16 As recalled by (Wüthrich 2010, p. 52):
The standard procedure for quantizing a classical theory was to interpret the classical Hamiltonian function as an operator in a Hilbert space
of state vectors. This operator would then determine the time evolution
of the quantized system described by a certain state vector. The problem
with quantizing the Wheeler-Feynman theory of electrodynamics was that
it could not be formulated by specifying a Hamiltonian function. Therefore, a method was needed to quantize physical systems, the classical
description of which could not be given by a Hamiltonian function.
The use of Fokker’s action principle allowed Feynman to have a theory that:
(i) explained the radiative reaction, (ii) used a combination of both advanced and
retarded interactions and (iii) was also relativistically invariant. As reconstructed by
(Blum 2017, p. 21), a classical theory can be expressed in terms of least action where
the action is the integral over the Lagrangian. From the Lagrangian, one can build an
Hamiltonian and therefrom apply canonical quantization. Fokker’s action, though, is
different in that:
[T]he integrations are carried out from −∞ to ∞, instead of from an
initial time t0 to a final time t1 . . . For an action formulated in terms of a
Lagrangian, the time integration range can be taken infinitesimally small.
15

It is worth mentioning that, in Feynman’s reconstruction, the latter quote came after he was
given the idea (by Wheeler) that positrons could be electrons traveling backward in time.
16

To be precise: the absorber theory is a direct-action theory and thus fields are no longer
‘ontologically independent’. As emphasized in (Kastner 2015): “[...] in a direct action theory (DAT)
the field interactions are not mediated by quantized fields considered as independent degrees of
freedom, but instead by a direct, ‘nonlocal’ interaction between sources of the field.” Therefore, the
theory does not need a quantization in the usual sense, which makes the use of the Hamiltonian
unsuitable for the expansion of the theory to quantum mechanics.
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The action is then minimized in each infinitesimal step and thus contact
is made with the Hamiltonian formulation of differential time evolution
of instantaneous states. This is not possible for the Fokker action: Since
the interaction is retarded (and advanced), one always needs to take take
into account the entire trajectories.
The solution, as reconstructed in (Feynman 1966) and (Schweber 1986), came
from Herbert Jehle, who told Feynman about a paper by Dirac (1933) in which the
connection between quantum mechanics and Lagrangian was made explicit. Starting
from the work of Dirac, Feynman completed his PhD thesis giving birth to the path
integrals formulation of (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics. He was able to reconstruct the probability amplitude in terms of an infinite series of integrals, in which
each path is weighted by a phase factor: exp(iS/~) and where S is the action of the
given path.17
It remains that Feynman did not quantize the absorber theory: he had obtained
a reformulation of classical electrodynamics and a new formulation of non relativistic
quantum mechanics. I have argued that the former had a philosophical underpinning
in what I have defined as the overall process view and the latter seems to have retained
an at least similar view —as emphasized by the use of the Lagrangian.
I leave the task to provide a more precise definition of ‘overall process’ in the
context of path integrals to subsequent works. Nonetheless, I have already mentioned in the introduction that (Blum 2017) has (among other things) reconstructed
the attempt by Feynman to merge the absorber theory with path integrals and the
developments of the use of path integrals in quantum electrodynamics. What distinguishes his perspective from the works of (Schweber 1986) and (Wüthrich 2010) is the
focus on the ‘paradigm shift’ which characterized the transition from early quantum
17

A more thorough and accurate historical reconstruction can be found, for instance, in (Schweber
1986) and (Wüthrich 2010).
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field theory (based on quantum states) to that of Feynman and Dyson (based on
scattering). This strengthens the idea of a common notion of overall process among
Feynman’s works. What is left out is the specification of such notion with respect to
the other theories.
To sum it up: path integrals use the Lagrangian to calculate the probability
amplitude and the use of the Lagrangian entails a view of certain physical phenomena
in terms of the Lagrangian schema proposed by Wharton. Therefore, as long as the
overall process view shows some similarities with the Lagrangian schema —as we have
argued above— it seems legit to suggest that path integrals are based on an intuition
similar to the one that was adopted for the absorber theory.18
The next section will present the reinterpretation of the absorber theory by Price
and some of the replies by ((Ridderbos 1997), (Leeds 1994), (Frisch 2000)). These
authors have shed light on some of the problems of Price’s arguments, mainly with
respect to the physical content of the theory. What I will emphasize is that, not
only the reinterpretation changes the physical content, but also the philosophical
underpinning we have addressed above.

2.5

Reinterpretation and Objections

According to the absorber theory, an oscillating charge in a complete absorbing
medium radiates and hence loses energy. This would not be a problem if it weren’t
for the fact that electrodynamics is symmetrical with respect to time. As a matter of
fact, it can be shown that by reversing time, one can get a fully advanced radiation
contra to experience.19 Wheeler and Feynman —to reconcile the time symmetry of
the theory with the time asymmetry of experience— suggest that the asymmetry
18

The point is even stronger if we consider the chronology of Feynman’s theories. As we have
pointed out: the absorber theory of radiation comes before Feynman’s thesis on path integrals.
19

The full argument is fleshed out in (Wheeler and Feynman 1945) and pointed out also by
(Ridderbos 1997) and (Price 1991)
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of radiation comes from statistical mechanics, (an important role is played by the
refractive index in derivation I) and from the complete absorber conditions (as in
derivation IV). In this way, their theory remains time-symmetric with respect to the
micro-dynamics laws while the (experimental) asymmetry emerges from the statistical
behavior of the system.20
Contra the explanation advanced by Wheeler and Feynman and in general against
the statistical argument, Price (1991) argues that: (i) Wheeler and Feynman’s derivation of the time-asymmetry is fallacious and (ii) that the mathematical core of the
theory needs to be reinterpreted so as to establish that radiation is fully symmetric.
Though the second point does not necessarily conflict with the original theory, Price’s
reformulation leads to a change in the type of symmetry at play in the phenomenon of
radiative reaction. His starting point is that the absorber theory of radiation endorses
two types of symmetries:
1. Emitters (i.e., those entities normally thought of as emitters) are associated
equally with advanced and retarded wavefronts, in either the statistical or the
individual case (Price 1991, p. 963).
2. Emitters and absorbers are both centered on coherent wavefronts, these being
half outgoing and half incoming in both cases (Price 1991, p. 962).
Then, Price argues, two main problems arise. The first one is concerned with the
possibility of distinguishing the different constructive interfering components from
either the source or the absorber. The second one is related to the ‘reversibility
argument’ —the fact that by reversing time (due to the time-symmetry of Maxwell’s
equations) one can obtain a fully advanced field rather than a retarded radiation.
20

Bauer et al. (2014) formulate another explanation for the macroscopic time asymmetry which
is based on the statistical argument but not on the complete absorber condition.
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In what follows, I will consider the first problem, for it is the more relevant with
respect to the absorber theory of radiation and to the overall process view. Because
the second problem is only tangential to the overall process view, I will briefly address
it in a separate appendix.

2.5.1

The Distinguishability Argument

Price maintains that it is not possible to distinguish the different components of
radiation and thus they can be conceived of as one and the same. The argument goes
as such: the component waves (retarded and advanced) are indistinguishable and thus
can be conceived of as one and the same. This leads to a new type of symmetry for
which the absorbers emit advanced radiation and the source emits retarded radiation
only. In this section I will both present Price’s argument and then raise two main
objections. First, the advanced and retarded components are not one and the same
in the absorber theory —as it was made evident in the derivations. Second, the
modified symmetry does not leave room to account for the radiative damping (which
was Wheeler and Feynman’s original purpose).

Change of Symmetry

Price (1991, p. 368) asks: “Do Wheeler and Feynman have any justification for the
claim that these component waves are actually distinct?” Possibly, argues Price,
the justification comes from the fact that the waves originate from different sources.
However, he continues, such a justification would lead to further troubles. For if we
start with half retarded radiation from the source, the retarded component of the
advanced response of the absorber —which is also half advanced and half retarded—
will ultimately be only one fourth of the original retarded wave. This means that
the retarded wave of the the source will ultimately be 1/2 + 1/4, therefore leaving
a 25% off. Price continues by arguing that the issue is not problematic: “as long
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as we are prepared to allow that waves needn’t have a unique source —i.e., to allow
that it is simply a matter of our temporal perspective whether we say that the given
wave originates at i [the source] or originates at the absorber particles” (Price 1991,
p. 968). Therefore, he suggests to give up on the uniqueness of the source so as to
avoid the distinction between the components, to the consequence that there are no
different components anymore —i.e., they are one and the same wave. However, by
interpreting the two waves as the same, Price also determines a modification of the
type of symmetry that was originally employed by Wheeler and Feynman. Such a
modification is well represented by (Frisch 2000, p. 391) in the following:
a
Fret
=

X

k
Fadv

(2.24)

k6=a

Equation (2.24) implies a different symmetry, one for which all emitters produce
retarded rather than advanced radiation. As further emphasized in: (Price 1997,
p. 74)
[The] basis of the proposed reinterpretation of the Wheeler-Feynman
argument is the recognition that radiative symmetry does not require
radiative emitters be individually symmetric in time. [...] Symmetry
would also be secured if the class of emitters of retarded radiation turned
out to be “mirrored” by a class of advanced radiation. As reinterpreted,
the Wheeler-Feynman argument shows that this latter kind of symmetry
is mathematically consistent.
Thus, at the micro-level, both absorbers and emitters are centered on coherent
waves, these being ingoing in the first case and outgoing in the second. This, argues
Price, permits an explanation of the (radiative) asymmetry based on the non-existence
of large absorbers and the existence of only large emitters —rather than on statistical
basis as argued by Wheeler and Feynman. He concludes:
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On this view the radiative asymmetry in the real world simply involves a [cosmological] imbalance between sources and sinks: large coherent sources of radiation are common, but large coherent sinks are unknown
(Price 1991, p. 970).
In what follows, we present the first objection to Price’s argument and we show that
the converging and diverging components are not one and the same.

They are not One-and-the-Same

An objection to Price’s statement —for which the wavefronts converging on the absorber are equal to those diverging from the source— was already pointed out by
Ridderbos (1997). There, he argues that in the absorber theory the wavefronts are
constituted by a superposition of plane waves, each of which having its own source
in one of the particles of the absorber. The diverging wavefronts, on the other hand,
have their source in the originally accelerated charge:
In other words, although this superposition of plane waves appears as
a spherical wavefront imploding on i and then exploding outward again,
each of the nearly plane waves has a definite source, viz. the absorber
particle j onto which it converges. The primary field on the other hand
of course has the particle i as its source (Ridderbos 1997, p. 480).
Although it might be impossible to distinguish the source of each converging plane
wave, it does not follow that the converging and the diverging waves are indistinguishable. If the radiations were one and the same, then there would be no explanation for
the difference between (2.10) and (2.12). If the advanced and retarded radiations are
one and the same, then it is not clear how they can be different in different regions
of space. As promptly emphasized in (Frisch 2000, p. 395):

42

But one way in which one might show that Wheeler and Feynman’s
original interpretation is correct while that of Price is mistaken is by
showing that the two representations agree only within a limited region
of spacetime. If the two representations do not agree everywhere (which
in fact they do not), then they cannot be representations of the one and
the same field.
If the advanced and retarded radiations are not one and the same, then there is
no ground for the new type of symmetry introduced by Price. Nonetheless, one could
grant that the new symmetry is needed because it provides a better explanation of
the radiative damping and total radiation. In what follows, we will see that to accept
Price’s new symmetry yields some problems with respect to the radiative damping
and the overall process view.

Radiative Damping and the Complete-Incomplete Absorption

An important problem in accepting Price’s reformulation is pointed out by (Frisch
2000) who argues that if we accept equation (2.24), either we admit some form of
self-interaction —which was the original problem that Wheeler and Feynman tried
to solve— or there seem to be no space for the radiative damping. As a matter
of fact, if the retarded radiation comes completely from the source, it also means
that the radiative damping comes from the self interaction of the source with its
own field. Alternatively, we can interpret the total radiation of the source (proper
retarded radiation and radiative damping) as a sum of converging waves onto the
absorber (corresponding to the advanced field of the absorbers). But then it would
not be clear how the absorbers started radiating in the first place, while in Wheeler
and Feynman’s theory this is explained in terms of the response of the absorbers to
the proper field of the initial source. Furthermore, even granted that the advanced
fields were already accelerated, it would not be possible to distinguish between the
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proper retarded field of the source and its radiative damping, for the sum in equation
(2.24) makes no distinctions between terms. We could then apply Price’s argument
and maintain that the two terms in equation (2.8) are the same, which is evidently
not the case.
The relevant aspect of having a time-symmetry such that the source and the absorbers emit a half-advanced and half-retarded radiation is that the radiative damping
comes from the response of the absorbers and adds-up to the initial retarded radiation
of the source —as it was expressed in (2.16). In the original theory then, the total radiation stemmed from the mutual interaction of the half-advanced and half-retarded
fields. Therefore, one needs the interaction of these two fields to account for the radiative damping (and the total radiation). By changing the relevant time-symmetry,
Price modifies this mechanism and thus undermines the main thrust of the absorber
theory. However, this does not imply that the new theory departs from the initial
philosophical underpinning of the original formulation.
It could be that Price retains the overall process view (or some form of it), to
build a different interpretation of classical electrodynamics. Consider (Price 1997,
p. 74):
[T]he crucial difference is that the usual retarded wave is no longer
taken to need two (finite) sources, one in the past and one in the future;
the claim is simply that insofar as such a wave does have two such sources,
their contributions are entirely consistent. [...] In its new form the argument shows that an electromagnetic radiation field may be taken to be
determined either by the past source or by its future sinks (absorbers);
the two representations give equivalent results.
The relevant point is that the presence of the absorbers (one of the two finite sources)
is not needed —against the second clause of the overall process view which states that
the relation between absorbers and emitter is necessary in accounting for radiative
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phenomena. If they are present though, then it is legit to assume they play a role in
determining the total radiation. We can then distinguish two cases: one in which the
presence of the absorbers determines a complete absorption and one in which either
the absorbers are absent or they are not enough to guarantee the complete absorption
of the radiation.
Let’s start with the case of complete absorption. This means that there are
enough future absorbers such that there is no infinite propagation of the retarded
field emitted by the source. If this is the case, then we have a similar situation to
the one of the absorber theory of radiation. This suggests the theories by Price and
Wheeler-Feynman might have a similar philosophical foundation. One way to see this
is to question whether Price’s theory still retains the analogy with the Lagrangian
schema, despite its different time symmetry.
As we have seen in section 4, the Lagrangian schema rests on setting the parameters for both the initial and final space-time positions. The ‘influence’ of the future
boundary on the initial (boundary) condition is what characterizes the ‘all-at-once’
approach. A system —for example a classical particle moving along a trajectory—
is constrained by the initial and final positions in such a way that the trajectory is
determined by both the boundaries and the variational principles. If we then take
Price’s reinterpretation for the case of complete absorption, it does seem that the
analogy with the Lagrangian schema partially holds. As a matter of fact, Price’s formulation depends on the presence of the future absorber to determine the radiation
emitted by the source, similarly to the Lagrangian schema which depends on the final
point of a particle to determine its trajectory.
In this sense, Price (1997, p. 71) does not depart from the overall process view
of the absorber theory, for he also takes into account the past and the future of the
radiative system: “In other words, I think the real lesson of the Wheeler and Feynman
argument is that the same radiation field may be described equivalently either as a
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coherent wave front diverging from i [the source], or as the sum of coherent wave
fronts converging on the absorber particles”.21
With respect to the second clause of the overall process view —that being the
necessity of the interaction between absorbers and source— there seem to be no
problems with Price’s theory. Because we are under the assumption of complete
absorption, the absorbers (and their relation with the emitter) are necessary to guarantee that no radiation is propagated infinitely into the future.
Thus far, the main differences between the absorber theory and Price’s theory
under the condition of complete absorption are: the complete absorption condition
being a consequence of the cosmological (im)balance between absorbers and emitters,
and the presence of interference between advanced and retarded radiation —caused
by the different types of time symmetries.22
What about the case of incomplete absorption? In this case the difference with
the absorber theory and the overall process view becomes more relevant. Not only
the problem of the radiative damping remains, but also the second clause about the
necessity of the absorbers turns false in Price’s view. As a matter of fact, if the
source can emit a radiation that is not completely absorbed, the response of the
absorber will not be enough to interfere with the advanced radiation and to provide
for the radiative damping (i.e., the response of the absorber would not correspond to
equation (2.7)). Even further, if the absorbers are not present at all, then the role
of the absorbers becomes unnecessary, contra the second clause of the overall process
view. Furthermore, the latter case also breaks the analogy with the Lagrangian
schema: since the future boundary concurs in determining the trajectory, once we
21

One can also read Price more ‘literally’ and emphasize that his use of past and future (diverging
and converging wavefronts) is only a matter of description and not a full commitment to the necessity
of using both future and past radiations of absorbers and emitters to account for the total radiation.
22
These differences plays an important role in the explanation of the time asymmetry at macroscopic level, for example as illustrated in (Price 2006). There, Price argues that the experimental
time asymmetry of classical radiation comes from the cosmological imbalance between large emitters
and small absorbers, rather than being a boundary condition that applies to the system.

46

remove the boundary the ‘all-at-onceness’ disappears. In Price’s theory this happens
as the radiation can propagate infinitely into the future.
One can reply that (Bauer et al. 2014) developed an account that does not require
the complete absorption condition and that perhaps the presence of an absorber is
not needed. However, while it is true that one can justify the radiative reaction
even in the case of incomplete absorption, this does not mean that the absorbers
are not needed. As a matter of fact, in (Bauer et al. 2014) the radiative damping
comes from the advanced response of the absorbers to the retarded radiation of the
source. Furthermore, the account rests on the low-entropy of the early universe and
on a statistical argument —the latter being the point that Price criticized in Wheeler
and Feynman’s original theory. Given that the second clause of the overall process
view does not imply complete absorption and that Bauer’s account dispenses such
a requirement while preserving the importance of the absorbers-emitter interaction,
it follows that Bauer’s theory can also be characterized by the second clause of the
overall process view. With respect to the first clause, this is also respected because
of the explicit use of advanced and retarded radiation of both source and absorbers.
To sum up: we have seen that Price’s reinterpretation changes the absorber theory
in two respects: (i) it does not account for the radiative damping —unless one resorts
to the self-interaction— and (ii) it only partly fits with the original philosophical
underpinning. With respect to the latter point, in this last section we have finegrained Price’s view and distinguished between complete and partial absorption. On
the one hand, in the case of complete absorption, Price’s reinterpretation fits with
the second clause of the overall process view (despite it still does not account for the
radiative damping). On the other hand, in the case of incomplete absorption, we
have shown that Price’s view and the second clause diverge.
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2.6

Holism

Thus far I have suggested that (part of) the intuition behind the absorber theory
was not to consider absorbers and emitters separately, but rather as partaking to a
whole process that involves advanced and retarded radiation. It is thus evident that
something needs to be said about (non)separability and eventually holism. For we
are considering overall processes, one might question whether the system absorbersemitter can be reduced to its parts. In other words, it seems legit to ask whether
the system involved in the overall process is a holistic one, i.e: whether the whole
has properties that are not reducible to the properties of the parts. Though, the
question whether the absorber theory can be interpreted in terms of holism begs
another question first: one concerned with the type of holism under consideration.
One of the most relevant works on holism (within the context of quantum mechanics) can be found in (Healey 2016) where holism is divided into three different
types: (i) metaphysical holism, (ii) relational holism and (iii) methodological holism.
Although the work by Healey is mainly focused on quantum mechanics and nonseparability, we will investigate whether any of these categories apply to the absorber
theory of radiation.
With respect to (i), (Healey 2016) distinguishes three different types: ontological,
property and nomological, though the common idea remains that: “the nature of
some wholes is not determined by that of their parts” (Healey 2016, p. 3). If we
consider the whole to be the overall system (S) of absorbers and emitter, then the
parts would be the single absorbers as well as the single source. To argue that the
nature of the system is not determined by that of its parts (in this case) is a tall order.
I have just argued, against Price, that emitter and absorbers are different and that
they are both necessary in the absorber theory. To account for the radiative reaction,
Wheeler and Feynman did not use any property of the system S that was not derived
by the properties of either the absorbers or the source. Therefore, it seems amiss to
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address the system S in terms of metaphysical holism.
The second type of holism, relational holism (or property holism) is mainly advocated by (Teller 1986) and the central idea is that the properties of the whole
are not strongly determined by the properties of the parts. To make the statement
non trivial, Teller (1989) specifies that relational holism is concerned only with some
properties, thus raising the question as to what properties one ought to consider. A
good starting point is to distinguish between relational and non-relational properties: the former depend on the existence or state of other entities, and the latter are
independent from the existence or state of other entities. For the present case, let’s
consider as the relational property of the system absorbers-emitter the total retarded
radiation, and as the non-relational properties of the parts the radiations emitted by
the absorbers and emitter respectively. If we then consider equation (2.22) we can
conclude that the total retarded radiation is indeed fully determined by the radiation
of the component parts of system S. It seems that property holism does not hold
for the case at hand. However, as Wheeler and Feynman argued, the retarded radiation of the source comes from the advanced radiation of the absorbers. It follows
that although they can be distinguished, it might be the case that they cannot be
separated, where we take as a separability principle the thesis that:
Separability Principle: The states of any spatio-temporally separated
subsystems S1 , S2 . . . , Sn of a compound system S are individually well
defined and the states of the compound system are wholly and completely
determined by them and their physical interactions including their spatiotemporal relations (Karakostas 2004, pp. 2–3)
By including the spatio-temporal relations between the parts, we can then conclude that the system absorbers-emitter is indeed a separable one. For the radiative
reaction is caused by the advance response of the absorbers, one ought to consider
the relation between the two and yet without violating the separability principle.
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The third type of holism individuated by (Healey 2016, p. 2) is named methodological holism, for which: “The best way to study the behavior of a complex system
is to treat it as a whole and not merely to analyze the structure and behavior of its
component parts”. Methodological holism is a much weaker thesis than (i) and (ii)
as it does not say anything with respect to the nature of the system under consideration. If we again consider the case of the absorber theory which accounts for the
phenomenon of radiation, one ought to consider both the diverging field of the source
and the fields converging on the absorber particles (as expressed in (2.16)). There is
therefore a sense in which one methodologically considers the whole system S, but
that is because the total retarded radiation ultimately stems from the relation between absorbers and source (as well as from the time-symmetry). Therefore, for there
are no instances of non-separability in the absorber theory, methodological holism is
what might approximate the idea of overall processes we have addressed here.23
However, if methodological holism is cast in terms of having to consider the spatiotemporal relations of the parts to account for the whole, then we might simply call it
relationism —namely the intuition for which both the interaction between absorbers
and emitter, as well as the temporal relations between advanced and retarded radiations, are fundamental to account for the phenomenon of radiation (and radiative
damping).24 As a matter of fact, relations are necessary for the overall process view
and the point was made evident in the previous quote by (Wheeler and Feynman
1945, p. 181): “Those phenomena [. . . ] require us to recognize the complete interdependence of past and future in nature”. The term ‘interdependence’ does not
entail non-separability here, but rather the necessity of looking at both advanced and
23

A slightly different view would be to consider the intuition of the absorber theory as an ‘earlystage’ form of holism, which will develop into a more robust form in Feynman’s later works.
24

The term ‘relationism’ is a loaded one in philosophy and philosophy of science. For the present
purposes, I will not refer to the debate about space-time substantivalism and/or relationsim (Huggett
and Hoefer 2018), or to relationist interpretations of quantum mechanics (Laudisa and Rovelli 2013).
By ‘relationism’ I focus on the relational character of the absorber theory that was advanced here.
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retarded radiations of both source and absorbers.

2.7

Conclusions

The main point of this chapter was to emphasize the philosophical underpinning
of Wheeler and Feynman’s original work. I have been suggesting that: Wheeler and
Feynman had an intuition with respect to electrodynamics phenomena. This intuition
led them to build the absorber theory of radiation. I have specified the intuition and
I have called it: the overall process view. By rehearsing the derivations of the theory,
I have shown how the concept of overall process is at play in the theory and the
possible connections with Feynman’s path integrals and with the Lagrangian schema.
I presented Price’s modified version of the absorber theory, where he suggested a
different time-symmetry which led to the possibility of expressing the total retarded
field of a source in terms of a sum of the advanced radiation emitted by the absorbers.
However, I have shown how this reinterpretation bears some problems, physical and
philosophical. The problems with the physics are mainly related to the difficulty of
justifying the radiative reaction —which was Wheeler and Feynman’s initial concern.
I have also questioned whether the new theory maintains the philosophical underpinning of the absorber theory. It turned out that if we dismiss the problem of radiative
damping, Price’s reinterpretation seems to endorse an underpinning similar to the
overall process view, although such similarity applies only to the case of complete
absorption. In such a scenario, Price’s theory advocates for the mutual interaction
of past and future, preserving the ’all-at-once’ narrative that was shared between the
Lagrangian schema and the overall process view.
However, when we consider the case of incomplete absorption, Price’s view changes
the philosophical underpinning. If the absorbers are not present, or they are not
enough to guarantee the complete absorption, the retarded radiation will propagate
infinitely into the future. This weakens the second clause of the overall process
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view which deems the presence of the absorbers and its relation with the source as
constitutive of the radiative phenomena. The weakened importance of the future
boundary condition (the presence of the absorbers) also weakens the analogy with
the Lagrangian schema for which a classical trajectory is calculated through the use
of variational principles within a given boundary.
A different reading of Price might focus on the representational character of the
total field as either a retarded field centered on the source, or as a sum of advanced
fields centered on the absorbers —this would be supported by the ‘one and the same’
argument. To argue that having a sum of advanced fields or only one retarded
radiation is a matter or representation, it undermines the importance of the relation
between absorbers and emitters in the sense emphasized by Wheeler and Feynman.
In the absorber theory, the different fields (half-advanced and half-retarded) interfere
with each other to give rise to the total radiation. If, on the other hand, we deem the
distinction of the fields to be a matter of representation, we are providing a different
narrative about the radiative phenomena. If this is the case, then the influence of
future on the past would be if not dismissed, at least weakened. By leaning toward
this interpretation of Price’s argument, one could probably make a case that even the
case of complete absorption would not fit with the overall process view.

52

Chapter 3
Path Integrals and Holism
3.1

Introduction

This chapter considers the path integral formulation of quantum mechanics (Feynman
1948c) and argues that it suggests a form of holism for which the whole has properties
that are not reducible to the parts. More specifically, we will characterize holism in
contraposition to reductionism and maintain that a system is holistic if it does not
reduce to its parts.
The overall line of argument of the chapter can be summarized as follows: Holism
means that a compound (or its properties) is not reducible to its parts. Consider, for
example, the least action principle: the total ensemble is constituted by the possible
paths and the principle reduces the possibilities to one actual trajectory. With respect
to path path integrals: the total ensemble is not reducible to the single trajectories,
even though weak reductionism is at least possible. However, this only means that
a complex system is composed of its parts, which is not an instance of holism yet.
We will then use an analogy with entangled states to discuss the difference between
physical possibilities and non-physical ones. Finally, we show how path integrals rely
on the sum over some physical possible trajectories and some mathematical artifacts.
In this sense, the ensemble of physically possible trajectories does not reduce to the
individual physically possible paths.
The chapter is structured as follows: section 2 provides a brief overview of Feynman’s path integrals formulation and the reconstruction of the classical limit. Section
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3 considers three different interpretations of path integrals to show that: (i) it is not
possible to reduce the ensemble of trajectories to a single real path, and (ii) some of
the paths in the total ensemble are non differentiable.
Section 4 starts from the conclusions of the previous section and argues that
upon a fine-graining of the definition of trajectory, the total ensemble is weakly nonreducible to the physically possible trajectories and their probability amplitudes. For
a trajectory to be characterized as ‘physically possible’ it means that it has to be
continuous and everywhere differentiable —granted that there are no physical obstacles between the boundaries. The fine-graining of the concept is necessary given that
some of the possible paths are non differentiable. While it is legitimate to incorporate
the physically possible trajectories in the total ensemble as physical possibilities (similarly to the case of the least action principle), the presence of the ill-behaved paths
becomes hard to justify. It is then argued that we can consider them as mathematical
entities and thus conclude that the total ensemble is non-reducible to the physically
possible trajectories and their individual amplitudes. This non-reductionism is only
weak, for the differentiable paths are necessary but not sufficient to calculate the total
amplitude.

3.2

Path integrals

Let’s approach path integrals —which is an equivalent formulation of quantum mechanics—
starting from the well-known double slit experiment, where an amplitude is associated
to the event of a particle going from a source S to a detector D (we call this amplitude
φ). Since in the double slit experiment there are two slits A and B, that constrain
the possible paths of the particle, what is obtained is a sum over the possible paths
that the particle can take, that is, φtot = φA + φB . Now, suppose we fill up the space
between the source and the detector by adding n many screens each of them with n
holes. Then, if we let n go to infinity, the probability becomes a sum over an infinite
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number of terms —representing the possibility for the particle to take every possible
path between the source and the detector.
Let’s derive the path integral for the transition amplitude of a system from initial
time ti to a final time tf . We consider the Schrödinger equation:
i~

∂
|ψi = Ĥ |ψi
∂t

(3.1)

and its solution:
i

|ψ(t)i = e− ~ Ĥ(t−ti ) |ψi i

(3.2)

where Ĥ is the Hamiltonian operator. We can then write the transition amplitude
as:
−i

hψf |e ~ Ĥ(tf −ti ) |ψi i

(3.3)

and we can express it in terms of position eigenstates:
−i

A = hxf |e ~ Ĥ(tf −ti ) |xi i

(3.4)

We can now ‘time-slice’ the transition amplitude, that is we divide a single trajectory
in infinitely many (N ) time-steps where ∆t = (tf − ti )):
−i

A = hxf |e ~ Ĥ∆t |xi i = hxf |e|

−i∆t
Ĥ
N~

e

−i∆t
Ĥ
N~

{z . . . e

−i∆t
Ĥ
N~

N −times

}|xi i

(3.5)

We have obtained the propagator for a single trajectory as shown in Fig.1

Figure 3.1

Time slice of a trajectory

We then insert a resolution of the identity for each term, that is, we use the
completeness relation:
1=

Z

|xi hx| dx

hx|x0 i = δ(x − x0 )
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(3.6)

So that each xk varies independently, generating all the possible trajectories as it
advances through the time-slices.
−i

A = hxf |e ~ Ĥ∆t |xi i = hxf |e
=

−i∆t
Ĥ
~N

N Z
Y

dxk

1e

−i∆t
Ĥ
~N

Y
N

k=1

1 . . . 1e

hxk |e

−i∆t
Ĥ
~N

−i∆t
Ĥ
~N

|xi i

(3.7)

|xk−1 i

k=1

Now, each step is defined as:
−i
Ĥ |xi
Ak = hxk |exp
~ "
(
#!)
−i p̂2
= hxk |exp
+ V̂ (xk−1 )
|xk−1 i
~ 2m




(3.8)

where we have used the equivalence  ≡ ∆t/N , we have considered the simple case:
Ĥ = T̂ + V̂ which are kinetic and potential energy respectively and where T̂ = p̂2 /2m.
We can use the Trotter formula for which: e−it(A+B) = s − limN →∞ (e−itA/N e−itB/N )N
and evaluate the potential and kinetic operators separately. We evaluate the action
of the potential operator and replace it with its own eigenvalues: e−iV̂ (x) |xn i =
|xn i e−iV (xn ) . However, in evaluating the momentum operator, the position state is
not an eigenvector and hence we insert a resolution of the momentum operator given
that:

R

dp/2π~ |pi hp| = 1, to obtain:
Ak =

Z

dp −ip2  +ip(xk −xk−1 ) −i V (xk−1 )
e 2m
e ~
2π~

(3.9)

which is a Gaussian integral of the form (Lancaster and Blundell 2014, p. 214):
R∞
∞

dxe−

ax2
+bx
2

=

q

2

b
2π 2a
e
a

where: a = i/m and b = i(xk − xk−1 ). We thus obtain the

time-slice propagator:


Ak =

im
2π~

1/2 i/~

e

 
m
2

xk −xk−1


2


−V (xk−1 )

(3.10)

We then apply (3.10) to all the various time-sliced terms in (3.7) and if we take
N → ∞ and ∆t → 0 we have the path integral:
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A=
=

Z
Z

i

D[x(t)]e ~

R

mẋ2
−V
2

(x)

(3.11)

D[x(t)]eiS/~

where the term Dx indicates that we are integrating over all the trajectories connecting the initial and final point.1

3.2.1

The Classical Limit

Let’s consider the classical limit ~ → 0, for which the main contributor to the total
amplitude is the path characterized by a stationary phase2 . All the other paths get
canceled out, due to the rapid oscillation of the phases and to the periodicity of the
exponential eix = cos x + i sin x. As Feynman claimed:
These small changes in path will, generally, make enormous changes in
phase, and the cosine or sine will oscillate exceedingly rapidly between
plus and minus values. The total contribution will then add to zero; for if
one path makes a positive contribution, another infinitesimally close (on
a classical scale) makes an equal negative contribution, so that no net
contribution arises (Feynman, Hibbs, and Styer 2010, pg29).
However, in the quantum case, for which the ratio S/~ is smaller, more paths will
contribute to the total amplitude.
To clarify this point, let’s consider a numerical example provided by Townsend
(2000) for both the classical and the quantum case respectively. Consider the action
of a particle moving at constant speed from x = 0, t = 0 to x0 = 1cm, t0 = 1s, with
1

For a more comprehensive mathematical treatment see, among others: (Townsend 2000),
(Grosche and Steiner 1998), (Chaichian and Demichev 2001)
2

To be more precise, in the classical limit ~ → 0, the main constructive interfering paths are
those in the infinitesimal neighborhood (in the order of the quantum of action) of the stationary
paths.
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no forces acting on it and with m = 1g. The path is described by x = (x0 /t0 )t and its
action is given by (Townsend 2000, p. 226):
Scl = S[xcl (t)] =

Z t0
0

m
dt
2

x02
t02

!

=

mx02
2t0

(3.12)

The path associated with the action in (3.12) is the path of least action which
is the only path for classical systems3 . Now, Townsend considers a path describing
uniform acceleration: (x = x0 t2 )/t02 with action S(x0 t2 ) = (2mx02 )/3t0 . The phase
difference between the two paths is given by the difference between the actions of the
paths:
S[x0 t2 ] − S[(x0 /t0 )t]
mx02
∆S
=
= 0
~
~
6t ~

(3.13)

With respect to the least action path, the phase difference is about (1/6)1027 radians.
The phases are clearly non-coherent, which means that a small change in action,
producing a large change in the phase, will ultimately cause the cancellation of the
paths that are not the classical path. Thus, paths whose actions are ‘slightly’ different
from the least-action one, are non coherent (out-of-phase) and hence cancel with each
other; thereby the least action trajectory is the dominant path.
However, in the quantum case, when we consider a particle having mass in the
order of 10−27 g, the difference between actions is only 1/6 radians. Thus, in the
quantum case the two paths are coherent and they both contribute to the total
amplitude. Within the range of periodicity of the exponential, more paths positively
contribute to the total amplitude, yielding the fact that not only the stationary phase
matters, but rather all the possible paths need to be considered. One might argue
that, from the fact that more paths count, it does not follow that all paths count. We
will see this argument in the next sections when we will consider (Wharton 2016), a
form of decoherent history account (Gell-Mann and Hartle 2012) and (Kent 2013).
3

It can be shown by proving that it is the path that minimizes the action.
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3.3

Holism

Let us begin this section by characterizing holism in contraposition to reductionism:
a system is holistic if and only if it is not possible to reduce the whole (or its properties) to its component parts (or to the properties of the component parts). In what
follows we will argue that holism applies to path integrals, and that the total ensemble
(and corresponding probability amplitude) does not reduce to the single trajectories
and their respective amplitudes. In the next section we will argue that the form of
non-reductionism is only weak and that some fine-graining of the notion of trajectory
is needed. With respect to the latter, although path integrals rely on possible trajectories, the ill-behaved ones have no physical interpretation. Consequently, the total
amplitude of the total ensemble is calculated based on the physical possibilities of
the system and some mathematical entities that are necessary and yet not physical.
The possibility of reinterpreting the ill-behaved trajectories as physical possibilities
is also considered, but not fully explored.
To be noted that the characterization of holism at the beginning of this section
remains vague, in particular, it leaves an open flank to two possible interpretations.
We can call them: ‘bottom-up holism’ and ‘top-down holism’. The former says that to
determine a given property of the whole the properties of the parts are not sufficient.
Clearly, the claim is limited to specific properties of the parts and whole, and on the
way we decide to parse the latter. It is trivial that the properties of a whole depend
on all the possible properties of all the possible components. This is why we are
limiting our case to the probability amplitude of an ensemble of trajectories and to
the single probability amplitudes of the single trajectories —and not, for example, to
all the possible properties of each spacetime point within the boundary.4 An example
of this ‘bottom-up’ holism is presented in (Karakostas 2004) where he argues that the
4

The point was also raised in (Healey 1991).
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spin properties of an entangled state (in his case, a singlet state) are not determined
by the spin properties of the separate individual parts.
A ‘top-down’ holism, on the other hand, focuses on how the properties (and
relations) of the parts are characterized by the whole. In this view, it is the whole that
determines some of the properties of the components, which cannot be determined
by the properties of the parts alone. One example of this view is defended in (Esfeld
2004, p. 9) where it is argued that: “there are global observables of the whole that
have a definite numerical value in the state in question [entangled state] and that
can be considered as intrinsic properties of the whole. These properties of the whole
indicate the way in which the parts are related with respect to their state-dependent
properties, for they contain correlations between the probability distributions of the
respective state-dependent properties of the parts, although these state-dependent
properties cannot be attributed to each of the parts”. In this sense, the whole dictates
the relational properties of the parts, even though the parts do not have intrinsic statedependent properties such as momentum or position. Therefrom, the characterization
of what we have called ‘top-down’ holism.
With respect to path integrals, we will show that the whole —that is, the total
ensemble of possible trajectories which expresses the total probability amplitude—
is not completely determined by the single trajectories connecting the initial and
final point and their respective individual probability amplitudes. This amounts to a
bottom-up holism as characterized above.
One might already notice that a potential problem is right around the corner.
Should we interpret the ensemble of possible trajectories as a physical system displaying a form of holism? The answer is no. An ensemble of trajectories is neither a
physical system nor a physical object. Even further: a trajectory is neither a physical system nor a physical object. Nonetheless, nothing prevents us from discussing
whether a trajectory is determined by the collection of all of its spacetime points.
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Similarly, nothing prevents us from discussing whether the probability amplitude obtained from an ensemble of possible trajectories reduces to the individual amplitudes
of the individual trajectories composing the ensemble.
Consider, for example, the least action principle which individuates one of the
possible trajectories of the ensemble as the actual path traversed by an object by
considering the action of all the physically possible alternatives. This means that
the total ensemble of trajectories is constituted by physical possibilities and that
among those possibilities there is one that is actualized. Even though we shall not
characterize trajectories and ensembles as physical systems, we still conclude that the
ensemble of possible paths is determined by the individual trajectories and that the
least action principle individuates the one that is traversed by the classical object.
However, path integrals show an important difference if compared to the least action
principle. To understand such a a difference, we need a distinction between ‘potential
possibility’ and ‘actual reality’ as addressed in (Terekhovich 2019, pp. 3–4):
The variational principles, as well as the path integral formalism use, in
the strict mathematical sense, two fundamental philosophical concepts —
potential possibility and actual reality [...] In a potential mode of existence,
the real system is in all possible alternative motions at once and interacts
with other systems in all possible ways. In the actual mode of existence,
the system is in one of the possible alternative motions.
What we will show is that path integrals not only do not reduce to an actual trajectory,
but they do not reduce to a possible trajectory either. The paths of the total ensemble
in the path integral count as potential possibilities and some of these possibilities are
not physically possible in the traditional sense of classical mechanics.
In what follows, we will consider three different accounts that attempted to reduce
the total quantum ensemble to either a set of possible paths or even to a single real
history. The point is to show that: (i) it is not possible to reduce the total ensemble
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to a single real trajectory, which is what distinguishes (among other things) path
integrals from the principle of least action. This non-reducibility also sets us in the
right direction to holism: if the total ensemble was reducible to a single trajectory,
the possibility of a holistic picture would be in jeopardy. (ii) Some trajectories of
path integrals are ill-behaved and nonetheless ought to be considered as part of the
total ensemble.

3.3.1

Parsing the Ensemble

Wharton (2016) suggests a possible parsing of the total ensemble of possible trajectories. Thereby, he can defend a reductionist approach that leads to a real subset
of non-interfering paths. Wharton’s idea is that: although it is not possible to dismiss all-but-one trajectories that we take as unreal (those, for instance, with negative
probabilities), it is nonetheless possible to group them into real sets by exploiting the
cancellation process.
Because of the impossibility to reduce to the total ensemble to a single trajectory,
we can distinguish between two types of reductionism:
• Strong reductionism: It is possible to reduce the total ensemble of possible
trajectories to a single real path undertaken by a particle.
• Mild reductionism: The total ensemble can be reduced to smaller sets of
possible trajectories.
Wharton leans toward the latter option and in doing so he draws a parallel between path integrals and statistical mechanics. In statistical mechanics, he argues, the
probability is epistemic in nature, for it describes a state of knowledge “underpinned
by one real microstate that exists in ordinary three-dimensional space” (Wharton
2016, p. 3). It follows that, although he admits the impossibility of a strong reductionism for path integrals, such impossibility is pinned on epistemic ground, and thus
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he recasts the probabilistic nature of path in terms of classical ignorance or subjective
probability. To do so, Wharton divides the ensemble into sets of only contributing
trajectories. Let R be the set of the possible trajectories and A and B be two single
trajectories, then Wharton constructs a coupling of the different paths so that the
total sum is non-negative (Wharton 2016, p. 4):
X

P (x0 , x1 ) =

cos

(A,B)⊂R

SA − SB
~

(3.14)

However, Wharton recognizes that the single terms in (3.14) can be negative, and
hence they cannot be interpreted as classical probabilities. He then suggests another
parsing according to which: P (x0 , x1 ) =

P

i

Fi + Gi where Fi > 0 and Gi = 0. In

other words, he divides (3.14) into two different subsets, such that the probability
for the subset Gi is equal to zero, and strictly positive for the subset Fi . The total
probability is found by coupling the trajectories A and B into subsets ai ∈ R and
summing over these subsets (Wharton 2016, p. 5):
P (x0 , x1 ) =

X

X

cos

i (A,B)∈ai

SA − SB
~

(3.15)

Because there are no more negative terms, he obtains a realistic interpretation of
the probability amplitude, but at the expense of “having the fundamental possibility
space consist of many particle trajectory-pairs, not merely one” (Wharton 2016, p. 5).
To avoid the problem, Wharton further restricts the parsing of (3.14) so as to
have different sets ci of single paths without having the same path appearing in more
than one set. Such approach results in the following formula for the calculation of
the probability (Wharton 2016, p. 5):
2

P (x0 , x1 ) =

X X
i

exp(iSA /~)

(3.16)

A∈Ci

The probability, according to (3.16), is given by the probability of each path A belonging to a group of paths ci , summed over all the possible groupings. Each group
of paths ci is a positive term, and hence it does not contain redundant paths. In
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other words: the difference between (3.15) and (3.16) is that the second imposes a
restriction on the sets ci such that a different trajectory does not appear in different
sets.5 To be noted that the phenomenon of interference will occur within the set ci
but not between different sets (Wharton 2016, p. 6):
Interference is still evidently possible between paths within a given
set. And because of the appearance of many-path interference in wellestablished phenomena (say, triple-slit experiment), there is no escaping
the conclusion that each set ci must contain many paths. There is no
way to reduce ci down to a single path or two, in agreement the earlier
analysis.
Again, a classical statistical interpretation is available: one set of paths ci will correspond to the one containing the trajectory taken by the particle, even though it
remains impossible to determine which one. Since we still have sets of paths, rather
than single trajectories, Wharton’s analysis clearly fits into the category of ‘mild
reductionism’.
What are, one might ask, the implications of Wharton’s mild reductionism for
the holistic view? In Feynman’s formulation, the main contributions to the quantum
probability amplitude come from non-differentiable paths. For example, the transition
amplitude for a particle of mass m which moves under a potential V (x) from an initial
state ψ(xk , t) to a close subsequent point ψ(xk+1 , t + ) is:
ψ(xk+1 , t + ) =

Z

"

i
exp
~

(

m xk+1 − xk
2



2

)#

− V (xk+1 )

where A is a normalization factor and S(xk+1 , xk ) =

ψ(xk , t)dxk /A

m xk+1 −xk
(  )−V
2

(3.17)

(xk+1 ). Feynman

(1948c, p. 17) argues that:
Most of the contribution to ψ(xk+1 , t + ) comes from values of xk
in ψ(xk , t) which are quite close to xk+1 (distant of order 1/2 ) so that
5

For the mathematical details see: (Wharton 2016, p. 5).
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the integral equation (3.17) [(23) in the original] can, in the limit, be
replaced by a differential equation. The “velocities”, (xk+1 − xk )/ which
are important are very high, being of order (~/m)1/2 which diverges as
 → 0. The paths involved are, therefore, continuous but possess no
derivative.
There are two important consequences for the present argument. First, the most
contributing paths are difficult to be pictured in terms of classical trajectories and
the reason is that the average velocity of a path diverges once the time interval
between two subsequent points tends to zero:


xk+1 − xk


2

=−

~
im

(3.18)

Therefore, Wharton’s idea of having trajectories being grouped into classes and to
assign them a classical probability, does not account for the non-classical nature of
the trajectories in the first place.
Second, the original formulation of path integrals already entails a distinction between contributing and non-contributing paths: continuous non-differentiable paths
contribute to the quantum mechanical probability amplitude and, in the classical
limit ~ → 0, the main contributions come from paths in the neighborhood π~ of
classical (differential) trajectories —as it has been shown in the section on the classical limit. It follows that the difference between the original formulation and the one
suggested by Wharton is that the latter eliminates the non-contributing paths before
the process of summation.
The final result, if one preserves the empirical adequacy, is the same: the mild
reductionism simply anticipates the action of the cancellation process. Hence, the
ensemble —although reduced— still plays a fundamental role in the calculation of
the final amplitude.
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Before moving to Wharton’s physical interpretation of the reduced sets ci , there
is one more concern that is worth of our attention. Wharton seems to cast the
probability of the real set in terms of subjective probability: “The preceding analysis
proves that it is possible to assign a classical-ignorance interpretation to the path
integral, essentially no different than the framework of classical statistical mechanics”
(Wharton 2016, p. 6). In other words, he compares the probability of path integrals
with the one in statistical mechanics, that being grounded on the existence of a real
microstate unknown to us. One then might argue that casting the probability in terms
of classical ignorance can be justified in terms of the existence of some sort of hidden
variables which would prevent the experimenter from individuating the one real set.
Alternatively, one might justify the ‘classical ignorance’ in terms of computational
difficulties due to the large amount of variables at play.6 Both alternatives are ruled
out if we consider the nature of the trajectories composing the set ci —which are the
contributing paths to the probability amplitude. Starting from the relation derived
in (Feynman 1948c, p. 26):7
~
xk − xk−1
xk+1 − xk
m
xk − m
xk ↔S


i








(3.19)

where the symbol ↔S means that the equivalence is valid under the same action,
one can reverse the second term on the left and translate the equation in operator
notation, thus obtaining the commutation relation and the uncertainty principle:
p̂x̂ − x̂p̂ =

~
i

⇒

1
(∆x)(∆p) ≥ ~
2

(3.20)

Also, from equation (3.19), Feynman shows the equivalence with equation (3.18) emphasizing the connection between uncertainty and non-differentiability.8 This con6

One can conceive of this last case as the difficulty of calculating the exact outcome of a dicetossing because of the presence of variables such as the friction between the dice and the surface,
the exact strength of the tossing, the imperfections of the shape of the dice and so on.
7

The mathematical details do not concern us here, but can be found in: (Feynman, Hibbs, and
Styer 2010) and (Feynman 1948c).
8

For the details of the proof, see: Feynman, Hibbs, and Styer (2010, p. 176)
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nection emphasizes that the probabilistic nature of path integral arises from the uncertainty principle affecting each -interval of each path. The probabilistic nature of
path integrals is then entrenched into the formalism, making the theory ‘objectively
probabilistic’. The concept is well expressed by Feynman et al. (1951, p. 533):
The new theory [i.e., quantum mechanics] asserts that there are experiments for which the exact outcome is fundamentally unpredictable, and
that in these cases one has to be satisfied with computing probabilities of
various outcomes.
Wharton’s account advanced the idea that the construction of the probability
amplitude via path integrals is based on classical ignorance. On the contrary, we
have argued that probabilities are genuinely entrenched into the formalism, but how
to interpret them and why that is the case, it would be a different project.
It seems that there is no much room there for either hidden variables, or for
computational complexity. The only other solution seems to be a reinterpretation
of the physical nature of the sets ci , treating them as something different than a
collection of trajectories. Wharton seems to opt for the aforementioned solution, for
he suggests to consider the sets ci as an extended field: “the task is then to map the
relevant parameters of the set ci onto a continuous, spacetime-valued field” (Wharton
2016, p. 9). Wharton also gives a hint on how to possibly construct such a map: “One
template for how this might work (albeit in reverse) is the connection between the
standard complex wave function and the collection of possible paths that particle
might take in Bohmian mechanics” (Wharton 2016, p. 9). However, the attempt
would require for ci to have a non-intersecting constraint for the paths of the set.
Since the parsing of the ensemble is not fixed, it might be possible to overcome the
problem. However, though the parsing of the ensemble might lead to a map onto a
spacetime valued field, the not unique parsing could easily rise the objection of being
undetermined by other possible sets.
67

A possible answer, to the problem of the non-uniqueness of the grouping, is proposed in (Wharton 2016, p. 9):
For example, in a double-slit experiment, a position measurement immediately after the slits (before interference could occur) would only have
sets ci in which every path passed through the same slit. But delaying
the time of the position measurement (after potential interference) would
lead to sets ci where the paths passed through both slits before converging
onto the measurement point. If each ci is interpreted as a field, the former case would yield a realistic field history that really did pass through
only one slit, while the latter case would yield a realistic field history that
really did pass through both slits.
The influence of the future over the past —that is, the fact that a future measurement of position can determine through which slit the particle has passed— is not
problematic, as the Lagrangian considers the whole trajectory ‘all-at-once’. Wharton
(2014, p. 4) calls this framework: ‘the Lagrangian Schema’:
One sets up a (reversible) two-way map between physical events and
mathematical parameters, partially constrains those parameters on some
spacetime boundary at both the beginning and the end, and then uses
a global rule to find the values of the unconstrained parameters and/or
a transition amplitude. This analysis does not proceed via dynamical
equations, but rather is enforced on entire regions of spacetime “all at
once”.
However, we ask: what quantity would be assigned to each point of space-time?
If, for example, the field is taken to be an action-valued field (or a phase-valued
field) which assigns a value of action to each space-time point, then restricting the
phenomenon of interference to paths within each set ci would not be enough. As
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previously argued, the paths within the set are non differentiable and might span
over the whole space within the boundary conditions. To provide a map from sets
of paths to an action-field, one would need to impose a non-interfering condition
also on the paths within the sets ci . Otherwise, same spacetime points would have
different action-values due to the superposition rule. But to impose such a restriction
seems at best problematic. The interference of the paths within the real set is what
guarantees the interference pattern well-verified by the experiments. One might try to
avoid this problem by calculating the action-field for -time-sliced trajectories, rather
than for the whole path. The ‘step-by-step’ calculation, though, might undermine the
Lagrangian Schema and the basis for justifying the influence of future measurements
on the past. Therefore, Wharton’s account remains unclear about what quantity the
spacetime points (or trajectories) would represent in a field-based picture.
To sum up: Wharton has shown how a mild-reduction of the total ensemble
is possible. However, we have also seen that the trajectories that survive to the
cancellation process —the latter being performed before or after the integration—
are far from being classical. In the next sections we will see how this latter point
plays an important role for holism.

3.3.2

The Decoherent History Approach

A different parsing of the path integral total ensemble is suggested by a reformulation
of the decoherent history interpretation (DH) proposed by Gell-Mann and Hartle
(2012). This subsection argues that such a reformulation provides a parsing of the
ensemble which yet does not undermine a possibility for a holistic interpretation. As
a starting point, let’s consider the decoherent histories interpretation, originally by
Griffiths (1984), which assigns probabilities not to single quantum states, but rather

69

to histories of closed quantum systems.9 Such histories become the main object of
the interpretation; they are sequences of alternatives at successive times described
n

by an exhaustive set of projection operators Pαkk

o

such that

P

αk

Pαkk = 1. Where:

“k denotes the set of alternatives at time tk (e.g. a set of position ranges) and αk
the particular alternative” (Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990). In general, the decoherent
histories account coarse-grains the total ensemble of possible paths into different
classes α: (Hartle 2005, p. 8)
hx00 |Cα |x0 i =

Z

δxeiS[x(t)]/~

(3.21)

α

The coarse graining in (3.21) is represented by the fact that we integrate over α which
corresponds to a region of configuration space ∆αk where αk = 1, 2, . . . at a given
sequence of time t1 , . . . tn .
DH distinguishes between fine-grained and coarse grained histories where: the
former represent the most refined description of a system (the example is the motion
of a particle of a gas described ‘step-by-step’ by Newton’s laws) and the latter consist
of partitions of the ensemble of the possible histories, i.e., sums of complete sets of
projector operators. The coarse-graining ‘mirrors’ the strategy we have seen in the
previous subsection. Consider for instance: (Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990, p. 7)
Feynman’s sum-over-histories begins by specifying the amplitude for
a completely fine-grained history in a particular basis of generalized coordinates Qi (t), say all fundamental field variables at all points in space.
This amplitude is proportional to exp(iS(Qi (t)))/~. . . (However), completely fine grained histories in the coordinate basis cannot be assigned
probabilities; only suited coarse-grained histories can.
9

For a better and more detailed exposition of such interpretation see: (Halliwell 1995), (GellMann and Hartle 1990) and (Hartle 1993).
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Gell-Mann and Hartle (2012) suggest a modification to the DH account in order to
have a formulation that admits the existence of one real fine-grained history. Such a
new account, named ‘Extended Probability Ensemble’(EPE), is based on the original
DH formulation and on four further ingredients. First, the one real fine-grained
history is assumed to be embedded in an ensemble of alternative histories. These
fine-grained histories are described in a preferred set of variables, i.e., those of the
sum-over-histories of Feynman’s interpretation. These preferred variables are denoted
by q i for a particle and, by evolving in time, they define a unique path q(t) in C, where
C is the configuration space spanned by q i .
Second: an extended notion of probability that goes outside of the range [0, 1],
which means that the probabilities for a fine grained history can be negative. Granted
that probabilities are in general understood as expressions of our ignorance toward
the happening of a given event, there is the implicit assumption that it is always
possible to settle whether one of the possible alternatives occurs. Gell-Mann and
Hartle point out that in quantum mechanics, to determine such alternative is not
only difficult in practice, but it is genuinely impossible. They provide the example
of the double-slit experiment for which, unless one disturbs the setting, to determine
whether a particle has passed through one of the slits (or both) is a non-settleable
bet.10 The extended probabilities represent a new form of ignorance and: “quantum
history ensemble will consist of alternative fine-grained histories assigned extended
probability” (Gell-Mann and Hartle 2012, p. 3).
The third ingredient is a fundamental distribution w[q(t)] which assigns an extended probability to each history q(t) (Gell-Mann and Hartle 2012, p. 4):
w[q(t)] ≡ Re[ψ̂ ∗ (qf , tf )exp {iS(q(t))/~} ψ̂ ∗ (q0 , t0 )]
10

(3.22)

Such an idea of probability fits more the objective probability expressed by the quote from
Feynman we have introduced in the previous subsection. As such, it is also different from the
epistemic probability advocated by Wharton.
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To see how (3.22) assigns an extended probability to a set of fine-grained histories,
Gell-Mann and Hartle suppose w[qi (t)] ∈ [0, 1] and then vary the fine-grained history
qi (t) in such a way that qi (t) ∼ qi∗ (t) leaving the initial and final conditions (ti , tf )
unchanged. Then, qi∗ (t) can contribute to the action in (3.22) and thus might change
the sign of w[q(t)] in such a way that w[q(t)] ∈
/ [0, 1]. Because of the negative
probabilities: “the set of fine-grained histories is not the basis for a settleable bet on
what the real fine-grained history is like” (Gell-Mann and Hartle 2012, p. 4). Given
the non settleable bet, the set of fine-grained alternatives qi (t) can be coarse-grained
in various classes Cα in such a way that the extended probability of each class is given
by the sum of the extended probabilities of its members:
P (α) =

Z

w[q(t)]dq

(3.23)

The coarse-graining into exclusive classes Cα and the classical probability expressed
in (3.23) constitute the fourth ingredient.
The reformulation is then three-layered: (1) there are multiple fine-grain histories
to which an extended probability is assigned, one of these histories is real although
we do not (and cannot) know which one. These histories are expressed in terms
of Feynman’s sum over histories. (2) The fine-grained histories are coarse-grained
into classes Cα in such a way that the probabilities for the latter is strictly positive.
(3) The exhaustive set of all the classes Cα for which the probability is equal to:
R

w[q(t)]δq = 1.
The approach suggested by Gell-Mann and Hartle does provide a partitioning of

the ensemble, but (unlike Wharton’s) it does not limit the reduced ensemble to only
possible real trajectories. The probability amplitude is obtained by summing over
non-settleable fine-grained histories —to which an extended probability is assigned—
embedded in coarse-grained histories. Furthermore, the EPE account does assume the
existence of one real fine-grained trajectory and this, one could argue, can undermine
a genuinely holistic picture. If the single real trajectory does exist, then the spectre
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of strong reductionism would pose a threat to the holistic account. However, the
measurement of the fine-grained history is deemed impossible, as emphasized in:
(Gell-Mann and Hartle 2012, p. 7)
By measurement and other observation we acquire data D on what
the real coarse-grained history is in any realm11 in which D is valid in
some histories but not in others. With these data we also acquire coarsegrained information on what the real fine-grained history is. As we make
further observations we learn more and more about the real fine-grained
history. However, this process of progressive discovery of reality can never
be carried to the completely fine-grained level.
Even though a fine-grained history exists, the inaccessibility to tests and observations is what determines the impossibility of narrowing the ensemble to a single
real paths. In support of this argument, one can resort to the mathematical separability of the various trajectories of the ensemble. The single trajectories of the
n

o

set T = q1 (t)eiS1 /~ , ..., qi (t)eiSi /~ , ..., qn (t)eiSn /~ are mathematically separable in the
sense that it is possible to individuate each single path by, for instance, changing the
value of the displacement of the action for a given path.
The mathematical separability and the existence (although un-detected) of a finegrained history in the EPE account suggest a reductionist view that would disprove
holism. However, given that the possible fine-grained histories can be bestowed with
negative probabilities they have to combine together into a coarse-grained history
to yield positive probabilities. It is thus the class Cα that does all the work in
determining the total probability amplitude. The point is made clear in the following
quote:
11

A realm is a set of decoherent coarse-grained alternative histories.
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There is a central idea in CSM [classical statistical mechanics] and
EPE: they are both concerned with systems with one real fine-grained
history about which we have little information from observation either
in practice (CSM) or in principle (EPE). The coarse-grained regularities
that are accessible to observation and test cannot therefore be predicted
from a fine-grained starting point. Rather, both theories use the ensemble method to describe coarse-grained regularities (Gell-Mann and Hartle
2012, p. 10).
That the coarse-grained regularities cannot be predicted from the fine-grained histories means that the probability amplitude cannot be derived starting from the single
fine-grained histories —which is precisely the instance of holism advocated in this
chapter.

3.3.3

A Reductionist Toy Model

The third reductionist attempt is proposed by (Kent 2013), who starts from the
recognition that: “[even] if we had a mathematical rigorous path integral for some
preferred choice of variables, we could not use it to explain why macroscopic objects
approximately follow classical trajectories” (Kent 2013, p. 1). He then provides a
modification of the path integral formulation by means of introducing a new postulate to the purpose of calculating the probability of single paths. His aim is to give
a representation that does not count on the (as he defines them) ‘pathological’ paths
—those which are more openly conflicting with the intuitive picture of the physical
system. In other words he addresses some paths as ‘pathological’ given that they deviate from the paths that would resemble a classical trajectory (or those that deviate
from the classical least action trajectory). In doing so, he attempts to recover an
‘intuitive’ idea of a single real trajectory that is probabilistically chosen. Following
up from the above sections, we argue that even if one gets rid of the ‘pathological
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paths’, the best he obtains is a new parsing of the total ensemble, thus leaving the
problem of the individuation of a single actual trajectory still open.
What initially moves Kent is the difficulty of addressing the emergence of the
quasiclassical world (to be intended as the classical limit ~ → 0) starting from the
quantum path integral.
To further examine the problem, Kent builds up a toy model (M1 ) for a particle
moving from A to B and involving a large finite number of possible trajectories. He
then imposes that the paths have phases (±1) and an order such that: “the amplitudes
alternate in pairs before and after the quasiclassical paths” (Kent 2013, p. 3), that is:
+1, −1, ... + 1, −1, +1, +1, ..., +1 , −1, +1, ..., −1, +1
|

{z

(3.24)

}

quasiclassical paths

If we then calculate the total amplitude of the system taking into consideration
all the possible paths, or if we calculate it by only summing over the quasiclassical
paths, the result does not change.
N
X

A(Pi ) =

i

MX
+K

A(Pi )

(3.25)

i=M

where the paths PM , ...., PM + K correspond to the quasiclassical trajectories. However, Kent points out that it is not possible to conclude that quasiclassical paths are
special —as different parsings of the ensemble are fully legit. He concludes then:
The standard treatment of the quantum path integral only defines a
transition probability from A to B. It does not supply for any rule that
tells us that the system actually follows any path. In particular, it gives
no rule that ensures the system will follow one path from among a set of
adjacent paths with similar phases and amplitudes, or even that we can
make some more coarse-grained statement about its behavior characterized by that set. (Kent 2013, p. 4).
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To solve the conceptual problem raised by the face-valued interpretation of path
integrals, Kent suggests to add a postulate to the purpose of assigning a probability
to single paths amidst an ensemble. The new postulate (3.26) assigns a probability
to a path P to be actually followed by a given particle (Kent 2013, p. 5):

P rob(P ) = C

Z

2

Z

dQ exp(−iS(Q))exp(−d(P, Q)) ( dQ exp(−d(P, Q)))−1

(3.26)

where ~ = 1. The integrals in (3.26) are taken to be over all paths Q with the
same initial and enpoint of P , that is from A to B. The postulate hinges on a new
quantity d(P, Q) which expresses the distance between paths P and Q or, in other
terms, it expresses the separation of the various paths. For the postulate to work as
an improvement of the original path integral formulation, the distance function needs
to be chosen so that it respects the predictions of quantum mechanics. That being
said, paths undergoing interference should be microsopically separated d(P, Q) ≈ 0
and paths that can be distinguished by observation and followed by classical objects,
should be macroscopically separated d(P, Q)  1.
Such requirement, which is fundamental to making the theory empirically consistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics, has some relevant consequences.
When the distance of paths is approximately zero, we obtain phenomena that are
proper of quantum mechanics (such as interference), while once we have a distance
such that the different paths are observationally distinguishable, classical mechanics
emerges. What this seems to suggest is that it is not the probability of a single path
that does the work, but rather it is the distance of the various paths that determines
the various probabilities. If we ‘look’ at the trajectory of a quantum particle, the
density of paths per unit of space is such that within the range of cancellation of
the paths (determined by the ratio S/~) there are many possible trajectories. If, on
the other hand, we look at the trajectory of a classical particle, we would have a
broader picture but with ‘less resolution’. We would be looking at the set of paths
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that survived the cancellation process from a ‘bird’s eye view’ and we would have the
impression that only one trajectory exists.
Let’s comment on the example of the single particle beam to see how the postulate
and toy model work: “We again suppose some set of adjacent paths PM , ..., PM +K lie
in a region in path space where the path space is essentially constant, while for the
remaining paths the path space oscillate” (Kent 2013, p. 7). For 1 < M < M +K < N
where K  N , Kent provides an ordering of the possible trajectories like in (3.24)
and also gives a definition of distance function: (Kent 2013, p. 8)
d(Pi , Pj ) = exp(|i − j|/D)

(3.27)

where
d(Pi , Pj ) =0 if |i − j| < D

(3.28)

d(Pi , Pj ) =∞ if |i − j| > D
d(Pi , Pj ) = log(1/2) if |i − j| = D
Having a distance function, we can apply (3.26) and obtain the formula to calculate the probability for a particle to undergo a given path.
One point is worth mentioning here: the choice of the distance function is somehow
underdetermined, i.e., not unique. Different specifications of a distance function
will lead to different probability assignments, given that the postulate (3.26) hinges
on such a function. As Kent argues: “It seems then, even for thinking about real
path quantum theory in the context of single particle interferometry, that we either
need some new compelling theoretical reason for picking out some particular distance
function, or empirical guidance” (Kent 2013, p. 14). However, we do not have (yet)
an empirical guidance that would suggest us a specific distance function to plug
into (3.26). Moreover, the theoretical guidance seems to rely on the search for a
reductionist picture of the total ensemble to a single real trajectory. However, if that
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is the case, we would be looking for a function starting from the assumption that a
real trajectory exists. Nothing (in quantum mechanics) seems to suggest the existence
of such a trajectory. If the real trajectory does not exist because of the way quantum
mechanics is, there would be no need for a distance function to plug into (3.26) and
the underdetermination would be solved.
Kent also proves that the trajectories with non-zero probability are the ones closer
to the area of constant phase.12 Such area is approximately defined by the term K in
the model: “Our parameter K here models [...] the size of the set of paths around the
stationary path for which (S/~) is approximately constant in standard path integral
quantum theory” (Kent 2013, p. 9). Nevertheless, the conclusion that there is a single
real trajectory the particles takes to go from point A to B does not follow. Kent’s
work is remarkable as it provides a new postulate that allows to reduce the ensemble
of possible paths relevant for the total amplitude. However, it still delivers a set —
that is an ensemble— of trajectories. In the model, the physically relevant paths are
those within the stationary phase region and those d-distant from that region. While
the former quantity is defined by the parameter K, the second one (expressed by a
parameter D) depends on the chosen definition of the distance function. Therefore,
these two quantities are what the theory hinges on. The postulate (3.26) applied to
the toy model M1 delivers a parsing of the total ensemble of possible trajectories into
a smaller ensemble of physically relevant possible trajectories. We then have a result
not too dissimilar from that of either Wharton or EPA: instead of taking into account
the total ensemble, we reduce the sum to a subset (or set of subclasses).
What about the case where interference emerges? Consider a new toy model M2
where a second region of constant phase is added. What changes is that instead of
looking at the distance between paths within a beam, now we also have to evaluate
the distance between different paths in different beams. We thus have a ordered list
12

I am leaving aside the mathematical details as not relevant for our purposes here.
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of amplitudes from A1 to An :
1, −1, . . . , 1, −1, exp{(−iθ0 )}, exp{(−iθ0 )}, . . . exp{(−iθ0 )}, 1, −1, . . .
|

{z

M0 +K0

(3.29)

}

. . . , 1, −1, exp{(−iθ1 )}, exp{(−iθ1 )}, . . . exp{(−iθ1 )}, 1, −1, . . .
|

{z

M1 +K1

}

Although Kent presents all the various possibilities, we are interested in the cases
where interference emerges. For instance, when i + D > M1 + K1 and i − D < M0
we have: (Kent 2013, p. 10)
P rob(Pi ) ≈ C |((K0 + 1) exp{(−iθ0 )} + (K1 + 1) exp{(−iθ1 ))}|2 (2D)−1

(3.30)

where the interference is given by the factor ((K0 +1) exp{(−iθ0 )})((K1 +1) exp{(−iθ1 )}).
On the other hand, if we have d-separated beams such as (for instance): i − D < M0
and i + D > M0 + K0 , the interference factor does not appear: (Kent 2013, p. 10)
P rob(Pi ) ≈ C(K0 + 1)2 (2D)−1

(3.31)

Kent concludes that: if the beams are close then the quantum interference emerges.
If the beams are widely separated, the paths within Ki + 1 collectively represent
the beam and do not display interference. In both cases then, the distance function
allows one to define a set (or many) of neighboring paths which contribute to the
total amplitude of the quantum system.
Models M1 and M2 both provide a way of ordering the total ensemble of possible
paths in Feynman’s formulation in such a way that some ‘pathological’ paths get
canceled. The philosophical drive for such an attempt seems that of recovering an
‘intuitive’ idea of a single (or set of) well-defined trajectory(ies). But such an attempt
led to a construction based on the choice of the distance function and the combination
of other parameters (such as beam separation). How to choose these parameters
and functions remains unclear and the adoption of one of them over another might
lead to important differences: “A distance function sensitive to spatial separation
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would mean that a pathological path that travels far from the stationary path makes
little contribution to the probability of the latter being realized. Distance functions
sensitive to first or higher derivatives can also suppress the contributions of rapidly
varying or undifferentiable paths” (Kent 2013, p. 17).
Kent’s argument leads us to an ontology of semi-real paths ‘living’ in the neighborhood of the stationary path. I call the paths ‘semi-real’, for the model cancels
out the pathological paths but ultimately does not individuate a single real trajectory. Again, one at best obtains a reduced set of possible paths, possibly traversed
by the particle. The nature of these paths remains unclear insofar as we maintain a
‘quasiclassical’ ontology, that is, an ontology that takes the paths (one or a defined
set) as the real paths traversed by the particle. Furthermore, Kent’s model is a simplification and as he claims: “A full path integral description would include infinitely
many paths with phases θi in the neighborhood of each Pi , and infinitely many more
exotic paths that are not piecewise linear and have rapidly fluctuating phases” (Kent
2013, p. 11). It seems, but a deeper mathematical analysis would be required, that
by increasing the complexity of the model and hence getting closer to ‘real’ quantum
systems, the hope for a reductionist (real) path ontology fades away.
Even granting that the new ordering based on the distance function allows for
the elimination of the pathological paths, the ontological weight still rests upon the
shoulders of a (reduced) ensemble. Kent assumes the existence of one real trajectory,
and yet he ultimately formulates the theory in terms of ensemble of possible (though
non-pathological) trajectories.
Furthermore, but this would require a further mathematical analysis of Kent’s
model, the pathological paths —those which conflict with classical intuition and in
Kent’s model are grouped together to give probability zero— might very well be the
non-differentiable paths that positively contribute to the total amplitude in Feynman’s formulation. The risk is that Kent’s account might not consider some of the
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paths that contribute to the probability amplitude, thus making the model not fully
consistent with empirical data.
To sum up: in the previous sections we have looked into three attempts to reduce
the ensemble of possible trajectories to either a subset or to a single trajectory in
the context of path integrals. As a result, we concluded that strong reductionism is
not a viable possibility. However, because some forms of mild-reductionism seemed
feasible, we have not proven yet that the total ensemble is holistic with respect to
the individual possible trajectories. In the next section, we will draw an analogy
between holism and path integrals, and non-supervenience and entangled states. The
analogy will serve the purpose of further discussing the ill-behaved trajectories and
their contribution in the calculation of the total amplitude and, upon a discussion of
what to count as physical possibilities, we will argue for a holistic interpretation of
path integrals.

3.4

Non-Physical Trajectories and Holism

In the last section we have argued that the ensemble is not strongly reducible and
that the contributing trajectories are not smooth. However, none of these claims
proves that the total ensemble is holistic with respect to the individual trajectories.
A tempting argument would be that the origin of the holistic character of the
total ensemble comes from the necessary relation among the single paths, mediated
by the various phase factors. In other words, because the trajectories get canceled
with each other, one could envision this process of cancellation as what makes the
probability amplitude of the total ensemble holistic
However, such a tempting argument is problematic. That the interference between
the various trajectories is what proves holism would be equivalent (or at least very
similar) to saying that the electromagnetic field generated by two charged particles
is not reducible to the electromagnetic field at each spacetime point separately. If
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this were the case, than any linear combination or interference would be a case of
holism, which is too strong of a claim. As a matter of fact, if we consider a simple
enough system, it is not difficult to reconstruct the destructive and constructive
interference and thus reduce the total electromagnetic field to the combination of the
two separate fields. We could assign an electromagnetic potential to each spacetime
point surrounding the two charges and thus it would be difficult to argue that the
total field does not reduce to the values of the potential at each point (even though
the determination of these values is a combination of the two fields).
To defend the thesis of holism, we can consider an analogy with the discussion on
supervenient and non-supervenient properties and entangled states —see, among others: (Esfeld 2004), (Cleland 1984), (Belousek 2003), (Karakostas 2004), and (French
1989). Given that the concept of supervenience is subject to variation in the literature
and since a more accurate discussion of such variations would lead us astray from the
our present purposes, I will take the definition offered in (French 1989) at face value.
A relation R is said to be strongly non-supervenient: “upon a determinable non relational attribute if the appearance of this relation is neither dependent nor determined
by its relata bearing the non-relation concerned” (French 1989, p. 10). Conversely,
the relation R is weakly non-supervenient “upon a non-relational attribute if the appearance of this relation is dependent upon the instantiation of the non relation in
the sense that the relation could not possibly be exemplified in the absence of each
of its relata separately bearing the determinable non-relation in question, but there
exist no determinable non-relational attributes whose manifestation is sufficient for
the appearance of the relation”.
To clarify the definitions, we shall briefly address the case of strong non-supervenience
as presented in (French 1989) with respect to quantum entanglement. Afterward, we
will discuss the analogy with the case of path integrals. Let us consider two systems S1 and S2 and the combined system S12 , then let’s consider two particles and
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their corresponding properties P1 , P2 and their combination P12 . Each property is
independent from the other and it can be exemplified even if in the absence of the
other property or system. A given system possesses a certain property, defined by an
Hermitian operator Ô, if the system is represented by a quantum state, that is, by
an eigenvector of the given operator where the property is represented by the corresponding eigenvalue. The operator Ô for our two-particles system has two eigenvalues
u and w such that: Ô |ui = u |ui and Ô |wi = w |wi. French considers three possible
states for the composite system Ô12 = Ô1 ⊗ Ô2 :
i. |ui1 |ui2
ii. |wi1 |wi2
√
iii. 1/ 2(|ui1 |wi2 ± |wi1 |ui2 )
where the eigenvalues of the eigenvectors (a), (b) and (c) of Ô12 are u2 , w2 and uw
respectively. (French 1989) and (Belousek 2003) argue that if the system is (a) or
(b) then each particle has an independent quantum state and a corresponding nonrelational property. The sates (a) and (b) —in the sense of the relation between the
two particles— supervene upon the non-relational properties of each particle. On the
other hand: “if the two-particle system were prepared in quantum state (c) [(iii) in
the original], then neither of the particles would have a single-particle quantum state
represented by an eigenvector of Ô [O in the original]” (Belousek 2003, p. 796).
In state (a), particle one and particle two separately posses property u and the
composite state possesses property u2 . The same goes for state (b) and property
w. However, in state (c), the single particles do not posses a non-relational property
expressed as an eigenvalue of the observable Ô, but the composite system possesses
the property Ô12 = uw. “In other words, since the state function as represented by
(c) [‘(1)’ in the original] is not the product of the separate state functions of the
particles, one cannot from a knowledge of (c) [‘(1)’ in the original] ascribe to each
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particle an individual state function” (French 1989, p. 11). Therefore, because state
(c) is not determined by the two subsystems having the non-relational properties u
or w, state (c) is strongly non-supervenient upon its parts.
That the total probability amplitude in path integrals is dependent on the single complex probabilities of the single trajectories is trivial and emphasized by the
formalism. This rules out the possibility of strong non-supervenience and marks a
difference with the case of entanglement. However, that the single trajectories are
also sufficient to determine the total amplitude is less obvious.
Weak non-supervenience for path integrals would correspond to the statement
that: the total amplitude is weakly non-supervenient upon the amplitudes of the
individual trajectories because the total amplitude depends upon the individual ones
in that it could not be exemplified in the absence of each of the individual paths. But,
there exist no determinate non-relational attributes whose manifestation is sufficient
to the total amplitude. Therefore, to prove weak non-supervenience we ought to show
that the single trajectories (and their probability amplitudes) are necessary and yet
not sufficient to explain the total amplitude calculated for the total ensemble.13
The core issue hinges on what we take the trajectories to be. Ideally, we want
them to be ‘classical’, that is, smooth and with probability equal to or less than one.
This is because, even though the trajectories are not physical objects, it would be
odd to consider as possible trajectories some paths that are not ‘physically possible’.
With respect to negative probabilities, we have seen that we can group the various
paths in such a way that the negative ones get canceled out with each other. However,
neither Wharton nor EPE, nor Kent were able to provide a parsing that suppressed
the non differentiable paths. It follows that the classical notion of trajectory is not
13

One might promptly note that if a reduction of the ensemble is possible, then the total amplitude
does not depend on each single trajectory. One could consider this as a further weakening of the
non-supervenience or, alternatively, simply take the ensemble to be the smallest set of trajectories
necessary to obtain the appropriate total probability amplitude.
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enough to account for the sum-over-paths of Feynman’s interpretation. This calls for
a fine-grained distinction of the concept of possible trajectories. On the one hand we
have physical possibilities in the sense of smooth trajectories that could be actually
traversed by a particle in a classical sense. On the other hand, we have possible
trajectories whose physical reality is at best blurred: the non differentiable ones. It
is in this sense that we ought to distinguish between ‘possibilities’ and ‘physically
possible trajectories’. The non-differentiable paths are possible because allowed by
the mathematical formalism, but they are physically impossible because of their nondifferentiability.
Therefore, there seem to be two alternatives here. The first one is to accept
that the computation of the total amplitude comes from the probability amplitude
of some trajectories that count as physical possibilities —in the sense of possibly
being traversed by a particle— and some non differential paths that count as nonphysical. Alternatively, we can expand the concept of trajectories to encompass the
contributing ill-behaved paths.14
With respect to the first case: if we have a distinction between classical (smooth)
and non-differentiable paths, and we deny that the latter are physical, then the physically possible trajectories would be not sufficient to account for the total amplitude.
In other words, the total amplitude would be weakly non-supervenient upon the the
classical possible trajectories within the boundary. Outside of the analogy with entangled states and non-supervenience: the total amplitude is (weakly) non-reducible
to the sum of the individual amplitudes of the physically possible trajectories.15
On the other hand, if we maintain that the non-differentiable trajectories are part
14

A third possibility would be to discuss whether trajectories can be non-local. The argument
would require a longer investigation on the non-local nature of quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, it
is opinion of the author that this would lead to a case of holism by analogy with entanglement. We
leave the issue to further investigations.
15
We say ‘weakly non-reducible’ because we have seen how the total ensemble can be reduced to
a subset.
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of our physical system, then we are moving to the second possibility. This amounts
to considering as ‘paths’ both classical and non-smooth trajectories, thus committing
to a much weaker notion of trajectory, something of the form: a trajectory is any set
of points connecting the initial and final positions. To each of these sets is assigned
a probability amplitude. On this basis, a reduction of the probability amplitude of
the whole ensemble to its parts (the various sets of points) seems possible and that
is because the new notion of trajectory would encompass the non differentiable ones
as well. However, insofar as the latter scenario has changed the notion of trajectory,
some problems emerge at the classical limit.
If, by setting ~ → 0 we can obtain the classical trajectory traversed by a particle
as calculated by the principle of least action, it means that the concept of a single
trajectory traversed by a classical particle emerges from the ensemble of possible trajectories in quantum mechanics, which is never reducible to a single path. How can
we justify that in quantum mechanics we ‘accept’ the existence of ill-behaved trajectories that do not fit with the notion of classical trajectories in classical mechanics?
In other words, to have two types of trajectories in quantum mechanics (classical and
quantum) and only one type in classical mechanics begs the question as to how and
why we move from one case to the other. A possible answer is that the notion of
trajectory is scale-dependent and thus the classical trajectory of the least action principle emerges from the ensemble of trajectories at the level of quantum mechanics.
Such a scale-dependency can be seen in the variation of large actions as opposed to
actions that have quantum magnitudes. Although the issue would require a longer
analysis, it seems to suggest that the notion of single real trajectory is emergent from
that of ensemble of possible paths. Whether this counts as holism and why, we leave
it to later works.

86

3.5

Conclusion

What was advanced in this chapter is the idea that the path integral formulation of
quantum mechanics suggests a holistic interpretation.
We have argued that the whole is to be taken as the set of possible trajectories
while the parts are the single paths, then we have taken into account three attempts
to reduce the total ensemble to either a real trajectory or to subsets of possible
trajectories. What emerged from the analysis of Wharton, Gell-Mann and Kent
is that: (i) it is not possible to calculate the probability amplitude starting from
the single independent trajectories, one always ought to sum over an ensemble of
paths. (ii) Some of the possible trajectories, under closer scrutiny, are not classical
trajectories in the sense of differentiable continuous curves. It thus becomes difficult
to provide a physical understanding of these paths although they actively contribute
to the total amplitude. This last point was especially relevant, for it forces us to
either accept these quantum paths as mathematical objects, or to accept them as
part of physical reality.
By considering the quantum paths as ‘merely mathematical’ we are admitting
that the classical paths of the ensemble are not enough to justify the total probability
amplitude calculated starting from the whole ensemble. This ‘non-sufficiency’ is what
characterizes the total ensemble as (weakly) non-reducible upon the single (classical)
trajectories. We can thus conclude that path integrals suggest a form of holism. It
is worth of notice that the top-down holism does not fit because it is not the total
ensemble that determines the properties of the single trajectories. As we have seen,
we can calculate the probability amplitude of a single path starting from the initial
and final position and through the assignment of a specific value of the action.
Although the argument proves the (weak) non-reductionism, a major problem
still remains. If the quantum trajectories are not physical, how do they ‘form’ the
total ensemble? The problem is that the ontology connected to the dynamics cannot
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be derived from a non-real (or semi-real) set of entities. One possibility could be to
interpret these entities in terms of mathematical possibilities and thus follow the line
of argument presented here, but such view might lean toward some form of mathematical realism. Alternatively, one needs to ensure the existence of the ensemble
based on a different ground, that being a different theory (such as: quantum field
theory or emergent space-time in quantum gravity) or a different ontology. We leave
such discussion to subsequent works.
The other possibility was to consider the non-differentiable paths as physical possibilities, together with the other possible trajectories. If this is the case, then how to
recover the notion of classical trajectory at the level of quantum mechanics becomes
most relevant. We have not investigated this last concern here, we have only mentioned that a possibility is to consider the notion of a single classical differentiable
trajectory (proper of classical mechanics) as emergent from the ensemble of possible
paths proper of quantum mechanics.
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Chapter 4
The Space-Time View in Feynman’s
Electrodynamics
4.1

Introduction

Traditionally, the evolution of a quantum system is described by the Schrödinger
equation: a differential equation that calculates the evolution of the wave function in
time. In his Nobel lecture, Feynman addresses this method as ‘the customary view’:
In the customary view, things are discussed as a function of time in
very great detail. For example, you have the field at this moment, a
differential equation gives you the field at the next moment and so on; a
method, which I shall call the Hamiltonian method, the time differential
method (Feynman 1966, p. 7).
The present chapter aims at reconstructing how Feynman challenged such customary
view, leading to viewing quantum phenomena in their entirety (the overall spacetime
view).
What differentiates the current chapter from the detailed and thorough works by,
among others, Schweber (1986), Mehra (1994), Kaiser (2009) and Wüthrich (2010), is
the focus on the evolution of Feynman’s philosophical thinking from his early works
with Wheeler to the formulation of his quantum electrodynamics. Kaiser (2009), for
example, provides a compelling analysis of how the diagrams spread around the various research groups and how they have been used to solve problems in theoretical
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physics. Wüthrich (2010), on the other hand, focuses on the evolution of the pictorial aspects of the diagrams, as it becomes evident in his attentive reconstruction of
Feynman’s theory of the quivering electron. In addition, Wüthrich (2013) emphasizes Feynman’s tendency to provide a physical understanding of the mathematical
equations as well as the role that modularity has played in combination with the
visualization (and thus understanding) of quantum phenomena. Notably, that modularity has played a crucial role in the development of Feynman’s electrodynamics is
originally advocated in (Galison 1998) where modularity refers to a theoretical culture
of favoring the visual and qualitative understanding rather than the mathematical
and purely formal niceties.1 Nonetheless, while a comprehensive and detailed historical study of Feynman’s works is provided in (Schweber 1986) and (Mehra 1994), not
enough attention has been paid to the evolution of Feynman’s overall spacetime view
from the absorber theory to quantum electrodynamics.
It is worth noting that the importance of the overall spacetime view to the development of quantum electrodynamics has been emphasized also in (Blum 2017,
p. 2):
What all these formulations had in common was that in some sense
they problematized the quantum mechanical notion of an instantaneous
state and tended toward replacing it with a focus on overall processes.
This stemmed from the relativistic need to treat space and time on the
same footing and the consequent tendency of relativity towards a block
universe view.
However, while in Blum’s work the overall spacetime view is only tangential, the
present chapter focuses on how it tweaked and changed along the way to Feynman
Diagrams. More specifically, I will point out how, from calculating a transition am1

Such a culture, it is argued in (Galison 1998), especially developed during the years of the war
and Los Alamos and became crucial in Feynman’s postwar works.
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plitude by integrating over all possible trajectories, Feynman expanded his view to
all possible interactions in the theory of positron and Feynman diagrams.
More specifically, unlike path integrals —which can be considered as the embodiment of the overall spacetime view for non-relativistic quantum mechanics2 —
quantum electrodynamics requires the use of perturbation theory which seem to constitute a drift from the overall spacetime view. This is because perturbation theory
amounts to a finer specification of the possible interactions and events happening
within the boundaries of the process under consideration. If path integrals sum over
all the possible trajectories that a particle can take from an initial to a final spacetime point, perturbation theory calculates how the amplitude of the system changes
if, along one of these trajectories, the particle interacts with either a field or another
particle. By means of an analogy: perturbation theory allows us to look into the
quantum process through a magnifying glass, but to calculate the final amplitude
we need to sum over all the possible events that we can ‘see’ through the lens (up
to a certain cutoff). Feynman’s great contribution was to realize that each term in
the perturbative expansion could be associated to a diagrammatic representation of
a quantum event, i.e., to a Feynman Diagram.
I will divide the present work into two main sections. The first one is meant
to provide a general overview of the overall spacetime view in the context of both
the absorber theory of radiation ((Wheeler and Feynman 1945) and (Wheeler and
Feynman 1949)) and path integrals ((Brown 2005), (Feynman 1948c)). The second
part will reconstruct the use of the overall spacetime view applied to positron theory
and Feynman diagrams (Feynman 1949b), (Feynman 1949a).
2

More on this in: (Forgione 2020a)
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4.2

Historical Overview: from the Absorber Theory to Path
Integrals

In the 1930s, a well known problem in classical electrodynamics (as well as in the first
attempts to develop a quantum electrodynamics) was the removal of the divergence
terms from the theory. In this context, the young graduate student Richard P. Feynman, together with his supervisor John A. Wheeler, worked on the formulation of
a divergence-free classical electrodynamics. The so-called ‘absorber theory of radiation’, developed in: (Wheeler and Feynman 1945) and (Wheeler and Feynman 1949),
is the product of their joint efforts. In general, the theory derives the radiative damping of the accelerated particle not from the self-action of the particle with its own
field, but from the response of the absorbers to the original radiation of the source.
The relevant aspect of the theory, at least for the present purposes, is that in order
to have the radiative damping happening at the same time as the original acceleration, Wheeler and Feynman used both advanced and retarded solutions to Maxwell’s
equations. The general principles of the absorber theory are presented in (Wheeler
and Feynman 1945, p. 160) in the language of the theory of action-at-a-distance:
i. An accelerated point charge in otherwise charge-free space does not radiate
electromagnetic energy.
ii. The fields which act on a given particle arise only from other particles
iii. These fields are represented by one-half the retarded plus one-half the advanced
Lienard-Wiechert solutions of Maxwell’s equations. This law of force is symmetric with respect to past and future. [. . . ]
iv. Sufficiently many particles are present to absorb completely the radiation given
off by the source.
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The third point is further developed in Wheeler and Feynman’s theory in such a way
that the radiative damping, constituted by the advance response of the absorber,
arrives at the position of the source at a time that is equal to that of the initial
acceleration.
In general, the total radiation emitted by the source is thus calculated by summing
the proper retarded field of the accelerated source with the response of the absorber,
where the latter constitutes the radiative damping. As phrased in: (Wheeler and
Feynman 1945, p. 166) and recalled in (Forgione 2020b):






 total disturbance

 diverging from


source

  proper retarded
 
 =  field of source
 
 
itself







  field apparently diverging from source 
 

 +  actually composed of parts converging 
 

 

on individual absorber particles
(4.1)

The second term on the r.h.s of the equality specifies the radiative damping as an
apparent diverging (retarded) field from the source, but truly being an individually
converging (advanced) radiation coming from the absorbers. The consequence is that
in the absorber theory of radiation the future response of the absorbers influences
the present total radiation emitted by the source. As reconstructed in (Blum 2017,
p. 20): “The radiative reaction emerged as the reaction of the emitting electron to
the advanced back-reaction of all the other electrons in the universe, if one assumed
there were were sufficiently many of these to ensure that all emitted radiation would
eventually be absorbed (hence, Wheeler-Feynman electrodynamics is also known as
absorber theory)”.
Radiation, in the absorber theory, is not anymore an only forward-in-time process
which has a linear causal history from past to present to future. Rather, the future
affects the past for it constitutes the radiative damping of the original accelerated
source.3 Thus, as we will see below, the use of both the advanced and retarded
3

Such a reading of the absorber theory can be contentious as it raises a number of questions
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radiation is fundamental to the ‘overall space-time view’ of the absorber theory.4
Because of the intertwining of past and future, the time evolution of the theory
was not an instantaneous state evolution anymore and thus it was not possible to
formulate an appropriate Hamiltonian.
A solution had already been suggested by Fokker (1929) who formulated a nonHamiltonian theory of electrodynamics based on the combination of retarded and
advanced interactions and on a principle of least action (Fokker’s action). As (Feynman 1966, p. 7) reconstructs in his Nobel lecture:
The behavior of nature is determined by saying her whole spacetime path
has a certain character. For an action like (1) [Fokker’s action] the equations obtained by variation (of Xµi (αi )) [the vector position of the ith
particle where α is a parameter] are no longer at all easy to get back into
Hamiltonian form. If you wish to use as variables only the coordinates
of particles, then you can talk about the property of the paths —but the
path of one particle at a given time is affected by the path of another
at a different time. If you try to describe, therefore, things differentially,
telling what the present conditions of the particles are, and how these
present conditions will affect the future you see, it is impossible with particles alone, because something the particle did in the past is going to
affect the future.
Thus, the new theory by Wheeler and Feynman which is based on a least action
principle keeps track of the positions of the various particles using fields variables
about, for example, the justification of the asymmetry of time for macroscopic phenomena. As it is
not the main point of the current chapter, I simply take at face value the reading of the absorber
theory suggested in (Forgione 2020b).
4

To be more precise, Feynman had originally formulated the theory in terms of retarded radiation
only. It was thanks to the contribution of Wheeler that Feynman implemented the use of the
advanced radiation as well.
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as bookkeepers: “From the overall space-time view of the least action principle, the
field disappears as nothing but bookkeeping variables insisted on by the Hamiltonian
method” (Feynman 1966, p. 7).
It is thus Feynman that in the previous quote firstly addresses the overall spacetime view for the absorber theory: in a theory that makes explicit use of advanced
and retarded interactions and of the action principle, the behavior of the system is
studied by looking at the entirety of the path of the given particle(s). Feynman emphasizes the point further when he lists what he had obtained during his work on the
absorber theory:
To summarize, when I was done with this [the absorber theory], as a
physicist I had gained two things. One, I knew many different ways of
formulating classical electrodynamics, whith many different mathematical
forms. I got to know how to express the subject every which way. Second,
I had a point of view —the overall space-time point of view— and a
disrespect for the Hamiltonian method of describing physics (Feynman
1966, p. 8).
However, this is not the end of the story. Since the absorber theory remains a
classical theory, it still needs to be quantized. Fokker’s main result was to build
a theory that was manifestly relativistic invariant and since the problems of the
divergences of QED were not fully manifest yet, he did not pursue quantization.
But, since at the time of the absorber theory the divergences in QED were much
better known, Feynman actively tried to quantize his new classical electrodynamics.
However, the task proved to be difficult, as for example emphasized by the anecdote
reported in (Schweber 1986, p. 457):5
5

Schweber takes the anecdote from (Feynman, Interview with Weiner, March, Center for history
and Philosophy of Physics).
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Wheeler had been scheduled to give a lecture on how to quantize their
action-at-a-distance theory at the next meeting of the colloquium. After
Feynman’s lecture [on the non-quantized absorber theory], while walking
back from Fine Hall to Palmer Labs with Feynman, Pauli asked him what
Wheeler was going to say. Feynman replied he did not know. “Oh” said
Pauli, “the professor doesn’t tell his assistant how he has it worked out?
Maybe the professor hasn’t got it worked out!” As it turned out, Wheeler
had in fact overestimated his results, and he canceled the lecture.
One of the main difficulties was that canonical quantization dictates how to quantize a classical theory starting from the similarity in the structure of the Hamiltonian
function in classical and quantum mechanics. The main gist is to promote the position and momentum variables (expressed in terms of the Hamiltonian: p = −∂H/∂q
and q = ∂H/∂p) to Hermitian operators. As recalled in (Wüthrich 2010, p. 52):
The standard procedure for quantizing a classical theory was to interpret the classical Hamiltonian function as an operator in a Hilbert space
of state vectors. This operator would then determine the time evolution
of the quantized system described by a certain state vector. The problem
with quantizing the Wheeler-Feynman theory of electrodynamics was that
it could not be formulated by specifying a Hamiltonian function. Therefore, a method was needed to quantize physical systems, the classical
description of which could not be given by a Hamiltonian function.
Because the absorber theory was formulated in terms of an action principle, the
problem with its quantization was the absence of an Hamiltonian. Normally, if the
R

action is the classical action S = Ldt, expressed as the integral over the Lagrangian
function, one could use Legendre’s transformation and obtain a Hamiltonian and once
the Hamiltonian is available one can apply the recipe for the canonical quantization.
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However, the form of Fokker’s action is not that of a Lagrangian and thereby of a
classical action. As pointed out in (Blum 2017, p. 21), the two actions differ in two
main aspects: “The first is that the integrations are over the proper times of all the
individual particles instead of over some universal time coordinate. The second is
that the integrations are carried out from −∞ to ∞, instead of from an initial time
t0 to a final time t1 ”.
The solution to the difficulty of deriving an action for quantum mechanics came
from the visiting scholar Herbert Jehle, who advised Feynman to look into a paper
from Dirac (1933), where a Lagrangian formulation of quantum mechanics was indeed
proposed. But to have a Lagrangian formulation of quantum mechanics was not
sufficient, and that is because the absorber theory was not formulated in terms of a
classical action. Nonetheless, what interested Feynman the most about Dirac’s paper
was the relation between the transformation function (qt |qT ) and the quantity eiS/~ ,
where S is the classical action.
Feynman, upon reading the work by Dirac, was able to derive the relation between
the wave function ψ(qi , ti ) and its infinitesimal-time subsequent ψ(qi+1 , ti+1 ):
Z

ψ(qt+δt , t + δt) =



√
qt+δt − qt
2dqt
iδt
L
, qt+δt ψ(qt , t)
exp
~
δt
A(δt)


(4.2)

where A(δt) is a normalization constant. The relation instantiated by equation (4.2)
is equivalent to how Schrödinger’s equation evolves the wave function for an infinitesimal time interval δt. However, Feynman still needs to generalize the result to non
infinitesimal time-intervals and to do so, it is enough to inductively reiterate the infinitesimal time evolution along the whole non-infinitesimal time interval. Then, by
gluing together the various infinitesimal transition amplitudes, one obtains:

ψ(qm+1 , tm+1 ) =

Z Z

···
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i
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m
X

"

~ i=−m0
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#


qi+1 − qi
L
, qi+1 (ti+1 − ti ) 
ti+1 − ti
√
√
g0 dq0 . . . gn dqm
× ψ(q0 , t0 )
(4.3)
A(t1 − t0 ) . . . A(T − tm )
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4.2.1

The Generalization to any Action and the Boundary Conditions

Because Feynman intended to quantize his absorber theory, he discussed, in his dissertation, a system that looked similar to the one he was trying to quantize. As
recalled in (Darrigol 2019, p. 356): “he [Feynman] considered the simpler similar theory obtained by eliminating the oscillator’s coordinates in a system of two particles
coupled through a harmonic oscillator. This system is analogous to two particles
interacting through an electromagnetic field because this field, by Fourier analysis,
can be regarded as a superposition of harmonic oscillators at various frequencies”.
Path integrals will provide a way to the quantization of the coupled system and to
the subsequent attempt of eliminating fields in electrodynamics. The elimination of
the fields should then give way to the theory of direct action at a distance.6

7

By considering a toy model composed of two atoms A and B, both interacting
with a harmonic oscillator, the question is whether one can find an action A such
that the system is described by a principle of least action that involves only A and
B. Consider an action integral (Brown 2005):
Z "

mẋ2 mω 2 x2
−
) + (Iy + Iz )x
Ly + Lz + (
2
2

#

where Ly and Lz are the Lagrangians for A and B, the term ( mẋ

(4.4)
2 −mω 2 x2

2

) is the

Lagrangian of the harmonic oscillator and the last term amounts to the interaction
between the elements of the system. Feynman argues that the oscillator (in the toy
model) has only one degree of freedom and thus velocity and positions are enough
to specify its state and to uniquely determine the motion of A and B. To solve the
equation of motion of either particle, one needs to solve the equation of the harmonic
oscillator.
6

A reconstruction of the elimination of fields in Feynman’s electrodinamics can be found in, for
example: (Darrigol 2019).
7
To be noted that the idea of treating a field as a collection of harmonic oscillators was not new,
as it was originally suggested in (Fermi 1932). The use of Fermi’s intuition is for example made
explicit in: (Feynman 1950).
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Not surprisingly, the action function depends on the parameters one chooses for
the harmonic oscillator. What is surprising though, argues Feynman, is that the
choice of the parameters determines whether the motion of two particles is expressible
in terms of a least action principle. To show his point, Feynman lists the possible
ways to express the solutions x(t) to the equation of the harmonic oscillator: (Brown
2005, p. 18):

x(t) = x(0) cos ωt + x(0)

1 Zt
sin ωt
+
γ(s) sin ω(t − s)ds
ω
ωm 0

(4.5)

where to solve the equation one needs the additional data x(0) and ẋ(0). Alternatively, x(t) can be expressed as:
x(t) =

1
[RT sin ωt + R0 sin ω(T − t)] +
sin ωT
1 Zt
1 ZT
+
sin ω(t − s)γ(s)ds −
sin ω(t − s)γ(s)ds (4.6)
2mω 0
2mω 0

where
sin ωT
R0 = 1/2 x(0) + x(T ) cos ωT − ẋ(T )
ω


sin ωT
RT = 1/2 x(T ) + x(0) cos ωT − ẋ(0)
ω




(4.7)
(4.8)

The additional information are now R0 and RT which are combinations of x(0), ẋ(0)
and x(T ) and ẋ(T ). Their physical meaning is recalled in (Brown 2005, p. 19):
It is seen that RT is the mean of the coordinate of the oscillator at time
T and what that coordinate would have been at this time if the oscillator
had been free and started with its actual initial conditions. Similarly, R0
is the mean of the initial coordinate and what that coordinate would have
had to be, were the oscillator free, to produce the actual final conditions
at time T . Outside the time range 0 to T the oscillator is, of course,
simply a free oscillator.
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The third expression for x(t) is:
x(t) =



sin ω(T − t)
1 Zt
sin ωsγ(s)ds +
x(0) −
sin ωT
mω 0
"
#
1 ZT
sin ωt
x(T ) −
sin ω(T − s)γ(s)ds (4.9)
+
sin ωT
mω t

where to solve this last equation, the additional data are x(0) and x(T ).
The various expressions for x(t) are thus used to calculate the equation of motion
for y and z, but different expressions of the solution to the harmonic oscillator lead
to different expressions for the equation of motion of the particles. What differentiates the various expressions for the harmonic oscillator are the conditions needed
to compute x(t). Feynman discovered that if one is to impose Cauchy data (i.e.,
[x(0)] and [ẋ(0)]) on the equation, it is not possible to obtain an action function that
satisfies the action principle in the form:

δA
δy(t)

= 0 and

δA
δz(t)

= 0. To satisfy the action

principle one needs to either specify the initial and final position of the oscillator (i.e.,
Dirichlet’s conditions x(0) and x(T )) or to specify Robin’s condition (i.e., by fixing
the values of R0 and RT ). For example, the case in which R0 = RT = 0 is a special
one that in electrodynamics “leads to the half advanced plus half retard interaction
used in the action at a distance theory” (Brown 2005, p. 22).
The connection between boundary conditions and the absorber theory is also
recalled in (Mehra 1994, p. 134):
Feynman showed that it is possible to find such a new action functional only if one chooses a definitely determined solution of the oscillator
equation, a symmetric one which included one-half advanced and one-half
retarded interaction between the atoms A and B.
While the action functional mentioned in the quote is the one obtained by Feynman
by taking the solution (4.6) to x(t) and the special case R0 = RT = 0, (Blum 2017,
p. 25) notes that Mehra’s statement is too strong since Feynman does not claim that
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the condition R0 = RT = 0 is the only one that leads to a possible action functional.
It is nonetheless true that such special case leads to connection with the action at a
distance theory. But, and this seems important with respect to the overall spacetime
view, it is the specification of boundary rather than initial conditions that allows the
derivation of an action functional that respects the minimum principle.
The fact that an action principle was not obtainable starting from the use of
Cauchy data suggests an interesting consideration. The use of boundary conditions
restricts the occurrence of the event within an initial and final spacetime points. Since
the equations represent the motion of the harmonic oscillator, which is a toy model
for the behavior of the electromagnetic field, is there a difference in what boundary
conditions we use other than the formal consequence of deriving the action principle?
The enclosing of the event within the initial and final space-time points not only
is compatible with the description of the event that is extended in time (i.e., not
instantaneous), but it is also compatible with the overall spacetime view implied by
Feynman in his absorber theory.
However, as well emphasized in (Blum 2017, p. 25): “[...] there are additional
boundary terms, which can only be made to vanish by assuming that the interaction
is adiabatically turned off in the distant past and future”. Nonetheless, the ‘turningoff’ of a given event (interaction) will promptly come back in the theory of positron
and Feynman diagrams as the notion of asymptotic states. This will further emphasize
the aspect of enclosing the physical process within a ‘space-time boundary’ as well
as the use of the overall specetime view.
An immediate objection would be that such a physical interpretation is too far
fetched. This is because the harmonic oscillator is but a simplified representation of
the field: a toy model. However, Feynman seemed to believe in his approach and
tried to generalize it to the quantum case:
Drawing on the classical analogue we shall expect that the system
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with the oscillator is not equivalent to the system without the oscillator
for all possible motions of the oscillator, but only for those for which
some property (e.g., the initial and final position) of the oscillator is fixed.
These properties, in the cases discussed, are not properties of the system
at just one time, so we will not expect to find the equivalence simply
by specifying the state of the oscillator at a certain time, by means of a
particular wave function. It is for this reason that the ordinary methods
of quantum mechanics do not suffice to solve this problem. (Brown 2005,
p. 62)
In the last sections of the dissertation, Feynman generalizes the classical case
to the quantum case, thereby showing that the system cannot be expressed by a
quantum mechanical principle of least action if one is to hold constant the initial
position and velocity of the oscillator.
It is worth mentioning that, before Feynman, Fermi had already developed a form
of the equations of classical electrodynamics suitable for quantization:
We must now write in Hamiltonian form the equations that describe
the motion of the particles and the variation of the electromagnetic field.
For this we simply write the Hamilton function and then verify that the
canonical equations that can be derived by it actually represent the motion
of the particles and the Maxwell equations. (Fermi 1932, p. 128)
Fermi’s derivation of the probability amplitude and Hamiltonian eliminates both
scalar and vector potentials, but the operator that multiplies the differential equation
for the probability amplitude shows an extra term

1
2

ei ej
ij rij

P

which amounts to an

instantaneous Coulomb interaction. The latter term is problematic in Feynman’s
picture because it does not leave room for the delayed interaction. Furthermore, the
term is problematic in general for it leads to self actions and divergencies:
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In conclusion we may therefore say that practically all the problems
in radiation theory which do not involve the structure of the electron
have their satisfactory explanation; while the problems connected with
the internal properties of the electron are still very far from their solution.
(Fermi 1932, p. 131)
In other words, Fermi’s quantization of the electromagnetic field (which was considered the traditional one, see: (Heitler 1984)) had to face the problem of the infamous
divergencies (emerging from the internal properties of the electron), which was a main
thrust in Feynman’s work. Furthermore, Feynman could only partly rely of Fermi’s
formulation since the latter displayed an instantaneous rather than delayed Coulomb
interaction. To be more precise, it is not that Fermi’s formulation commits to instantaneous interactions, for that would be a violation of special relativity. The point is
made clear in (Heitler 1984, p. 50): “It would seem as if in this gauge [Coulomb gauge]
the interaction of two particles were only the instantaneous Coulomb interaction and
not the retarded interaction. However, this is not the case. The effect of retardation
is contained in the part of the Hamiltonian which depends on the transverse waves”.
Fermi’s delayed interaction involves retarded radiation only, thereby leaving no space
to the advanced components of Feynman’s formulation.8
We can now return to the generalization of the classical case to the quantum case,
as advanced in the last sections of Feynman’s dissertation. The starting point is to
consider the form of a general action of a particle in a potential V (x) interacting with
a mirror:
A=

Z +∞
−∞

mẋ(t)2
− V (x) + k 2 ẋ(t)ẋ(t + T0 )dt
2

(4.10)

The first difficulty is that the integral over a Lagrangian —as calculated starting from
equation (4.2) and (4.3)— is taken over two finite times and because the action A
8

I wish to thank Alexander Blum for the reference to Heitler’s book and the clarification on this
point.
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might depend on values that are external to such time interval, the action integral is
meaningless.
This difficulty may be circumvented by altering our mechanical problem. We may assume that at a certain very large positive time T2 , and
at a large negative time T1 , all of the interactions (e.g., the charges) have
gone to zero and the particles are just a set of free particles (or at least
their motion is describable by a Lagrangian). We may then put wave
functions, χ and ψ, for these times, when the particles are free (Brown
2005, p. 41)
In other words: Feynman stipulates a ‘space-time boundary’ within which the
event (e.g., an interaction) takes place and then postulates that outside this ‘spacetime boundary’ the evolution of the system is described by the free Lagrangian. To be
more precise, Feynman calculates that for two wave functions χ and ψ —representing
a state at time T2 and T1 respectively— the matrix elements of a general operator F
are:

hχ|F |ψi =

Z



χ∗ (qT2 ) exp

i
√
A(qT2 ...qT1 ) F (..., q1 , q0 , ...)ψ(qT1 ) gdq/A
~


(4.11)

where the action is expressed in equation (4.10).
Feynman then discusses the role played by the wave function in equation (4.11)
addressing it as an useful but not strictly necessary tool:
We can take the viewpoint, then, that the wave function is just a
mathematical construction, useful under certain particular conditions to
analyze the problem presented by the more general mechanical equations
(4.11) [(68) in the original] [...], but not generally applicable [...] Quantum
mechanics can be worked entirely without a wave function, by speaking
of matrices and expectation values only. (Brown 2005, p. 45)
104

The convenience of the wave function is that one can assume that outside the interval
[T1 , T2 ] the action has a Lagrangian form and thus, having ‘fixed’ the initial and final
wave functions, Feynman can start looking into the evolution of the system within
the time interval.
Starting from the transition amplitude hχ|1|ψi, calculated under the action A,
it is possible to alter the action within the time interval such that: hχ|1|ψiA+F =
i

hχ|e t F |ψiA where the latter can be expanded in powers of  (perturbation theory).
Perturbation theory warrants the possibility of expressing “the average of a function
for one action in terms of averages of other functionals for a slightly different action”
(Brown 2005, p. 47). Such use of the wave functions foreruns the use of asymptotic
states in the positron theory and Feynman diagrams.
However, Feynman is initially dissatisfied with the use of the wave functions to
represent the states of the system —as emphasized in the previous quote (and more
widely in (Blum 2017)). To overcome the dissatisfaction, Feynman attempts to replace the matrix elements and transition amplitudes with the expectations values of
the relevant quantities directly.9
In pursuing quantization via expectation values, and in analogy with the classical
case, Feynman investigates a system of two atoms A and B interacting through
an harmonic oscillator O and asks (Brown 2005, p. 61): “to which extent can the
motion of the the oscillator be disregarded and the atoms be considered as interacting
directly?” However, the problem is not only to show that one can eliminate the
oscillator in favor of direct interaction and expectation values of a given functional:
Feynman wants such functional to be an expression of an action principle of the
particles alone. In other words: The point is to calculate under what conditions the
9

Feynman also admits that the project is only tentative and not complete: “An alternative
possibility is to avoid the mention of wave functions altogether, and use, as the fundamental physical
concept, the expectation value of a quantity, rather than a transition probability. The work done
in this connection, which is presented in this section, is admittedly very incomplete and the results
tentative” (Brown 2005, p. 50).
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trace of the functional F for atoms and oscillator is equivalent to the trace of the
functional F for an action principle —granted that the initial and final states of the
oscillator are fixed: x(0) = α and x(T ) = β. Formally, (Brown 2005, p. 62):
xT + x0T
x0 + x00
Tr F · δ
−β ·δ
−α
2
2
*

!

!+

= const · Tr hFiA,B

(4.12)

A,B,&O

To simplify the calculations, Feynman sets the action of the system without the
oscillator to be A0 + I which depends on the coordinates (Q and Q0 ) of the two
atoms only and where the first term is the action of the particles and the second term
is the action of the interaction. Feynman calculates that the action of interaction I
is analogous to the action calculated in the classical case where the solution of the
oscillator is taken to be (4.9). However, this does not prove that the systems with
and without oscillator are equivalent, but only that, similarly to the classical case,
under some conditions it is possible to replace the intermediate oscillator with an
action functional:
Thus, the particles with the action of interaction I, may be replaced
by a system with an intermediate oscillator, provided that, in calculating
the expectation of any functional of the particles, it is calculated under
the condition that the oscillator’s initial position is known to be α and
the final position is known to be β. It is to be noted that we have no
proved that, in general, the system with the oscillator is equivalent to one
without, for that is not true. The equivalence only holds if the oscillator
is known to satisfy certain condition. (Brown 2005, p. 65)
In the reminder of the section (the last few pages of the dissertation) Feynman proves
that: (1) one can obtain an action functional from Robin conditions and (2) that no
action exists if one is to specify the Cauchy data for the functional F, i.e.: “no action
exists in case the initial position and velocity are held constant” (Brown 2005, p. 67).
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However, Feynman ultimately decided not to publish these results in his condensed
version of the dissertation. The use of the trace to calculate the expectation values
was tainted by an unsolved difficulty: “The trace of an arbitrary functional is not
always a real number!” (Brown 2005, p. 52). The difficulty with the complex valued
quantities is also emphasized in (Blum 2017, p. 24): “This was especially problematic
concerning the expectation value of the energy, where a complex expectation value
implied the loss of unitarity.” This makes the last pages of the dissertation —where it
is shown how it is possible to obtain a direct action theory if the oscillator has similar
boundary and Robin conditions as the classical case— a formal result with no physics
interpretation. The conclusions of the dissertation report Feynman’s dissatisfaction:
The interpretation of the formulas from the physical point of view
is rather unsatisfactory. The interpretation in terms of the concept of
transition probability requires our altering the mechanical system, and
our speaking of states of the system at times very far from the present.
The interpretation in terms of expectations, which avoids this difficulty, is
incomplete, since the criterion that a functional represent a real physical
observable is lacking (Brown 2005, p. 68)
The conclusions make clear that the inclusion of the system into a spacetime
boundary led Feynman to dive into the use of expectation values. Ultimately, this
led to the derivation of an action functional, but only for those cases in which the
boundary conditions of the oscillator are known (and are the same as those of the
classical case).
Thus far, Feynman’s work amounts ‘only’ to a reformulation of quantum mechanics by means of the Lagrangian function. There is still no application of the new
method to quantum electrodynamics, which would have stemmed from the proper
quantization of the absorber theory:
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The results of the application of these methods to quantum electrodynamics is not included in this thesis, but will be reserved for a future time
when they shall have been more completely worked out. [. . . ] All the
analysis will apply to non-relativistic systems. The generalization to the
relativistic case is not at present known (Brown 2005, pp. 5–6)
Before moving on, it is worth taking a detour and briefly comment on the condensed and revised version of Feynman’s doctoral thesis. The article emphasizes
the physical interpretation behind the path integral formulation and at the very end
it also provides a first derivation of an action functional for relativistically moving
particles.

4.2.2

The Paper from 1948

In his post-war revised and condensed version of the thesis, Feynman (1948c) begins
the derivation of his path integral formulation by remarking one of the fundamental
differences between classical and quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics three
measurements (say) A, B and C can give as a result the values a, b, c respectively. One
can thus express the probability of the event Pabc as Pab × Pbc granted that the events
are independent. If we have a set of mutual exclusive possibilities for the values of
B, then we can express the probability Pac as a sum over the alternatives of b, i.e.:
Pac =

P

b

Pab Pbc . The same happens in quantum mechanics with the difference that to

obtain a real probability one needs to square the probability amplitude: Pab = |ϕab |2
and Pbc = |ϕbc |2 . Feynman then considers a particle that can take many values of
coordinate x in one dimension and by making many successive measurements of the
particle’s position at  time intervals, then the function x(t) defines a path for the
particle along the x coordinate. The probability that the particle undergoes a path
in a region R is defined as:
Z
R

P (. . . , xi , xi+1 , . . . ) . . . dxi , dxi+1 . . .
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(4.13)

With respect to quantum mechanics, Feynman considers an ideal experiment which
does not disturb the system and only determines whether the particle lies somewhere
within R. The probability is thus given by |ϕ(R)|2 where:
ϕ(R) = lim

Z

→0 R

φ(. . . , xi , xi+1,... ) . . . , dx1 dxi+1 . . .

(4.14)

The integration over R amounts to integrating over the entire spacetime region within
which the particle can wiggle and where the complex function φ(. . . , xi , xi+1,... ) defines
a path. Similarly to having summed over the different values of b to the quantum
probability Pac =

P

b

ϕab ϕbc , equation (4.14) adds all the intermediate spacetime

points as possible values that the particle can take: Pan = |

P P
b

c

. . . ϕab ϕbc . . .ϕmn |2 .

The physical interpretation is then made evident in the two postulates as expressed
in (Feynman 1948c, p. 8):
Postulate I. If an ideal measurement is performed, to determine whether
a particle has a path lying in a region of space-time, then the probability
that the result will be affirmative is the absolute square value of a sum of
complex contributions, one for each path.
The second postulate specifies how to properly calculate the probability amplitude, i.e., it specifies how to determine the contribution to the probability amplitude
of each path:
Postulate II. The paths contribute equally in magnitude. [B]ut the
phase of their contribution is the classical action (in units of ~); i.e., the
time integral of the Lagrangian taken along the path.
This means that the contribution of a given path such as φ(. . . , xi , xi+1 . . . ) is proportional to eiS/~ , where the action principle S(xi+1 , xi ) = min
to the action S =

P

i

R ti+1
ti

L(ẋ, x)dt is applied

S(xi+1 , xi ). Because the sum in the action is infinite, upon
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restricting the time interval to an arbitrarily long finite interval, Feynman obtains
that (Feynman 1948c, p. 10):
#

"

dxi+1 dxi
iX
...
ϕ(R) = lim × exp
S(xi+1 , xi ) . . .
→0 R
~ i
A A
Z

(4.15)

This new formulation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics calculates the transition amplitude (and therefrom the probability amplitude) by taking into account the
ensemble of all possible paths where each of these path is ‘weighted’ by a phase factor eiS/~ . The ensemble is defined by the space of mathematical possibilities (granted
that the paths are continuous) and since there is no such a thing as a ‘real trajectory’
—in the sense of a path actually being traversed by the quantum particle— we are
left with a new and deeply-non classical understanding of quantum phenomena:10
One characteristic of the present formulation is that it can give one a
sort of bird’s-eye view of the space-time relationships in a given situation.
(Feynman 1948c, p. 32)
What has changed with respect to the absorber theory of radiation is the use of the
entire space of possibilities to calculate a probability amplitude. On the other hand,
what has remained the same is that in both the absorber theory and path integrals
the dynamics of the system is calculated by taking into account two different times:
the initial and final spacetime positions in path integrals (to be precise: the entirety
of a given trajectory) and the advanced and retarded radiation in the absorber theory.

4.3

The Road to Feynman Diagrams and QED

4.3.1

To Understand and To Explain

What path integrals amount to is a reformulation of quantum mechanics, one that
does not involve relativistic phenomena. It was thus a yet incomplete work, espe10

More on this in: (Forgione 2020a)
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cially in light of Feynman’s attempt to quantize the absorber theory of radiation.11
Nonetheless, the last section of (Feynman 1948c) is a tentative generalization of path
integrals to relativistically moving particles and the consequent derivation of an action functional for the relativistic Dirac equation. However, despite obtaining the
correct result, Feynman remains ultimately dissatisfied with the too formal nature
of the derivation, one which does not provide the ‘understanding’ of the quantum
phenomena he had been seeking: “These results for spin and relativity are purely
formal and add nothing to the understanding of these equations. There are other
ways of obtaining the Dirac equation which offer some promises of giving a clearer
physical interpretation to that important and beautiful equation” (Feynman 1948c,
p. 36).
The first attempt to derive the Dirac equation based on a stronger ‘visual’ component —that is a derivation that had its basis on a clearer physical understanding—
resulted in the so-called theory of the quivering electron. The theory is thoroughly reconstructed in (Wüthrich 2010) by means of some of Feynman’s original manuscripts.
For our purposes, it is enough to say that the theory consists of an initially onedimensional model of the Dirac equation where the electron is taken to move either
to the left or to the right on a lattice and the probability amplitude is thus calculated
based on the counting of those turns.
Through the model of an electron zigzagging through an infinitesimally
fine space-time lattice, Feynman can now explain the time evolution of a
relativistic electron, though only in one dimension. And, unlike in the final
section of (Feynman 1948c) [RMP48 in the original], Feynman can now
justify the action function, since he has derived it from the a description
of the zigzagging electron. (Wüthrich 2010, p. 77)
11
The most thorough discussion of the quantization of the absorber theory via path integrals is
provided in (Feynman 1950). For a general reconstruction of the mathematically dense argument,
see: (Darrigol 2019).
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The term ‘explain’ in the previous quote has the same significance of the term ‘understanding’ used in Feynman’s quote. They both refer to a ‘visual understanding‘
that was absent in the study of spin and relativity in (Feynman 1948c) and that was
‘recovered’ by the image of an electron zigzagging on a lattice in the theory of the
quivering electron.12
Perhaps, the scientific attitude represented by the search for an ‘understanding’,
as intended by Feynman, is best understood when contrasted with the almost antithetical approach pursued by another peak expert in quantum mechanics during
those years: (Dirac 1981, p. vi)
The classical tradition has been to consider the world to be an association of observable objects (particles, fluids, fields, etc.) moving about
according to definite laws of force, so that one could form a mental picture in space and time of the whole scheme. This led to a physics whose
aim was to make assumptions about the mechanism and forces connecting these observable objects, to account for their behavior in the simplest
possible way. It has become increasingly evident in recent times, however,
that nature works on a different plan. Her fundamental laws do not govern the world as it appears in our mental picture in any very direct way,
but instead they control a substratum of which we cannot form a mental
picture without introducing irrelevancies.
Thus, Dirac’s take on the possibility of understanding quantum mechanics (in general)
seems to rest on the contrast between ‘old classical physics’ and the ‘new quantum
mechanics’ in terms of the possibility of visualizing the phenomena that the theory
describes. Dirac maintains that once the ‘visualizability’ of phenomena is of little
12

I am here taking the two terms ‘understanding’ and ‘explain’ as both referring to having a
world picture, a scientific Weltanschauung. On the other hand, for example, (Salmon 2006, p. 182)
distinguishes the two terms in that while ‘explain’ refers to systematized knowledge, ‘understanding’
involves having a scientific world picture.
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(if any) help, then one ought to resort to ‘mathematical ideas’. As, for example,
reconstructed in (Crease and Mann 1996, p. 77):
In one of his last addresses, Dirac explained his credo: “[O]ne should
allow oneself to be led in the direction which the mathematics suggest
. . . [o]ne must follow up [a] mathematical idea and see what its consequences are, even though one gets led to a domain which is completely
foreign to what one started with . . . Mathematics can lead us in a direction
we would not take if we only followed up physical ideas by themselves.”
But, contra to a view that is mostly based on ‘purely mathematical reasoning’, Feynman seems to rely on the value of visualization independently of how unintuitive
the result is. Such visualizations, which amount to a general ‘understanding’ of the
physics phenomena, have already played a relevant role in Feynman’s early theories:
the absorber theory and the path integrals formulation. As we have seen, Feynman
imagined the self-action of the electron to be caused by the advance response of the
absorbers and that a quantum particle moves following every possible trajectory. It
is in this sense that his scientific attitude is almost antithetical to that of Dirac:
I dislike all this talk of there not being a picture possible but we only
need know how to go about calculating any phenomena. True we only
need calculate. But a picture is certainly a convenience & one is not
doing anything wrong in making one up. It might be completely haywire
while the equations are nearly right —yet for a while it helps . . . I want
to go back & try to understand them [the equations]. What do I mean by
understanding? Nothing deep or accurate —just to be able to see some of
the qualitative consequences of the equations by some method other than
solving them in detail.13
13

Quoted in (Wüthrich 2010, p. 94): Dirac Equation a, folio 12 (page 11).
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Figure 4.1

Representation of the Dirac electron-positron pair creation.

What happened, though, to the theory of the quivering electron? Did it provide
for the visual understanding that Feynman sought? The generalization from the onedimensional model to two and three dimensions led to an unsatisfactory conclusion,
akin to the last section of (Feynman 1948c). Feynman had obtained a generalization
to three dimensions, but it was again too formal and devoid of the ‘visual understanding’ he required.14

4.3.2

The theory of Positrons

The seminal article (Feynman 1949b) provides the best presentation of the overall
spacetime view and, together with (Feynman 1949a), it formulates a theory of electron
and positron interaction with both an external potential and among each other. More
specifically, the article on the theory of positrons presents a method for calculating
(and understanding) the motion of electrons and positrons in an external potential.
The initial intuition is not to focus on the creation and annihilation operators
—which are needed in the traditional (Dirac) view where pairs of particles and antiparticles are created and destroyed— but rather to look at the total charge that
remains conserved throughout the electrodynamic event.
Let’s first consider the conventional (Dirac) way of representing an electron positron
pair creation as represented in Figure 4.1. In terms of hole theory, the figure represents
14

I will not report the details of the argument, as they are already extensively presented in
(Wüthrich 2010, Chapter 4).
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an electron traveling along world-line C while, at the same time, an electron-positron
pair is created (world-lines A and B) at spacetime point 1. Following the time evolution of the system, at spacetime point 2 the electron from world-line C and the
positron from world-line B get annihilated, thereby leaving on electron on world-line
A traveling forward in time.15 This picture follows the evolution of the system as
time unfolds unidirectionally from past to future and it is thus comparable to the
‘customary view’ that Feynman had rejected in his Nobel lecture.
What happens if, as suggested by Feynman, we look at the conservation of the
charge rather than at the number of particles?
Following the charge rather than the particles corresponds to considering the continuous world line as a whole rather than breaking it up
into its pieces. It is as though a bombardier flying low over a road suddenly sees three roads and it is only when the two of them come together
and disappear again that he realizes that he has simply passed over a long
switchback in a single road. This over-all space-time point of view leads to
considerable simplification in many problems. One can take into account
at the same time processes which ordinarily would have to be considered
separately. (Feynman 1949b, p. 749)
Instead of looking at the time evolution of the process described in Fig.1, Feynman
suggests to consider the entirety of the time interval within which the event happens,
and to look at it from the bird’s eye point of view. This leads to the realization
that what is represented in the figure does not amount to a time-ordered series of
distinct processes (electron C coming-in while positron-electron pair is created, then
positron electron get annihilated while electron A propagates outwards), but rather,
it amounts to a single continuous world-line in which the electron moves forward-in15

The representation in the picture of subatomic particles traveling along a fixed trajectory is
only visual, standing for a representation of the direction of propagation.
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time and the positron moves backward-in-time. The manuscript from 1947 provides a
straightforward description of Feynman’s view, (which was shortened in the published
article from 1949).
In common experience the future appears to us to develop out of conditions of the present (and past). The laws of physics have usually been
expressed in this form. (Technically, in the form of differential equations,
or ‘Hamiltonian Form’.) The formulae tell what is to be expected to happen if given conditions prevail at a certain time. The author has found
that the relations are often very much more simply analyzed if the entire time history be considered as one pattern: The entire phenomena is
considered as all laid out in the four dimensions of time and space, and
that we come upon the successive events. This is applied to simplify the
description of the phenomena of pair production in the present paper. A
bombardier watching a single road through the bombsight of a low flying plane suddenly sees three roads, the confusion only resolving itself
when two of them move together and disappear and he realizes he has
only passed over a long reverse switchback of a single road. The reversed
section represents the positron in analogy, which is first created along
with an electron and then moves about and annihilates another electron.
The relation of time in physics to that of gross experience has suffered
many changes in the history of physics. The obvious difference of past
and future does not appear in physical time for microscopic events (the
connection of the laws of Newton and of statistical mechanics). (Schweber
1986, p. 488)16
A further example (also provided in the manuscript) considers a rope being im16

From: Feynman, R. P., handwritten notes entitled ‘Theory of Positrons’, fall, 1947. RPF, CIT

13.1.
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Figure 4.2

Doubling-back of a rope immersed in collodion.

mersed in a hardened cube of collodion (see: Figure 4.2). The rope is not completely
stretched from top to bottom, but rather, it doubles back at the points 2 and 1. Now,
suppose we slice the cube into thin layers and each of them will display a black dot
which originally belonged to the rope.
If we look at the various layers from top to bottom (see for example the horizontal
dotted lines in Figure 4.2), we notice that at the points where the rope doubles back
each layer will have 3 black dots. From a ’layer-by-layer’ perspective, an immediate
explanation would be that at point 2 a dot-pair was created and then the dot from
segment A will be annihilated by the dot from segment B, while the dot on segment
C will continue to the bottom of the cube of collodion, analogously to the case of
positron-electron pair creation. Feynman’s view, on the other hand, is to look at the
entirety of the cube and to interpret the various dots as a doubling back rope where,
outside of the analogy, the segment B amounts to the electron traveling backward in
time, i.e., to a positron.
How does the analogy of the rope relate to the overall spacetime view with respect
to quantum electrodynamics? To see this we need to look more closely into the details
of how such change of perspective leads to the calculation of the probability amplitude
in the context of quantum electrodynamics.
The starting point is the use of Green functions to express probability amplitudes
of the system under consideration.17 Feynman expresses the solution to Schrodinger’s
17

Informally, a Green function turns the operator into a delta function, thereby making possible
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equation ψ(x2 , t2 ) in terms of an initial state times the Green function (which will
act as a propagator for the initial wave function):18
ψ(x2 , t2 ) =

Z

K(2, 1)ψ(x1 , t1 )d3 x1

Because ψ(x2 , t2 ) can also be expressed as: ψ(x2 , t2 ) = exp(−iH(t2 − t1 ))ψ(x2 , t1 ) and
ψ(x2 , t1 ) can be expressed as a superposition of eigenfunctions φn of the Hamiltonian,
Feynman obtains that for t2 > t1 :
K(2, 1) =

X

φ∗n (x1 )φn (x2 ) exp(−iEn (t2 − t1 ))

(4.16)

n

As emphasized in (Feynman 1949b, p. 750), K(2, 1) is “the total amplitude
for arrival at x2 , t2 starting from x1 , t1 ” and it “results from adding an amplitude,
exp{iS}, for each space time path between these [x1 , t1 and x2 , t2 ] points, where
S is the action along the path”. Furthermore, Feynman sets that for t2 < t1 the
propagator K(2, 1) = 0 in such a way that the expression for the wave function
ψ(2) = K(2, 1)ψ(1)d3 x is not valid.
R

To familiarize with the Green function and the method thus far suggested, Feynman discusses the case of a particle in a potential U (x, t) and assumes the potential
to be different than zero only in the interval ∆t3 such that: (t1 < t3 + ∆t3 < t2 ).
Because of perturbation theory, it is possible to expand the Green function K as:
K(2, 1) = K0 (2, 1) + K (1) (2, 1) + K (2) (2, 1) + ..., where K0 (2, 1) is the free propagator
from the initial to final spacetime point expressed as a path integral:
K0 (2, 1) =

Z

i

D[x(t)]e ~ S0

(4.17)

The subsequent terms in the expansion correspond to the multiple interactions that
the particle has with the the potential when the potential is different than zero.
to find the solution to the associated differential equation. Feynman became familiar with the use
of Green functions during his time at Los Alamos.
18

Equation (2) in (Feynman 1949b, p. 750).
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Feynman derives that for the extended time ∆t3 , if the particle interacts once with
the potential U , then the amplitude of the particle to undergo that single interaction
is (Feynman 1949b, p. 750):
K (1) (2, 1) = −i

Z

K0 (2, 3)U (3)K0 (3, 1)dτ3

(4.18)

where dτ3 = d3 x3 dt3 . The ‘physical meaning’ of the equation is that a particle freely
propagates from (x1 , t1 ), then it undergoes a scattering (that is, it interacts with the
potential) which is represented by the term U (3) and it ultimately freely propagates
to the final spacetime point (x2 , t1 ). Furthermore, the initial and final states define a
‘spacetime boundary’ within which we need perturbation theory to properly calculate
the interaction of the particle with the potential.
What does ‘properly calculate’ mean though? The probability amplitude calculated by means of free-propagator only is not ‘precise’ enough. One needs to calculate
the first order expansion of K and, to gain even further precision, one resorts to higher
and higher order expansions of the propagator, where each new order corresponds to
a new scattering of the particle.19 For instance, if the particle is scattered a second
time, then one needs to expand the propagator to its second order (Feynman 1949b,
p. 750):
K (2) (2, 1) = (−i)2

Z Z

K0 (2, 4)U (4)K0 (4, 3)U (3)K0 (3, 1)dτ3 dτ4

(4.19)

thereby obtaining that the particle interacts with the potential at two distinct points
and times —in this case: U (4) and U (3) as represented in Figure 3(b).
To clarify the matter further, we imagine the spacetime boundary defined by the
initial and final states as the walls of a black box inside of which there is a potential.
We only know that when the particle passes through the first wall it gets out from the
19

It is in this sense that perturbation theory looks like a fine-grained analysis of the possible
interactions that might occur between the particle and the potential when the potential is different
than zero.
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Figure 4.3 First (a) and second (b) order solutions to Schrodinger (and Dirac) equation
can be visualized as single (a) and double (b) scattering of a particle in a potential. The
figure is taken from: (Feynman 1949b, p. 751).

second wall, but whatever happens inside the box is unbeknown to us. Perturbation
theory allows us to switch on a torchlight on a precise point inside the box, so that
we can see the particle interacting with the potential. If we then turn on the light a
second time and then a third a fourth etc., we will also be able to see the particle a
second, a third and a fourth time. Whenever we switch the light on, that corresponds
to a further expansion of K(2, 1). It is in this sense that further expansions of K(2, 1)
amount to giving a ‘close look’ at what happens to the particle interacting with the
potential. However, each expansion provides a probability amplitude that adds up to
the final amplitude, which is then calculated by gluing together all the times we have
switched on our torchlight (i.e., by gluing together all the probability amplitudes of
further interactions with the potential).
The use of perturbation theory to derive the complete transition amplitude in
the case of interacting systems is similar, at least conceptually-wise, to the inductive
way of constructing the transition amplitude in the case of non-relativistic quantum
mechanics as presented in Feynman’s thesis. There, after deriving the transition
amplitude for infinitesimal time intervals, the total transition amplitude is calculated
by dividing the time interval into many infinitesimal time intervals and by integrating
over all of their transition amplitudes. Similarly, perturbation theory fine-grains the
possible interactions that either an electron or a photon undergo within the spacetime
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boundary defined by the initial and final states. The difference is that, instead of
having now a particle freely propagating in spacetime, one needs to account for the
interactions that this particle undergoes. Each order in the expansion, as understood
in the theory of positron, corresponds to a different interaction between (say) the
electron and the field, thus leading to the gluing of all the various terms in the
expansion (the various possible interactions) to obtain the total transition amplitude
for the interacting system. This same strategy is then further generalized to the case
of Feynman diagrams where electrons and photons not only interact with a potential,
but they interact with each other.

4.3.3

Relativity and Dirac

Before moving on, let’s take stock of this initial treatment of perturbation theory and
the use of Green function. To calculate the amplitude of a free-moving particle one
needs to take into account all the possible trajectories the particle might undertake.
Then, once we add an interaction with a potential, to calculate the the total amplitude
we divide the problem in three different steps. The first one is the free-propagation of
the particle approaching the interval, the second one is the particle interacting with
the potential for a given time interval and, ultimately, the particle freely propagates
away from the potential. To calculate the amplitude of the interaction phenomena,
Feynman uses perturbation theory to expand the propagator (Green function) of
the particle, thereby obtaining a series of possible events —each with an assigned
probability amplitude— corresponding to the different terms of the expansion. It is
to obtain a more precise result for the amplitude that one calculates higher order of
the expansion, but the final amplitude is ultimately calculated by summing over all
these possible events. In this sense, while perturbation theory alone amounts to a
further specification of the possible events within the time interval of the interaction,
the total amplitude is obtained by summing all these possible events.
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We have then an evolution of the overall spacetime view: from ‘all the possible
trajectories’ to ‘all the possible interactions of a particle with an external potential’.
However, thus far all these possible events proceed forward in time. This changes
with the treatment of the Dirac equation.
The treatment of the Dirac equation is conceptually analogous to that of the
Schrodinger equation, i.e., it can also be visualized as describing the scattering of
waves by a potential with the potential with U now being replaced by the scalar and
vector potential times the electric charge (the potential is now denoted with A).

Figure 4.4 The Dirac equation admits negative energies solutions of a scattered wave
(a). The second order processes are represented in (b) and (c) where the former represents
a double scattering and the latter an electron-positron pair creation. Feynman interprets
(c) as double scattering similar to (b) but with the electron traveling backward in time.
The figure is taken from: (Feynman 1949b, p. 752).

However, the main difference is that the Dirac equation admits negative energy
solutions (as also visualized in Figure 4(a)) coming from the fact that a free particle
q

has energy E = ± (p2 − µ2 ). The negative solutions are not problematic in the
classical case, as pointed out in (Heitler 1984, p. 110): “because one can define energy
to be the positive square root, and then it does not change in time”. On the other
hand, the quantum case is trickier and that is because of the possible transitions of
the particle from a positive to a negative energy state.
The wave equation [...] refers equally well to an electron with charge e
as to one with charge −e. [...] One gets over the difficulty on the classical
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theory by arbitrarily excluding those solutions that have a negative W
[term of energy which is replaced by i~∂/∂t in Klein Gordon equation].
One cannot do this on the quantum theory, since in general a perturbation will cause transitions from states with W positive to states with W
negative. Such a transition would appear experimentally as the electron
suddenly changing its charge from −e to +e, a phenomenon which has not
been observed. The true relativity wave equation should thus be such that
its solutions split up into two non-combining sets, referring respectively
to the charge −e and the charge +e (Dirac 1928, p. 612).20
To account for the extra solution of the equation, (Dirac 1930) suggests that the
positive energy solutions of the wave equation amount to particle-behaving holes in
a sea of negative energies:
Let us assume there are so many electrons in the world that all the
most stable states are occupied, or, more accurately, that all the states of
negative energy are occupied except perhaps a few of small velocity. Any
electrons with positive energy will now have very little chance of jumping
into negative-energy states and will therefore behave like electrons are
observed to behave in the laboratory. We shall have an infinite number
of electrons in negative-energy states, and indeed an infinite number per
unit volume all over the world, but if their distribution is exactly uniform
we should expect them to be completely unobservable. Only the small
departures from exact uniformity, brought about by some of the negativeenergy states being unoccupied, can we hope to observe. (Dirac 1930,
p. 362)
20

The double solution fits well with the description of the spin components by means of 4x4
matrices. An accurate historical overview of the development of the Dirac equation can be found
in: (Valente 2020), (Pais 1986) and (Kragh 1990).
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In the same work Dirac also suggests —it was actually an idea by Weyl— that the
positive energy particle ought to be a proton and thus the wave equation describes
the dynamics of both protons and electrons. However. as reconstructed in (Pais
1986), Dirac was never fully convinced of interpreting the positive energy solutions
as representing a proton, especially because of the problem of the charge and mass
conservation. In 1928, though, that seemed to be the only answer because protons and
electron were the only known subatomic particles. Finally, it is in a letter to Bohr that
Dirac introduces the double transition interpretation which is now (after the discovery
of the positron) known as the electron-positron creation which is represented in figure
4(c).21
Thus, the second order processes, as represented in Figure 4(b, c) can be interpreted in Dirac’s theory as a double scattering of an electron wave traveling forward
in time and as an electron-positron pair creation at A(4):
A pair could be created by the potential A(4) at 4, the electron of
which is that found later at 2. The positron (or rather, the hole) proceeds
to 3 where it annihilates the electron which has arrived there from 1
(Feynman 1949b, p. 752).
The novelty of Feynman’s approach was to reject the pair-creation mechanism
in favor of taking the positron as an electron moving backward in time. He first
determined the propagation of a free particle from the Dirac equation as: (i∇21 −
m)K+ (2, 1) = iδ(2, 1) where K+ (2, 1) plays the role of the free propagator and its
first and second order corrections are, by analogy with (4.18) and (4.19) (Feynman
1949b, p. 752):
(1)
K+ (2, 1)
21

= −i

Z

K+ (2, 3)A(3)K+ (3, 1)dτ3

For more on this, see: (Pais 1986) and (Heitler 1984)
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(4.20)

and
(2)

K+ (2, 1) = −

Z Z

K+ (2, 4)A(4)K+ (4, 3)A(3)K+ (3, 1)dτ3 dτ4

(4.21)

Then, while it would be easy to take K0 (2, 1) as equal to K+ (2, 1), Feynman recognized that it was not a viable possibility anymore, for the negative energy solutions
need now to be accounted for in the theory. He thus re-interpreted the Green function
from (4.16) into:

K+ (2, 1) =

X

φn+ (2)φ∗n+ (1) × exp(−iEn (t2 − t1 ))

(4.22)

n+

for t2 > t1 , and
K+ (2, 1) = −

X

φn− (2)φ∗n− (1) × exp(−iEn (t2 − t1 ))

(4.23)

n−

for t2 < t1 . While the negative energy solution —which amounts to the negative sum
in equation (4.23)— was interpreted in the Dirac hole theory as the negative energy
particle (a hole) moving along with the electron, Feynman reinterpreted it as the same
electron represented by equation (4.22) but moving backward in time. Both negative
and positive solutions are thus accounted for by the integral in equation (4.21):
The expressions such as (4.21) [(14) in the original] can still be described as a passage of the electron from 1 to 3 (K+ (3, 1)), scattering at
3 by A(4), arriving finally at 2. The scattering may, however, be toward
both future and past times, an electron propagating backwards in time
being recognized as positron (Feynman 1949b, p. 753)
The original manuscript provides, as emphasized by the metaphor of the collodion cube, a more philosophically oriented explanation which thereby emphasizes
Feynman’s physical understanding of quantum electrodynamics phenomena:
The author [Feynman] has found that the relations are often very
much more simply analyzed if the entire time history be considered as
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one pattern: The entire phenomena is considered as all laid out in the
four dimensions of time and space, and that we come upon the successive
events.22
One could question whether Feynman first wished for a theory with electrons
traveling backward in time and then derived the new propagator, or rather, whether
he first derived the new propagator from the comparison with the Dirac hole theory
and then interpreted the negative energies as backward electrons.23 For example,
(Mehra 1994), maintains that Feynman was tweaking with the propagator and found
out that the use of the minus sign gave the correct result. But then, because of the
dissatisfaction with the negative energy term, Feynman reinterpreted it as an electron
moving backward in time. This is similar to the reconstruction by (Schweber 1986)
where it is emphasized (similarly to Mehra) that the comparison with the hole theory
by Dirac is what led Feynman to the new propagator and therefrom to the new
interpretation. However, Schweber also points out that in the manuscript of the 1949
paper: ‘The Theory of Positron’, Feynman already presents his doubts about the
complexity of hole theory:
One of the disadvantages of this [hole] theory is that even the simplest
processes become quite complicated in its analysis. One must take into
account besides the limited number of real particles, the infinite number
of electrons in the sea. The present work results from a reinterpretation
of the Dirac equation so that this complexity is not required.24
Wuthrich, on his part, focuses on equation (4.21) and emphasizes that in hole
22

Quoted in: (Schweber 1986, p. 489) from: Feynman, 1947, unpublished manuscript.

23

Feynman was already aware of the possibility of the electron traveling backward in time because
Wheeler had pitched him the idea that there could be only one electron in the universe moving back
and forth in time, see: (Schweber 1986, p. 460).
24

Cited in: (Schweber 1986, p. 488).

126

theory: “[...] there are two physical processes that contribute quantitatively to such
a second-order correction: the electron may be scattered twice by the potential, or
an electron-positron pair may be created in an intermediate state of the process”
(Wüthrich 2010, p. 121). On the other hand, equation (4.21) includes both processes
in one single second-order correction term, and thus: “Feynman proposes an alternative interpretation. An interpretation, that is, in which only one, not two, physical
processes corresponds to the one quantitative expression. If a positron is viewed not
as a “hole” but as an electron moving backwards in time, the creation of an electronpositron pair and the subsequent annihilation of the positron can be described as the
sequence of propagations of a single electron [both backward and forward in time]
(Wüthrich 2010, p. 122)”.
Alternatively, (Blum 2017) seems to suggest that Feynman tweaked the form of
the propagator to obtain a term for waves propagating backward in time: “His new
method was to modify the Green Function obtained from the Dirac equation taken
as a one particle equation (4.16) [Eq.(38) in the original], so that the intermediate
negative energy states would propagate backwards in time”.
Notably, assessing the chronological order of ideas is somewhat problematic because the order of publications of the various papers does not fully represent the
order of Feynman’s thinking process. This is evident if we consider that, for example,
Feynman had already presented his theory of electrodynamics at the Pocono conference in April 1948. But, due to the lackluster reception of his talk, Feynman decided
to publish his work on papers.25 As a matter of fact, shortly after the conference,
Feynman publishes in order: (Feynman 1948a), (Feynman 1948b), (Feynman 1949b)
and (Feynman 1949a).
25

Feynman recalls: “It’s very simple, I’ll have to publish this and so on, let them read it and study
it, because it’s right.” As reported in: Interview of Richard Feynman by Charles Weiner on 1966
June 27, Niels Bohr Library & Archives, American Institute of Physics, College Park, MD USA,
www.aip.org/history-programs/niels-bohr-library/oral-histories/5020-3. A detailed commentary of
the Pocono conference can be found also in: (Schweber 1986).
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Nonetheless, what remains is that the new physical interpretation, as opposed
to the Dirac pair-creation, brings back the original idea of the absorber theory for
which radiation can travel backward in time and thereby shows a consistency with
the overall spacetime view. While the absorber theory of radiation was characterized
by advanced radiation influencing the strength of the field of the accelerated particle
in the present, path integrals, on the other hand, were representative of a view for
which a quantum particle seems to undergo all the possible trajectories. Finally, the
theory of positron expands the idea of ‘all the possible paths’ to ‘all the possible
interactions’ that could occur under the effect of a potential where such interactions
evolve both forward and backward in time.

4.3.4

Feynman Diagrams

The article (Feynman 1949a) can be taken as an expansion of the arguments in
the theory of positron to interacting electrons, positrons and photons.26 The basic
idea is still to use Green functions and perturbation expansions to represent physical
processes corresponding to higher order terms:
Furthermore, each term in the expansion can be written down and
understood directly from a physical point of view, similar to the spacetime view (Feynman 1949b) [I in the original] (Feynman 1949a, p. 769)
Similarly to his work on the theory of positron, Feynman begins discussing the
interaction picture by considering the solutions of Schódinger equation for particles
26

Mehra (1994, p. 284) seems to remark a philosophical shift in Feynman’s paper on quantum
electrodynamics: “Here one can see an important change in the evolution of Feynman’s belief about
the two forms of electrodynamics. He did not insist anymore on the action-at-a-distance theory as
the only right form. Instead of this he tried to use both the forms in a most practical way.” But, as
I pointed out earlier, such a change is already made explicit by Feynman in his work on the theory
of positron.
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interacting instantaneously. He will then proceed to generalize his account to delayed
interactions and relativistic particles.27
The first step is to define the free propagator for two particles a and b to move
from (xa , xb ) to (x0a , x0b ) as:
K(xa , xb , t; x0a , x0b , t0 ) = K0a (xa , t; x0a , t0 )K0b (xb , t; x0b , t0 )
≡ K0 (3, 4; 1, 2) = K0a (3, 1)K0b (4, 2) (4.24)
Feynman stipulates that at t1 = t2 and t3 = t4 the two particles are well separated,
i.e., at the initial and final spacetime positions the interaction is ‘turned off’ similarly
to the case of the potential in the theory of positron. Feynman, in analogy with
equation (4.18), calculates that if the interaction between two particles is mediated
by a Coulomb potential during an infinitesimal time, the first order correction to
(4.24) is (Feynman 1949a, p. 772):
K (1) (3, 4; 1, 2) = −i2

Z Z

−1
K0 (3, 5)K0 (4, 6)r5,6
δ(t56 )K0 (5, 1)K0 (6, 2)dτ5 dτ6

(4.25)

where the delta function makes the integrand non-zero if the interaction is instantaneous (t5 = t6 ). But, since the potential which is acting between the two separate
particles cannot be instantaneous (because of relativity), Feynman’s initial solution
is to replace r−1 δ(t56 ) in equation (4.25) with r−1 δ(t56 − r56 ), where: t56 ≡ (t5 − t6 )
and r56 is the time the interaction needs to travel from one particle to the other.28
But, fields are represented as quantum harmonic oscillators, as recalled in (Wüthrich
2010, p. 134):
While working on the cut-off papers [...], Feynman becomes used to
representing a classical electromagnetic potential as an assembly of harmonic oscillators and, in the quantum case, to conceiving of the interaction
27

Feynman explains the difference between the overall spacetime view and the Hamiltonian in
view in that the former, which employs delayed interactions, is bets suited to account for virtual
phenomena, i.e., close interactions.
28

The actual term should be r56 /c, but Feynman had set c = 1 for simplicity.
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as being brought about by emissions and absorptions of of the quanta of
these oscillators —the photons.
Therefore, since the Fourier transform of the delta function r−1 δ(t56 −r56 ) had positive
and negative frequencies, Feynman had to restrain the result to positive frequencies
−1
−1
only: r56
δ+ (s256 ).29 The new function results from the combination of r56
δ+ (t56 − r56 )
−1
for t5 > t6 and r56
δ+ (−t56 − r56 ) for t5 < t6 which amounts to particle a receiving a

photon and particle b emitting it, and vice versa. The final result is that r−1 δ(s56 ) is
2
“replaced by δ+ (s256 ) where s256 = t256 − r56
is the square of the relativistically invariant

interval between points 5 and 6” (Feynman 1949a, p. 772).30

Figure 4.5

(Feynman 1949a, p. 772)

Having defined the appropriate delta function for the delayed interaction, the
first-order correction to the interaction represented in figure 4.5 is thus:
K

(1)

(3, 4; 1, 2) = −ie

2

Z Z

K+a (3, 5)K+b γaµ γbµ δ+ (s256 )K+a (5, 1)K+b (6, 2)dτ5 dτ6
(4.26)

Equation (4.26) describes the fundamental interaction in Feynman’s quantum electrodynamics: the exchange of one photon (quantum) between two electrons. Such basic interaction marks a departure from one of the premises of Feynman and Wheeler’s
29

The restriction to positive frequencies only amounts to having an electrodynamics of retarded
interaction only. The point is also emphasized in (Mehra 1994, p. 231).
30

Cf. figure 4.5.
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absorber theory: the future response of the absorber as part of the mechanism of radiation. Furthermore, Feynman also notices that the premise of the direct action
theory is incompatible with the interpretation of the positron being an electron traveling backward in time. It is in a letter that Feynman writes to Wheeler in 1951 that
the physicist questions and shows the demise of the premises of his absorber theory
and the incompatibility with his positron theory:31
I wanted to know what your opinion was about our old theory of action
at a distance. It was based on two assumptions:
(1) Electrons act only on other electrons
(2) They do so with the mean of retarded and advanced potentials
The second proposition may be correct but I wish to deny the correctness
of the first. The evidence is twofold. First there is the Lamb shift in the
hydrogen which is supposedly due to the self-action of the electrons. [...]
The second argument involves the idea that positrons are electrons going
backward in time. If this were the case, an electron and positron which
are destined to annihilate one another would not interact according to
proposition one, since they are actually the same charge.32
However, the advance radiation in the absorber theory had the purpose of justifying the self interaction of the electron with its own field. By abandoning the premise
of radiation going backward in time, Feynman explained the self-interaction of the
electron by using his new quantum electrodynamics interaction, as shown in 4.6(a)
below:
The self action of the electron is now represented by the particle freely propagating
to spacetime point 3 and to then emitting a virtual photon that gets reabsorbed at a
31

The point is also made in (Sauer 2008) and (Schweber 1986).

32

R. P. Feynman to J. A. Wheeler, 4 May 1951, Feynman Papers, Caltech, folder 3.10. The
complete quote can be found in: (Schweber 1986, p. 503).
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Figure 4.6

(a):(Feynman 1949a, p. 773). (b):(Feynman 1949a, p. 774).

later spacetime point 4. The self action thus consists of a spontaneous emission and
subsequent absorption of a photon. The transition amplitude for such self interaction
process assumes the form (Feynman 1949a, p. 774):
(1)

k (2, 1) = −iσ

2

Z Z

K+ (2, 4)γµ k+ (4, 3)γµ K+ (3, 1)dτ3 dτ4 δ+ (s243 )

(4.27)

From equation (4.27) Feynman derives the change of energy brought about by the
self interaction (the self energy):
∆E = e2

Z Z

(ūγµ K+ (4, 3)γµ u) exp{(ip · x43 )}δ+ (s243 )dτ4

(4.28)

However, for such a process to happen —and the ones corresponding to the increasing orders in the perturbation theory— the electron must lose some energy which
is thus ‘bestowed’ to the photon. Wouldn’t this borrowing of energy cause the ‘collapse’ of the electron? This might be even more concerning if we consider subsequent
orders in the expansion, where the electron already deprived of the energy for the first
photon would have to borrow energy to another photon etc., thereby enforcing the
worry about the disappearance of the initial electron. Although it is not my purpose
to investigate the role of virtual and real particles here, the reply to the worry is
‘simply’ that because of the short interval in which these interactions happen, the
energy-momentum relation does not need to be respected.
Similarly to the case of the positron theory, increasing precision in the calculation
of the transition amplitude of a given quantum electrodynamics process involves the
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calculation of increasing orders in perturbation theory, where each subsequent order
will consist of combinations of the fundamental interaction between electrons and the
self action of the electron with itself. Since Feynman associated a specific expression to
every graphic element of his diagrams, more complicated calculations became possible
by iteration of the fundamental processes and corresponding expressions. As Feynman
will recall many years later:
The diagrams were intended to represent physical processes and the
mathematical expressions used to describe them. Each diagram signified
a mathematical expression. In these diagrams I was seeing things that
happened in space and time. (Mehra 1994, p. 290):
We can consider, as an example, the amplitude of the leading order of the positronelectron scattering which is calculated by considering both diagrams:
e+

e+

e−

e+
γ

+

γ
e−

e+

e−

= ge2 M1 + ge2 M2

(4.29)

e−

where ge2 is related to the coupling constant by: ge2 = 4πα and M1 , M2 are
the amplitudes calculated on the basis of the diagrams above.33 By increasing the
perturbation order and thus by accounting for more complex processes one obtains a
more precise transition amplitude, which also means that the vertexes of the diagrams
become more numerous. For example, as shown in (4.30), one can consider the self
interaction of a fermion with itself via production of a virtual particle, or one can
calculate an additional interaction between the two fermions or, in the last diagram,
one can have a virtual photon splitting into a electron-positron pair (diagram that is
usually associated with phenomena of vacuum polarization).
33
I have used the term ‘consider’ because usually the amplitudes of the diagrams in the same
order are summed, but that depends also on the calculated sign of each amplitude.
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(4.30)
All these diagrams add-up (for example) to those in (4.30) in such a way that
the amplitudes of the higher order processes also contribute to the calculation of the
total final amplitude. Thus, for example, the total amplitude of the positron-electron
scattering is best characterized not only by the two second-order processes, but also
by the subsequent orders of the perturbation expansion.34 It is in this sense that
Feynman Diagrams constitute the final version of the overall spacetime view: one
that considers all the possible events within the spacetime boundary defined by the
initial and final states.35

4.4

Conclusion

In this chapter I have reconstructed how the notion of overall spacetime view that
was originally employed by Feynman in his absorber theory of radiation has changed.
Starting from a view that involved radiation traveling backward in time, Feynman
attempted to quantize the theory incurring though into a number of difficulties such
that a final quantization remains nowadays incomplete. Nonetheless, during such
attempts, Feynman ended up developing a new form of quantization (and thus a
new formulation of quantum mechanics): the path integrals formulation. The main
difference with respect to the absorber theory, more specifically in terms of the overall
spacetime view, is that to calculate the transition amplitude of a particle moving from
an initial to a final spacetime point one ought to sum over all the possible trajectories
34

It does not concern us here that the integrals above a certain order will diverge. However, the
probability amplitude for those processes is negligible.
35

I have not discussed vacuum polarization, to which Feynman dedicates a whole section of (Feynman 1949a). Ultimately, the problem will be solved with the implementation of the renormalization
techniques.
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that the particle might undertake. This amounts to a generalization of the overall
spacetime view: from the idea that some radiation can travel backward in time to
the idea that the propagation of a quantum particle happens along all the possible
paths.
While the two mentioned theories are of great relevance to Feynman’s work, the
present chapter has focused mostly on the theory of positron and quantum electrodynamics. Following Feynman’s heuristic, as addressed in terms of the search for a
physical understanding of the theories, I have addressed how the use of perturbation
theory has contributed to the change of the overall spacetime view. Now, with the
theory of positrons, it is not only that the electron (or a quantum particle) undergoes all the possible trajectories, but rather the electron undergoes all the possible
interactions with a given potential. Furthermore, it is in the theory of positron that
a more specific understanding of the overall spacetime view is addressed, one that
comes with the rejection of the intuition of studying the dynamics of a quantum system interacting with a potential by following the total charge of the system, rather
than the Hamiltonian of each particle.
Finally, the paper on quantum electrodynamics constitutes the extension of positron
theory to interaction phenomena between electrons and positrons. Notably, the theory drops the hypothesis of the single electron and introduces two fundamental interaction from which all the others are derived. These interactions (positron-electron
scattering and self-interaction) are the basis for the more complex phenomena of
quantum electrodynamics.
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Chapter 5
Visualization and Understanding of Quantum
Phenomena
5.1

Introduction

The present chapter aims at clarifying an important implicit assumption that I have
left lingering around in the previous chapters of this dissertation. Such assumption
involves the epistemological character of the overall spacetime view and the type
of scientific understanding of quantum phenomena that Feynman had when he was
developing his famous diagrams. I will argue that such understanding came from the
physicist’s capacity of forming a partial visualization of the phenomena and that this
visualization helped him write the appropriate equations for the calculation of the
scattering amplitude.
Historically, the importance of partial visualization in physical theories has already
been discussed. For example, Boltzmann (1974) believed that theories should provide
pictures of the physical world that guide scientific thought and experiment. These
pictures, though, should not be considered as faithful representations (one-to-one) of
physical phenomena. Similarly, Schrödinger believed that spacetime visualizability
contributes to the making of good scientific theories —even though the theories are
not representative of the real world. How do these considerations apply to the case
of Feynman diagrams? One possible answer is provided in De Regt (2017) where an
extensive analysis of the relation between visualizability, intelligibility and scientific
understanding is laid out.
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The starting point of De Regt’s analysis is that: “Scientists seek explanations that
fit the phenomenon to be explained into a theoretical framework and connect it with
relevant background knowledge” (De Regt 2017, p. 36). The connection between the
theoretical knowledge, the background knowledge, and the phenomenon is based on
the construction of appropriate models which ultimately provide the explanation to
the phenomenon. What are the characteristics that the theories should have to be able
to facilitate the construction of such phenomena-explaining models? The suggestion
is that: “scientists prefer theories with properties that facilitate the construction of
models for explaining phenomena, and that is the case if their skills are attuned
to these properties” (De Regt 2017, p. 39). This means that scientists search for
theoretical virtues (for example: simplicity and visualizability) also in relation to
their own scientific skills. When such a combination between theoretical virtues and
scientific skills is met, De Regt argues that we have a pragmatic understanding.
It is at this point that De Regt introduces his newly forged definition of intelligibility, to be intended as the value assigned by a scientist (or group of scientists) to
the qualities of a scientific theory that make the theory more usable. The usability of
a theory is then referred to as the capacity of scientists to build explanatory models
for a given phenomenon starting from that theory. In other words, in De Regt’s view,
(i) the understanding of a phenomenon comes from an explanation which is provided
by a model. Then, (ii) the model is constructed starting from the pragmatic understanding of a theory and (iii) the pragmatic understanding of a theory is to be
understood in terms of intelligibility —to wit, we have an understanding of a given
theory when we can use that theory to build models that can provide an explanation
to some phenomena. Visualizability, which is a property I will discuss in this chapter in relation to Feynman’s works is, according to De Regt, a quality that makes a
theory (QED) intelligible.
With respect to Feynman diagrams, (De Regt 2017, p. 252) maintains that: “vi-
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sual Feynman diagrams functioned as conceptual tools that made quantum field theory more intelligible for most theoretical physicists”. While I can agree on the sociological effect that the diagrams had in the scientific community (cf: (Kaiser 2009)),
the claim seems at odds with how Feynman developed the diagrams, especially in
light of the overall spacetime view.
In what follows, I will maintain that Feynman did not develop the diagrams to
make quantum electrodynamics more intelligible, but rather, that the visualization
of quantum phenomena and the consequent writing down of the diagrams were fundamental to the development of quantum electrodynamics in the first place. More
specifically, I will argue that the explanations of a given phenomenon, that is, the
writing of mathematical equations attuned with the empirical data, come from a form
of partial understanding of that phenomenon. The understanding is only partial since
it is not backed by a ‘one-to-one’ representation with physical reality, and it is intended as providing an answer to plausible explanatory why-questions. For example,
we can interpret such an understanding as the capacity of providing a narrative of
how a given phenomenon comes to be, where, for example, the phenomenon is the
shift in the 2p1/2 and 2s1/2 spectral lines of the Hydrogen atom (Lamb shift). In
the present chapter, though, I will not provide an assessment of what such narrative corresponds to, as this would require some precise account of representation of
quantum processes (the topic is still being discussed in the literature, cf.: (Dorato
and Rossanese 2018), (Brown 2018), (Meynell 2018), and others). What I will argue
is that the form of partial understanding came, in the case of Feynman diagrams,
from the capacity of visualizing a physical interpretation of the phenomenon under
consideration and, more in general, from the overall spacetime view.
In support of this reading, we can consider some historical examples: (1) Feynman’s attempt to understand the Dirac equation is based on his previous works on
path integrals, but it is also guided by the intention of visualizing a physical system
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that satisfies the equations, i.e., the quivering electron and the path counting. The
example shows that Feynman’s method of searching for a physical, partially visualizable system, traces back to his previous theories. Notably, this should also clarify
that the visualization of phenomena, that I argue helped Feynman developing the diagrams, was not the product of an isolated mental reasoning. Feynman’s background
was the overall spacetime view, as I have analyzed in this dissertation, but also those
theories and equations that proved to be empirically adequate. In this sense, for
example, Feynman ‘reinvented’ the physical interpretation of the Dirac equation via
visualization and overall spacetime view, but the Dirac equation remained essential to
Feynman’s thinking process and necessary to his theory. (2) Feynman’s presentation
at the Pocono conference was ill-received because it made use of the diagrammatic
simplifications to avoid some mathematical complexities and the audience was not
used to such visual-based thinking. The lackluster reception of his talk forced Feynman to publish his works in a mathematically more rigorous way. What emerges from
examples (1) and (2) is that the use of visualization techniques was fundamental to
Feynman’s scientific method and theory building, and that it was fundamental to the
development of the actual theory, and not not just to its understanding.
In what follows I will briefly address De Regt’s view and its philosophical background (Section 2), then I will argue that Feynman’s overall spacetime view aimed at
understanding the phenomena, rather than the theory (Section 3). In Section 3 and
Section 4 I will discuss the role payed by visualizability in Feynman’s theorizing and,
more specifically, I will emphasize its use in the theory of the quivering electron.

5.2

Boltzmann and De Regt

Before diving deeper into De Regt’s account of scientific understanding, it is perhaps
worth taking a detour and look at Boltzmann’s philosophy of science and theory
of picture (Bildtheorie). Since the latter directly influenced De Regt’s account of
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understanding for Feynman diagrams, this detour shall give us some historical and
conceptual context, together with the tools to better capture Feynman’s understanding of quantum phenomena.
Generally speaking: Boltzmann suggests that we should find pictures that represent phenomena as accurately as possible, and not the absolute truthful theory. With
this, he remarks his difference from a naive realist conception of scientific theories
and thus rejects the one-to-one correspondence between theory and physical reality.
(Boltzmann 1974, p. 33):“Task of theory consists in constructing a
picture of the external world that exists purely internally and must be
our guiding star in all thought and experiment.”
(Boltzmann 1974, pp. 90–91): “No theory can be objective, actually coinciding with nature, but rather, [...] each theory is only a mental picture
of phenomena, related to them as sign is to designatum.”
While Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie (theory of picture) has been mostly viewed in the
context of epistemological questions —that is, mainly about the relation between
physical reality and scientific theory— De Regt (1999) investigates how the Bildtheorie relates to the explanatory purpose of science, i.e.: how pictures “contribute to
the scientific understanding of natural phenomena” (De Regt 1999, p. 114).1
For example: a question about the kinetic theory of gasses is whether picturing the
atoms offers a better understanding of the behavior of the gas. Boltzmann answers
in the affirmative, even though there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the
picture (Bild) and the phenomena. As addressed in De Regt and Dieks (2005, p. 223):
“Kinetic theory of gasses does not have a literally true representation of reality but
provides a picture [Bild] that possesses a certain similarity with unobservable reality.
In general, theories should not pretend to give true representations of states of affairs
1
More on the general aspects of Boltzmann’s theory of picture in the context of philosophy of
science: (Hiebert 1980), (De Regt 1996).
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and processes in nature, but only to describe mechanisms that have a strong analogy
with natural phenomena.”
However, modern physics made evident the limits of a view of scientific understanding based on mechanical models; the same Boltzmann acknowledged those limits
for theories such as classical electrodynamics. How should we understand the reference to ‘mechanisms’ then? De Regt (1999, p. 122) reports Boltzmann’s answer:
“What, then, is meant by having perfectly correct understanding of a mechanism?
Everybody knows that the practical criterion for this consists in being able to handle
it correctly. However, I go further and assert that this is the only tenable definition
of understanding a mechanism (Boltzmann, 1974, 150)”. It is from this latter point
that De Regt builds a more structured theory of scientific understanding, one that
starts from “the idea that scientific understanding of a phenomenon is achieved if
one possesses a theory of it that is both empirically adequate and intelligible”, and
a theory is intelligible if “one is able to recognize at least qualitatively its consequences without performing exact calculations” (De Regt 1999, pp. 122–123). Thus,
while intelligibility assumes a pragmatic sense, visualizability —which is grounded
on mechanical explanation— is a useful tool, but not a necessary condition for the
intelligibility of theories in physics.2

5.3

Feynman’s Look at the Phenomena

How do such considerations about ‘understanding’ relate to this dissertation? I intend
to pry into De Regt’s new tool (intelligibility) and show that the application of
his theory of understanding is misleading when applied to Feynman’s works, even
2

De Regt mentions the distinction between two different interpretations of mechanical picture
(as originally presented by Boltzmann) for which, on the one hand, we have a physical theory that
can be regarded as a picture and, on the other hand, “one may employ specific mechanical analogies
in order to obtain visualization (Versinnlichung) of the consequences of a theory” (De Regt 1999,
p. 116). The distinction serves the purpose of keeping separated the use of visualizability and
pictures as forms of representation, and their use for scientific understanding.
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though some of the concepts and references can and do play an important role in
understanding Feynman’s understanding of quantum phenomena.3
The starting point is the pivotal (and new) concept of De Regt’s view, which is
the concept of intelligibility defined as:
Intelligibility: Value that scientists attribute to the cluster of qualities that facilitate the use of the theory (De Regt 2017, p. 12)
The definition implies that, among the different qualities a theory might have,
there are some that concern the usability of such theory for building explanatory
models, and that intelligibility is a value attributed to a theory and assigned by one
(or more) group of scientists. Consequently (as De Regt will clarify), insofar as different scientists are members of different research contexts, and different values can
be attributed to the same qualities, intelligibility will be a contextual concept. In
addition, and this is more relevant for my purposes here, the definition emphasizes
how the concept of intelligibility applies to theories and not to phenomena. Moreover,
because the concept of intelligibility directly refers to the attribution of a qualitative
value by some scientists, it suggests (at least in its definition) a component of subjectivism. If intelligibility (as we will see below) is fundamental to De Regt’s view of
scientific understanding and the concept implies subjectivism, then scientific understanding will also be subjective. But, De Regt argues that there is more to scientific
understanding than the division between objective understanding (i.e., explanation)
and the subjective understanding which is dependent on psychological factors. In fact,
he proposes a more sophisticated account which is based on the distinction between:
• Phenomenology of Understanding (PU): It is the feeling of understanding that
may accompany an explanation (e.g., an aha! or eureka experience).
3

What I will not do, however, is to fight against the general project advocated by De Regt, as
it is not my intention to defend or propose a specific account of scientific understanding.
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• Understanding a Theory (UT): Corresponds to being able to use the theory. It
is a pragmatic understanding that depends on the scientist or on the scientific
community.
• Understanding a Phenomenon (UP): Corresponds to having an adequate explanation of the phenomenon. It is associated with Hempel’s account of scientific
understanding and with his Deductive Nomological (DN) model.4 (De Regt
2017, p. 23)
Intelligibility pertains to UT since it is concerned with the practical skills of the
individual scientists (or the scientific community) and with the capacity of producing
effective explanatory models. These practical skills, argues De Regt, are in general
a tacit knowledge that can be acquired in social contexts. An example from my
experience: it is not enough to teach students the rule of reductio ad absurdum in
classical logic, one also needs to teach them strategies to individuate the contradiction
needed to continue the derivation. Different strategies for finding such a contradiction
(most relevantly in difficult derivations) constitute practical skills that are shared by
a given scientific community, which is, in this case, a class of students.
In general, the relation between UT and UP marks the first difference between
the view that De Regt is proposing about scientific understanding and what I think
is implicit in the evolution of the overall spacetime view in Feynman’s works. As it
emerged from the discussion of both the absorber theory of radiation, path integrals
and quantum electrodynamics, Feynman did not learn the overall spacetime view from
a scientific context, but rather, his approach brought about a drastic change in the
practices of the scientific communities of his time. Perhaps, the strongest evidence
in favor of such a reading can be found in the reports of the Pocono conference
4

De Regt specifies that in his account every explanation is an argument and that the DN model
is thus one specific articulation.
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(Pennsylvania) in 1948 in which Feynman presented his new approach to quantum
electrodynamics:
At each step he was asked to justify his procedure; instead he offered
to work on physical example to demonstrate the correct results it produced. But the audience objected to the time this would require and
the hair involved, even though these had been drastically reduced by his
methods. The culmination of his audience’s feeling that Feynman was
running amok without being rigorous came when Niels Bohr stood up,
objected to Feynman’s use of trajectories for small particles, and started
reminding him about Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Here Feynman
gave up in despair, realizing that he couldn’t communicate the fact that
his analysis was justified by its correct results (Schweber 1986, p. 491).
What the quote emphasizes is that the quantum mechanics community originally
rejected Feynman’s new approach, and part of the reason is that Feynman’s presentation was too physical and lacked mathematical rigor:
Feynman was prepared to present “this whole thing backward . . . not
formally . . . with all physical ideas starting from path integrals” (Schweber
1986, p. 491)5
It is only in the subsequent years that the diagrams became accepted and started to
spread among different scientific communities (see: (Kaiser 2009)). In addition, the
diagrams did not spread uniformly across the different countries and communities,
thereby testifying the contextual aspect of the scientific understanding advocated
by De Regt. The reason being that the diagrams did not come with a clear and
unambiguous ‘user’s manual’ and thus different scientists applied them to different
5

Quoted from Feynman’s interview with Schweber in 1980 Nov. 1st
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set of problems and under different assumptions. But again, this view seems to apply
to the historical phase of the diffusion of the diagrams and not to the phase of their
development from Feynman’s intuition.
Returning to the distinction between UP and UT, De Regt’s theory rests on the
idea that “scientists need intelligible theories in order to achieve scientific understanding of phenomena”. Early quantum mechanics is an exemplar case, as pointed out in
De Regt (2017, p. 91): “the fact that the theory of matrix mechanics appeared unintelligible to many physicists hampered the construction of explanations to understand
phenomena by mean of this theory”.
But, as I tried to emphasize earlier, Feynman’s approach was to start from the
problem of an accepted theory (i.e., the divergence of the strength of the field produced by point charge at r → 0 in classical electrodynamics) and then develop a ‘new
theory’ based on the understanding of the physical phenomena. The understanding
of the physical phenomena, in this case, means the formulation of a narrative of how
the phenomenon under consideration (radiative damping and self action in classical
electrodynamics) might occur. Such a narrative, I argued, came from the application
of the overall spacetime view in contraposition to the accepted theory of classical electrodynamics. The point, I believe, is especially evident in the brief reconstruction of
the attempts to quantize the absorber theory of radiation that Feynman discusses in
his doctoral thesis, as I emphasized in the first and last chapters of this dissertation.
With the work on the absorber theory of radiation, Feynman obtains a new way
to formulate classical electrodynamics and, as he mentions in his Nobel lecture, a new
view on these phenomena:
I had a point of view —the overall space-time point of view— and
a disrespect for the Hamiltonian method of describing physics (Feynman
1966, p. 8).
As a consequence of this ‘disrespect’ and motivated by the new view, Feynman moves
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to quantize the absorber theory of radiation which has no Hamiltonian—this will lead
to the formulation of the path integrals for non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The
relevant point is that in those years the method of quantization for a classical theory was fairly well established and it was based on the promotion of the position
and momentum variables to non-commuting operators (expressed in terms of the
Hamiltonian of the system). But the absorber theory of radiation was not formulated
around a Hamiltonian and thus Feynman had to provide a new method for quantizing the theory. Thus, motivated by the new overall space-time view and moved by
the necessity of quantizing the absorber theory of radiation, Feynman searched for
a suitable action functional for a theory of direct-action-at-a-distance with half advanced and half retarded components and that could be successfully quantized. The
solution came partly from the work by (Dirac 1933), who developed a quantization of
the classical action functional expressed as the integral over the classical Lagrangian,
and from the attempts to eliminate the electromagnetic oscillators. This led to the
necessity of embedding the system into a spacetime boundary outside of which the
system is in free initial and final states.
This reconstruction, that I have now presented only briefly, suggests that Feynman
was not trying to understand the theory and then, through the theory, to understand
the phenomena. Rather, it seems that Feynman had a new understanding of the
physical phenomena —represented by the overall spacetime view— and that he built
a theory around such a view.
We can now return to De Regt and to his theory of scientific understanding which,
he argues, is based on the following idea:
CUP: A phenomenon P is understood scientifically if and only if there
is an explanation of P that is based on the intelligible theory T and
conforms to the basic epistemic values of empirical adequacy and internal
consistency (De Regt 2017, p. 92).
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Intelligibility is thus a necessary and yet not sufficient condition for scientific understanding, for empirical adequacy ad internal consistency are also generally deemed
necessary. If we apply this view to the analysis I have offered in this dissertation,
we run into some troubles. One could argue that the absorber theory is internally
consistent (under the condition that the universe is a complete absorber), but there
is no evidence of advanced radiation in classical electrodynamics. However, Wheeler
and Feynman argue that the advanced response of the absorber is what constitutes
the radiative reaction of the emitter and thus, although we do not ‘see’ the radiation
moving backward in time, the theory remains consistent. The issue is not entirely
solved because unless we assume that the universe is a complete absorber there is no
justification for the asymmetry between advanced and retarded radiation and for the
asymmetry of time-direction of the electromagnetic radiation.
With respect to path integrals: the empirical adequacy is preserved, for one can
calculate the right probability amplitude of a system. But, one might argue that the
internal consistency is threatened by the fact that some trajectories are ‘physically
impossible’ (although this would not really constitute a contradiction in the theory).
These trajectories, as discussed in chapter 3, are non-differentiable and thus they
are hard to interpret physically. The solution I have suggested in the chapter is
that since the very notion of trajectory is problematic in quantum mechanics (as
made evident by Heisenberg’s principle), one needs to resort to a holistic view. If we
consider the ill-behaved non-differentiable trajectories as ‘non-physical’ then it is not
possible to reduce the probability amplitude of the system to the sum of the physically
possible trajectories. Thereby, the holistic character of the probability amplitude is
determined by the (weak) non-supervenience of the whole (the ensemble of possible
trajectories) upon its parts (the physically possible trajectories).
With respect to Feynman diagrams, the empirical adequacy is guaranteed by
the fact that quantum electrodynamics is considered as one of the best empirically
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verified theories of contemporary physics. As for the internal consistency: first, the
divergence problem is something that caused quite a headache to the physicists at
the time. The problem was tamed by the introduction of renormalization. Second,
Feynman’s idea of depicting the physical processes by means of some diagrams and
the fact that these processes can be infinite in number is still there, and this has
raised and still raises questions about the type of representation that the diagrams
offer. However, even though I deem the topic to be of great interest, I will not discuss
it in this dissertation.
As a matter of fact, here is a caveat: I do not suggest, neither here nor in the other
chapters, that the overall spacetime view, as codified in the various theories, provides
a complete and entirely trustworthy representation of the phenomena under consideration. Rather, I have implicitly suggested that the overall spacetime view can offer
a partial (visual) description of the phenomena and that such a description provided
Feynman with a form of (partial) understanding. As a matter of fact, Feynman never
maintained that his new view corresponded to a complete and truthful understanding
of the phenomena described by his theories. For example, when drawing diagrams
at the Pocono conference in 1948, he was aware of Heisenberg’s principle and that a
definite trajectory is a concept unavailable in quantum mechanics. It is likely that
Feynman implicitly thought of an approximate understanding of the physics phenomena for which an answer to an explanatory why-question is acceptable as long
as we do not precisify the phenomenon too much.6 What ‘too much’ corresponds to
and whether we can provide a complete understanding of phenomena described by
quantum electrodynamics are questions that far exceed the scope of this dissertation.
Consider that whether we have a complete understanding of non relativistic quantum mechanics or whether such an understanding is in principle achievable is already
6

An explanatory seeking why-question is a question that asks for an explanation about why a
given phenomenon has occurred. See: (Hempel et al. 1965).
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a very tall question, as proven by the extensive literature on the interpretations of
quantum mechanics.

5.3.1

Visualizability

One more aspect I would like to briefly discuss is the relation between visualizability
and intelligibility and, consequently, the relation between visualizability and understanding. With respect to visualization and Feynman diagrams, De Regt (2017,
pp. 251–252) maintains that the diagrams provide: “a visualization of interaction
processes, albeit one that cannot be taken as one-to-one representation of actual occurrences in nature. [. . . ] The visual Feynman diagrams functioned as conceptual
tools that made quantum field theory more intelligible for most theoretical physicists.
[. . . ] Rather than realistic representations of physical processes, Feynman diagrams
are tools for solving problems and making calculations”.
From the previous quotation, De Regt makes clear that the diagrams do not have
a relation with physical reality and thereby they are not representations (in any sense)
of the physical processes they depict. Such an instrumentalist view is not new in the
literature. As a matter of fact, the works by (Brown 2018) and (Dorato and Rossanese
2018) move in a similar direction. However, I believe this view might be too much
cut-and-dried. In what follows, I will suggest that Feynman diagrams can be taken
to be a form of weak-representation, even though I will leave the task of specifying
what is that they represent and what is a weak-representation to later works.
First of all, without stirring up a hornet’s nest, I want to distinguish between
visualization and representation. The latter pertains to the epistemological question
about theory and reality, while the former refers to the capacity of more or less
accurately describing a given phenomena.7 Now, that Feynman diagrams are not
7

I deliberately leave the term ‘description’ vague, as a fine graining of what constitutes a description of a phenomenon would lead me astray from the purposes of this chapter. Intuitively: the
overall spacetime view in the case of Feynman diagrams is a form of visualization. A single diagram

149

a one-to-one representation of physical processes is not a mystery, as, for example,
they represent the motion of fundamental particles in straight-lined trajectories and
definite trajectories are mostly incompatible with quantum theories. However, the
fact that they are not a one-to-one representation does not rule out the possibility
for them to be at least a partial description of an interaction process.
Clearly, how to characterize the expression ‘partial description’ is but a simple
task and I haven’t found much clarification in Feynman’s writings. However, something can be speculated, especially if we compare Feynman’s view to that of Dirac.
Dirac emphasizes how modern physics is becoming less and less visualizable and how
the attempt of forming a mental picture of some physical processes requires the introduction of some irrelevancies:
The methods of progress in theoretical physics have undergone a vast
change during the present century. The classical tradition has been to
consider the world to be an association of observable objects (particles,
fluids, fields, etc.) moving about according to definite laws of force, so
that one could form a mental picture in space and time of the whole
scheme. This led to a physics whose aim was to make assumptions about
the mechanism and forces connecting these observable objects, to account
for their behavior in the simplest possible way. It has become increasingly
evident in recent times, however, that nature works on a different plan.
Her fundamental laws do not govern the world as it appears in our mental
picture in any very direct way, but instead they control a substratum of
which we cannot form a mental picture without introducing irrelevancies.
(Dirac 1981, p. vii)
is also a form of visualization but, instead of visualizing the entire process, it describes only one of
the contributing factors.
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On the other hand, Feynman emphasizes the importance that visualization plays
in understanding the equations, seemingly placing the two physicists on opposite
positions:
I dislike all this talk of there not being a picture possible but we only
need know how to go about calculating any phenomena. True we only
need calculate. But a picture is certainly a convenience & one is not
doing anything wrong in making one up. It might be completely haywire
while the equations are nearly right —yet for a while it helps . . . I want
to go back & try to understand them [the equations]. What do I mean by
understanding? Nothing deep or accurate —just to be able to see some of
the qualitative consequences of the equations by some method other than
solving them in detail.8
However, a more attentive reading can lead to a partial reconciliation. First, Dirac
does not claim that the visualization of phenomena described by modern physics is
impossible, but rather that one ought to add some irrelevancies. This resonates with
Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie in that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between
theory and physical reality. Second, while Feynman emphasizes the importance of
forming a picture of a physical phenomenon, he is also clear in saying that the picture
might be “completely haywire”. This, again, resonates with Boltzmann’s position
(Feynman, here, goes even further and weakens the link between the visualization
and the physical reality even more). What Feynman adds is that the picture can help
the physicist to understand the equations, where, here, ‘to understand’ is the capacity
of foreseeing the qualitative consequences of the equations. This comes very close to
what is defended by De Regt, especially the practical role played by visualization.
What the quotation does not show is that Feynman’s use of visualization will often
8

Quoted in (Wüthrich 2010, p. 94): Dirac Equation a, folio 12 (page 11).
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be directed toward the phenomena and that it will be a fundamental aspect of his
theorizing.

5.3.2

Quivering Electron

One example of the importance of visualizability for Feynman is in the work on
the Dirac equation after the paper on the path integral formulation of quantum
mechanics. The last section of (Feynman 1948c) attempts to generalize the path
integrals to relativistically moving particles, and to derive an action functional for
the relativistic Dirac equation. Even though Feynman derives the proper equation,
he remains dissatisfied with the too formal nature of the derivation.
These results for spin and relativity are purely formal and add nothing
to the understanding of these equations. There are other ways of obtaining
the Dirac equation which offer some promises of giving a clearer physical
interpretation to that important and beautiful equation (Feynman 1948c,
p. 387).
One could argue that what emerges from the previous quote is that Feynman was
trying to provide a physical picture (based on path integrals) of the Dirac equation and
thus he was not trying to understand the phenomena directly, contrary to what I have
been arguing thus far. A possible response to the objection is that, indeed, Feynman
tried to understand the Dirac equation, but it is also true that he was coming from a
new formulation of quantum mechanics and from his overall spacetime view. Because
the Dirac equation is the dynamical equation for relativistically moving particles in
quantum mechanics, it is only natural that Feynman tried to derive it starting from
his new theoretical framework. In addition, his attempts ultimately failed and forced
the physicist to undertake a different strategy. This led to the so-called theory of the
quivering electron: an initially one-dimensional model of the Dirac equation where
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the electron is taken to move either to the left or to the right on a lattice; and the
probability amplitude is calculated based on the counting of those turns.9 As argued
in (Wüthrich 2010, p. 65): “[...] what Feynman means by "understanding" the Dirac
equation is not the study of the mathematical properties of the Dirac equation or
the search for an ingenious method of solution required by the application of the
equation to complex problems. Rather, Feynman is looking for a physical system,
the appropriate description of which would satisfy the Dirac equation.” But, the
description of the system (e.g., the diagrams) needs not be a truthful representation
of the physical reality and, in this respect, Feynman comes close to the Bildtheorie
by Boltzmann that I reviewed earlier in the previous sections.
Another clue suggesting that visualization was fundamental for Feynman is reported in (Schweber 1986, p. 466):
One delightful example that I really got big pleasure out of, is the
liquid helium problem . . . So the whole thing was worked out first, in fact,
was published first as a descriptive thing... which doesn’t carry much
weight, but to me was the real answer. I really understood it and I was
trying to explain it.
Based on the last quotation, De Regt distinguishes between understanding and explaining where understanding is provided by the visualization and explanation is
provided by the mathematical derivation: “First one needs intelligibility (i.e., understanding of the theory), which may be provided by visualization, and subsequently one
can construct explanations, which may consist of mathematical derivations. Thus,
visualization contributes to the intelligibility required for developing explanations.
The success of Feynman’s diagrammatic method indicates that most physicists prefer
visualization as a tool for making theories intelligible” (De Regt 2017, p. 255).
9

That an electron as described by the Dirac equation oscillates around a mean trajectory was
already suggested by (Breit 1928) and (Schrodinger 1930).
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However, thus far I have argued that the story is almost entirely flipped over: it
is the visualization of the phenomena as overall processes that led Feynman to an
understanding of those phenomena and, through that understanding, to the formulation of Feynman diagrams. Consider the excerpt of Feynman’s interview in (Schweber
1986, p. 465):
But visualization in some form or other is a vital part of my thinking
and it isn’t necessary I make a diagram like that. The diagram is really, in
a certain sense, the picture that comes from trying to clarify visualization,
which is a half-assed kind of vague, mixed with symbols. It is very difficult
to explain, because it is not clear. [. . . ] It is hard to believe it, but
I see these things not as mathematical expressions but a mixture of a
mathematical expression wrapped into and around, in a vague way, around
the object. [. . . ] Ordinarily I try to get the pictures clearer but in the end,
the mathematics can take over and can be more efficient in communicating
the idea than the picture. In certain particular problems that I have done
it was necessary to continue the development of the picture as the method
before the mathematics could really be found.
It is clear that Feynman does not have a precise philosophical account of visualization
and/or understanding, but he also makes clear that his visualization and understanding is directed toward the phenomenon and not toward the theory. The formal and
mathematical theory comes after the visual understanding of the phenomena, even
though the mathematically well-formed theory can be more efficient in communicating
such understanding. Allegedly, this is because scientific communities tend to receive
formal mathematical arguments better than physical reasoning based on diagrammatic representations —see the reception of Feynman’s quantum electrodynamics at
the Pocono conference as I recalled earlier.
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5.4

Conclusion

The objective of this last short chapter was to clarify some implicit assumptions of
the philosophical analysis I have offered in this dissertation. Such assumptions are
related to the type of scientific understanding that I believe the overall spacetime
view offered to Feynman in the development of the absorber theory, path integrals
and quantum electrodynamics.
While a full-fledged theory of scientific understanding is never spelled out in Feynman’s works, I have relied on the recent work by (De Regt 2017) to emphasize the
direction of Feynman’s understanding and the role played by visualization. Notably,
I have discussed these topics in light of Feynman’s works and by keeping in mind
the philosophical analysis that I have offered in this dissertation. As a consequence,
I have not tried to discuss the issue as to whether and to what extent Feynman
diagrams represent real physical processes.10 Rather, I have offered an account of
scientific understanding and visualization that fits Feynman’s personal and peculiar
way of doing physics. The overall spacetime view provided Feynman with a partial
understanding of the phenomena under consideration. Such an understanding was
not characterized by a one-to-one correspondence with physical reality, but it allowed
the physicist to develop the theory of quantum electrodynamics and the well-known
Feynman diagrams. In addition, I have argued that The visualization of the physical
processes, even without a pretense of realism, was a fundamental aspect of Feynman’s
scientific understanding and theorizing. The final result was a theory capable of calculating the scattering amplitude of quantum processes to an extremely high-degree
of precision and this is achieved through the use of diagrams that are only partly
representative of the actual process. I leave the issue of better refining the concept
of ‘partial representation’ to future and more specific investigations.
10
Most recently, the issue has been discussed by (Brown 2018), (Stöltzner 2018), (Meynell 2018)
and (Dorato and Rossanese 2018).
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
In this dissertation I have identified Feynman’s overall spacetime view in the absorber
theory of radiation (Chapter 2), then I have analyzed how the view changed with
the path integrals formulation of quantum mechanics (Chapter 3) and, finally, with
Feynman diagrams (Chapter 4).
More specifically, in Chapter 2 I have presented Wheeler and Feynman’s absorber
theory of radiation which had the purpose of solving the problem of radiative reaction
and thus the problem of the interaction of an electric accelerated charge with its own
field. The solution proposed by Wheeler and Feynman makes use of the advanced
solutions to Maxwell’s equations and the assumption that the universe is a complete
absorber. I have then argued that the overall spacetime view in the context of the
absorber theory of radiation consists of the intertwining of past and future, together
with the necessary relation between absorbers and emitters. Absorbers and emitters
constitute a ‘closed-system’ within which past and future are intertwined. As a
consequence, the system ought to be studied in its spacetime entirety.
The failed attempt to quantize the absorber theory of radiation led Feynman to
the development of the path integrals formulation of quantum mechanics. In Chapter
3, I have presented Feynman’s new interpretation and argued that the closed system
is now constituted by the initial and final states. Within such states, all possible
trajectories need to be accounted for to calculate the probability amplitude. I have
thus compared the path integrals to the Lagrangian schema addressed in (Wharton
2016), and I have compared Feynman’s idea of looking at quantum phenomena from
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the bird’s eye view with the Newtonian schema (the hyperbolic partial differential
method). In addition, the chapter analyzed the structure of the ensemble of possible trajectories and showed how the total ensemble is not strongly reducible to the
single individual paths. The consequence is that the very notion of well-defined trajectory loses its meaning in quantum mechanics —in accordance with the results of
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.
In Chapter 4, I have addressed the overall spacetime view in the context of the
theory of positrons and Feynman diagrams. There, I have described how from calculating transition amplitudes by integrating over all the possible configurations of the
system, Feynman obtained a view that accounts for all possible interactions within
the spacetime boundary. More specifically, I discussed how the use of perturbation
theory and Feynman’s interpretation of the terms in the perturbative series led the
physicist to consider as possibilities not only the various spatial configurations of the
system, but also all the possible interaction within the spacetime boundary.
In Chapter 5, I have addressed what type of understanding the physicist gained
from the application of his view to the realm of quantum field theory, and the result is
that Feynman diagrams, together with the overall spacetime view, provide a partial
understanding via visualization of quantum processes. However, the last chapter
deliberately avoided the question as to whether the diagrams constitute a form of
representation of physical reality. I leave the question to later works, since a thorough
answer would require diving into troubled waters.
Finally, the next section will conclude this dissertation with a brief discussion
about Feynman’s commitment to his own spacetime view, especially with respect to
his later works.
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6.1

I Want to Believe

The last chapter of this dissertation argued that Feynman, through the absorber
theory of radiation, path integrals, and Feynman diagrams, tried to understand the
physical phenomena interested by the respective theories. The overall spacetime view
is what provided Feynman with a partial understanding, characterized by a strong
visual component. I wish to conclude the dissertation with some considerations on
whether Feynman believed in the physical picture offered by the overall spacetime
view and quantum electrodynamics.
Such considerations can only be tentative, since again Feynman was not clear
about assessing his philosophical standings. Furthermore, I think there is room for
arguing that the extent to which he believed in his theories and their philosophical
underpinning has changed over time. As a matter of fact, if one is to accept the
reconstruction I have offered in this work, it should be clear that the overall spacetime
view was not merely a conceptual framework used by Feynman for building quantum
theories. One example in support of this thesis can be found in Chapter 4, where I
presented how Feynman interprets the phenomena of electron-positron pair creation.
Another example comes from how (Kaiser 2009, p. 175) characterizes the different
attitudes toward the diagrams by Feynman and Dyson:
To Feynman, his new diagrams provided pictures of actual physical
processes, and hence added an intuitive dimension beyond furnishing a
simple mnemonic calculational device.
Dyson, on the other hand, takes the diagrams to be graphical representations of
combinatorial possibilities, i.e., useful tools to manipulate the mathematical terms of
the perturbative series.
However, it is also clear that the extent to which Feynman believed that his
theories represented actual physical phenomena has changed. For example, (Schweber
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1986, p. 503) reports a letter written by Feynman to Wheeler in which the former
rejects one of the assumptions of the absorber theory of radiation:
I wanted to know what your opinion was about our old theory of action
at a distance. It was based on two assumptions:
i. Electrons act only on other electrons
ii. They do so with the mean of retarded and advanced potentials
The second proposition may be correct but I wish to deny the correctness
of the first.
Schweber (1986) describes the letter as the evidence that a chapter in Feynman’s
intellectual life had come to a conclusion. While I agree with Schweber, I also believe
that the letter conveys more than just that. First, it testifies that Feynman believed
in the assumptions of the absorber theory of radiation, which were the basis and
first instance of the overall spacetime view. Second, it shows that Feynman had progressively questioned the reality of the overall spacetime view —and the consequent
truthfulness of his theories.
With respect to the first point, consider how Feynman recalls the search for a
general action for his absorber theory of radiation:
When the action has a delay, as it now had, and involved more than
one time, I had to lose the idea of a wave function. That is, I could no
longer describe the program as: given the amplitude for all positions at
a certain time, compute the amplitude at another time. However, that
didn’t cause very much trouble. It just meant developing a new idea.
Instead of wave functions we could talk about this: that if a source of
a certain kind emits a particle, and a detector is there to receive it, we
can give the amplitude that the source will emit and the detector receive.
We do this without specifying the exact instant that the source emits or
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the exact instant that any detector receives, without trying to specify the
state of anything at any particular time in between, but by just finding
the amplitude for the complete experiment. (Feynman 1966, pp. 10–11)
The second point, on the other hand, is emphasized when Feynman recollects his
calculation efforts about the Lamb shift experiment. There, he clearly characterizes
his theory as a calculation tool: “The rest of my work was simply to improve the techniques then available for calculations, making diagrams to help analyze perturbation
theory quicker” (Feynman 1966, p. 14). Nonetheless, Feynman retains the physical
approach and in recalling the development of his theory of positrons he comments:
“[b]ut one step of importance that was physically new was involved with the negative
energy sea of Dirac, which caused me so much logical difficulty. I got so confused
that I remember Wheeler’s old idea about the positron being, maybe, the electron
going backward in time” (Feynman 1966, p. 15).
It is hard to precisely pin down the moment when Feynman changed his attitude
toward the overall spacetime view, and yet this change of attitude remains quite
evident. As a further evidence, consider the way he recalls the work on the calculation
of the interaction of the electron with the neutron:
That was a thrilling moment for me, like receiving the Nobel Prize,
because that convinced me, at last, I did have some kind of method and
technique and understood how to do something that other people did not
know how to do. That was my moment of triumph in which I realized
I really had succeeded in working out something worthwhile. (Feynman
1966, p. 16)
The quote remarks how Feynman, in the end, and after having formulated his version
of quantum electrodynamics, came to the conclusion that what he had developed was
a calculation method rather than a new theory of quantum electrodynamics. This
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at least suggests that he stopped believing that Feynman diagrams, and perhaps the
overall spacetime view, were a (partial) representation of the physical world. Another
remark that seems to confirm this conclusion is quoted in (Mehra 1994, p. 453) where
it is reported Feynman’s enthusiasm about his results on weak interactions in 1957:1
As I thought about it, as I beheld it in my mind’s eye, the goddamn
thing was sparkling, it was shining bright! As I looked at it, I felt that
it was the first time, and only time, in my scientific career that I knew a
law of nature that no one else knew. Now it wasn’t as beautiful a law as
Dirac’s [discovery of the relativistic equation for the electron] or Maxwell’s
[equation of the electromagnetic field], but my equation for beta decay was
a bit like that. It was the first time that I discovered a new law, rather
than a more efficient method of calculating from someone else’s theory (as
I had done with the path integrals method for Schrödinger’s equation and
the diagram technique in quantum electrodynamics) [...] This discovery
was completely new, although, of course, I learned later that others had
thought of it the same time or a little before, but that did not make any
difference.
I believe that Feynman here is being uncharitable to his own results (path integrals
and Feynman diagrams) and I am in good company thinking it, for example: “[. . . ]
Richard, with his great talent for working out, sometimes in dramatically new ways,
the consequences of known laws, was unnecessarily sensitive on the subject of discovering new ones. [. . . ] Thus it would have pleased Richard to know (and perhaps he
did know, without my being aware of it) that there are now some indications that
his PhD dissertation may have involved a really basic advance in physical theory and
not just formal development. ” (Gell-Mann 1986, p. 51)
1

R.P. Feynman, Interviews and conversations with Jagdish Mehra, in Pasadena, California,
January 1988.
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While the history of Feynman’s works on weak interactions does not concern us
here, the quotation is relevant in that it shows what Feynman thought (years later)
about his path integral formulation and diagrammatic methods. Neither of them can
be interpreted as a theory that describes the reality of quantum phenomena, and this
suggests that even the overall spacetime view will be in the end taken by Feynman
to be but a useful aid to develop different formulations of quantum theories. There
is thus no commitment to the reality of such a view and, as it will become even more
clear in the closing part of the Nobel Lecture, the view was useful for guessing the
equations, rather than being a viable representation of the phenomena:
This completes the story of the development of the space-time view
of quantum electrodynamics. I wonder if anything can be learned from
it. I doubt it. It is most striking that most of the ideas developed in the
course of this research were not ultimately used in the final result. For example, the half-advanced and half-retarded potential was not finally used,
the action expression (1) [the action for the absorber theory of radiation]
was not used, the idea that charges do not act on themselves was abandoned. The path-integral formulation of quantum mechanics was useful
for guessing at final expressions and at formulating the general theory of
electrodynamics in new ways —although, strictly it was not absolutely
necessary. The same goes for the idea of the positron being a backward
moving electron, it was very convenient, but not strictly necessary for the
theory because it is exactly equivalent to the negative energy sea point of
view. (Feynman 1966, p. 17)
What remains of the physical reasoning and intuition behind the overall spacetime
view? That Feynman started with the idea of formulating a new theory with the
intention of solving the divergences problem remains a fact: “Therefore, a new theory
was sought, not just a modification of the old.” (Feynman 1966, p. 18). And yet,
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it seems that in later years Feynman grew skeptical about the purchase on physical
reality of his view, especially in favor of a greater enthusiasm toward mathematics.
At the end of the Nobel lecture, he characterizes the physical reasoning as helpful
to some people, but the only true physical description comes from the mathematics
describing the experimental observations:
The only true physical description is that describing the experimental
meaning of the quantities in the equations —or better, the way the equations are to be used in describing experimental observations. This being
the case perhaps the best way to proceed is to try to guess equations,
and disregard physical models or descriptions. For example [. . . ] Dirac
obtained his equation for the description of the electron by an almost
purely mathematical proposition. A simple physical view by which all
the contents of this equation can be seen is still lacking. (Feynman 1966,
p. 18).
Independently of how much Feynman believed in his overall spacetime view and
representational character of his diagrams, it remains that they played a crucial role in
the development of modern quantum field theory, one of our most successful scientific
enterprises. His fight against the customary view and the original way of thinking
about quantum processes are surely worth studying, and perhaps even developing
further, into new interpretations and theories.
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Appendix A
Time asymmetry and quantized absorber theory
A.1

The reversibility Argument

In what follows, I wish to briefly address the second problem that Price mentioned in
his critics to the absorber theory of radiation. That is: the problem of justifying the
emergence of the macroscopic time-asymmetry of radiation from time-symmetric laws.
Far from being a complete discussion of the issue at hand, I will simply emphasize
how a viable answer can be found in some works on quantum electrodynamics, rather
than on the cosmological imbalance suggested by Price.
Simply stated: if the micro-laws of electrodynamics are time-symmetric, why is
it the case that we do not experience advanced radiation? Wheeler and Feynman
deemed the irreversibility of the radiation phenomena to be: “a phenomenon of statistical mechanics connected with the asymmetry of the initial conditions with respect
to time” (Wheeler and Feynman 1945, p. 170).1 In this sense, Wheeler and Feynman ground the asymmetry of radiative phenomena on the statistical behavior of the
particles in the absorber. As neatly emphasized by Davies (1977, p. 144):
This absorption is clearly an irreversible thermodynamical damping effect; the entropy of the absorbing medium increases. The thermodynamic
asymmetry in the absorber imposes an asymmetry on the electromagnetic
1

In this, Wheeler and Feynman seem to side with Einstein with respect to the Ritz-Einstein
debate (1909). Ritz thought that the asymmetry of radiation was a fundamental character of
thermodynamics while Einstein advocated for a probabilistic explanation. More on this: (Pegg
1975), (Frisch and Pietsch 2016).
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radiation, by permitting the transport of energy from the source at the
center of the cavity to the cavity wall, but not the other way around. The
advanced self-consistent solution, which is allowed on purely electrodynamic grounds, is thus ruled out as overwhelmingly improbable, because
it would require the cooperative ”anti-damping” of all the particles in the
cavity wall. [...]
In the absorber theory of radiation the close relationship between electrodynamic temporal asymmetry is fully exploited. The existence of retarded
‘radiation’ is assured by the thermodynamic properties of the absorbing
medium. The time direction of electromagnetic radiation is determined
by the time direction of entropy increase in the universe.
The explanation provided by Davies fits the original formulation of the theory,
as it accounts for the term p(ω) in equation (2.9) and hence endows to statistical
mechanics the explanation of the macroscopic asymmetry. Price, on the other hand,
counter-argues that such explanation is tainted by a ‘double standard fallacy’, for
which the time-symmetric argument is applied for one time direction only: “so if a
statistical argument rules out the advanced solution, an exactly parallel argument
rules out the usual retarded solution” (Price 1991, p. 966).
The solution advanced by Price is that the asymmetry of radiation is not grounded
on the thermodynamic asymmetry, but rather, that they share a ‘common-cause’. As
he explains in: (Price 1994, p. 1024) “[. . . ] we have a reduction of the issue of
the (strictly macroscopic) asymmetry of radiation not to that of the thermodynamic
asymmetry as such, but to cosmological issues of the same kind as those to which the
thermodynamic arrow leads us.” By ‘cosmological issues’, he means a cosmological
imbalance between large absorbers and large emitters. However, to support this view,
he needs the modification of the mathematical core of the absorber theory expressed
in equation (2.24) and thus he needs to change the type of symmetry of the overall
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process view. This change, as I have already emphasized, bears some problems that
seem unresolved in Price’s account.
The statistical argument advanced by Wheeler and Feynman is still tainted by
the double-standard fallacy pointed out by Price. Therefore, unless we accept the
change of time-symmetry —and thus modify (or reject) the overall process view—
we ought to provide a possible explanation to the time-asymmetry.
I will now look at a possible extension of the absorber theory to quantum mechanics and show how it explains the imbalance between advanced and retarded radiation.
It will be shown that at the level of quantum mechanics the time-symmetry is ‘naturally broken’, thus providing an explanation for how the phenomena of radiation is
not symmetric. The difference, with respect to the solution proposed by Wheeler and
Feynman, is that instead of imposing an a priori statistical argument that rules out
the advanced fields, we have a derivation of the time-asymmetric operator starting
from the interactions between absorbers and emitters.

A.2

Extension to Quantum Mechanics

The works by (Davies 1970), (Davies 1971), (Davies 1972) extend the theory of
Wheeler and Feynman to the domain of quantum electrodynamics (QED) by means
of S-matrix (scattering matrix) and the use of some boundary conditions.2
Davies (1971, p. 840) demonstrates that the action propagator for current-field
interaction
XZ

µ
j(i)
(x)Aµ (x)dx4

(A.1)

i
µ
where Aµ is the quantized electromagnetic field and the j(i)
(x) is an emitting current,
2
A different route was taken by (Hoyle and Narlikar 1995) who instead of using the S-matrix
adopted the path integrals formulation based on the works by (Dirac 1933) and (Feynman 1948c).
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can be replaced with an operator for current-current interaction:3
XX
i

j

1Z Z µ
µ
j(i) (x)DF (x − y)j(j)
(y)dx4 dy 4
2

(A.2)

Then (Davies 1971) and (Davies 1972) prove that one can decompose Feynman’s
time-asymmetric photons propagator DF (x − y) into: DF = D̄ + D1 ; where D̄ =
1/2(Dret + Dadv ) is the time-symmetric propagator for virtual photons and D1 =
1/2(Dret − Dadv ) describes the free field and thus real photons. The situation, argues
(Davies 1972, p. 1027), is similar to the one in classical electrodynamics: “[...]the
virtual photons (time symmetric bound field) give rise to the near field, because of the
finite lifetime of the virtual photons, while the real photons can escape to infinity as
the far field”. The analogy is that we can consider a point charged particle in arbitrary
motion and construct two fields: Ā = 1/2 (Aret + Aadv ) and A = 1/2 (Aret − Aadv ).
The first one is ‘near’ (1/R2 ) and it is a solution to the inhomogeneous equation and
the second is a ‘far’ (1/R) source-free field.
When aµ = 0 (i.e., for a uniform motion) the far field vanishes and thus what remains is the time symmetric velocity field at the source without the radiative damping. At the quantum level, we only have virtual photons for which the order of
emission and absorption can’t be determined:
To see this, we appreciate that when no energy source is available the
time ∆T required for the emission process is related to the frequency of
the photon by ∆T ∼ 1/ω. That is, in the wave zone of the source, we are
completely unsure of the order of emission and absorption. This order is
only well defined in the far zone, but the far field vanishes here (Davies
1972, p. 1028).
What happens, though, if the system is accelerated and hence aµ 6= 0? At the classical level, accelerated particles emit fields to which the universe (absorber) responds.
3

µ
The second current being j(j)
(y).
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In other words, the presence of the free field is due to the response of the universe
which applies to the originally emitting charge. That this radiation is completely
absorbed is the light-tight box condition for the classical absorber theory:4
X
j

1 ret
(A − Aadv
j ) = 0
2 j

(A.3)

In the quantum case, Davies distinguishes real and virtual photons based on having
infinite and finite lifespan respectively. The quantum equivalent of the complete
absorber condition is that there are not real photons propagating infinitely into the
future. Under this condition, though, the presence of the term D1 is paradoxical.
Davies’ solution is that the presence of propagating real photons comes from the
interaction with the virtual ones:
The paradox [of having infinite lifespan photons] can be resolved by
appealing to the classical theory. Just as we can never separate the A
and Ā fields, and both of them carry away radiation when aµ 6= 0, so
the virtual photons continually interfere with the real photons when we
have the quantum analogue of acceleration (ie energy available for the
transition) (Davies 1972, p. 1027).
As well summarized in (Kastner and Cramer 2017):
In the Davies theory, the usual quantum electromagnetic field A(x)
(suppressing components indices for simplicity, i.e. A = Aµ and x = xµ )
is replaced by the direct current-to-current interaction as above. Thus, the
field at a point x (on a charged current i) arising from its interaction with
responses of all currents jj is given by A(x) =

P R
j

DF (x − y)jj (y)d4 y

where the quantum analog of the ‘light-tight-box’ condition is imposed:
namely, that for the totality of all currents jj , there are no initial or final
4

Equation (A.3) corresponds to equation (2.20) in Derivation IV.
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states with real photons —i.e., no genuine photon ‘external lines’. (In the
Davies theory, this amounts to the requirement that the existence of a
real photon requires both an emitter and an absorber.)
While Davies’ theory represents a step toward a full quantum treatment of the
original absorber theory of radiation, Kastner (2020, p. 3) argues that it remains a
semi-classical theory: “insofar as it tacitly identified radiation with continuous fields,
and assumed that a real photon could be unilaterally emitted, which is not the case
at the quantum level”. She also points out that a fully quantum direct action theory
needs no cosmological conditions in the sense of a completely absorbing universe.5
What is really needed, from the mathematical point of view, is the equivalence between equations (A.1) and (A.2) which is obtained by setting the electromagnetic
field operator Âµ to zero in the scattering matrix (Kastner 2020, p. 20):

Z
iZ µ
4
4
j (x)DF (x − y)jµ (y)d xd y × exp i jµ (x)Âµ (x)d4 x
S = exp −
2








(A.4)

Kastner argues that to set the quantum operator to zero corresponds to the classical
light-tight-box condition in equation (A.3).6 The latter, however, is interpreted not
as the condition that all radiation is ultimately absorbed, but rather as the condition
that there are no free (sourceless) fields:
While selective cancellation of fields does occur among charges to produce the effective radiation field, the absence of an unsourced radiation
field is the primary physical content of the ‘LTB’ [light-tight-box] condition for the quantum form of the DAT [direct action theory.]
5

Whether the universe is a complete absorber in the sense expressed by the absorber theory is
investigated in: (Hoyle and Narlikar 1995).
6

Setting the electromagnetic field operator to zero fits with the original attempt by Wheeler and
Feynman to build a theory without an independent classical electromagnetic field.
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A fundamental point in the argument is that real and virtual photons ought not
to be distinguished based on finite and infinite lifespan, because real photons can be
absorbed and emitted as well: “[...] the response of the absorbers is what gives rise
to the ‘free field’ that in the quantum domain is considered a ‘real photon’. So the
‘realness’ of the photon is defined in the transactional picture not by an infinite lifetime —which, in reality, is practically never obtained— but rather by the presence of
an absorber response” (Kastner 2014, p. 5)7 . In other words: the near field —which
is mediated by virtual photons (off the mass shell)— does not involve the absorber
response and thus virtual photons are only direct time-symmetric connections between currents. On the other hand, the far field —which is mediated by real (on
the shell) photons— exists conditioned to an appropriate response of the absorber
which is the only field that ought to be absorbed (according to the light-tight-box
condition). Some confusion might arise from the use of the term ‘absorber response’,
which is misleading because it is conducive of a temporally oriented mechanism for
which a source emits a field and the absorber responds. This is not the case in Kastner’s reinterpretation: “So rather than ‘absorber response’, this quantum relativistic
process is really a mutual agreement to generate an on-shell field” (Kastner 2020,
p. 2).
The technical details of how the presence of this mutual interaction between absorbers and emitters determines the presence of D1 and thus the emission of real
photons under quantum acceleration, do not concern us here; they are specified in
(for example): (Kastner 2020) and (Kastner and Cramer 2017). What is of most
interest to us is that both Kastner and Davies advance a theory that strongly relies
on the absorber theory of radiation by Wheeler and Feynman.
Where does the time asymmetry come from? In Davies’ theory, the imposition
7

The expression ‘transactional picture’ in the quote referes to the Transactional Interpretation
of Quantum Mechanics by (Cramer 1986) and (Kastner 2013)
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of complete absorption guarantees the response of the absorbers which causes the
radiative damping and the cancellation of the advanced fields. The theory is thus
time symmetric and justifies the time asymmetry at the level of boundary conditions.
However, we have seen that Davies’ account bears some problems and questionable
assumptions —namely, that the universe is a complete absorber and real photons have
an infinite lifetime. That being the case, we have briefly presented Kastner’s solution
which is based on a different definition of virtual-real photons and light-tight-box
condition. The temporal asymmetry and the phenomena of radiation are derived
from the mutual interactions between absorbers and emitters, where the presence of
the former dictates the presence of radiation. It remains that Kastner’s account does
not diverge from the philosophical underpinning of the original absorber theory. As
a matter of fact, it makes the interaction between absorbers and emitters even more
fundamental in accounting for the phenomena of radiation, and this is because it does
not need a cosmological boundary.8
To be more precise, Kastner replaces the cosmological boundary condition with
the quantum completeness condition which makes explicit the role of the mutual interaction between absorbers and emitter and leaves us with no need for the cosmological
boundary:
Physically, this means that absorbers corresponding to each possible
value of k must respond; or, more accurately at the relativistic level, that
the emitter and absorbers must engage in a mutual interaction, above
and beyond the off-shell time-symmetric field D̄, to generate an on-shell
8
One can still object that the use of Feynman’s propagator, for which positive energy solutions
propagate forward in time, is a form of double standard. For example, one could use Dyson’s
propagator and thus have negative energy solutions propagating forward in time. However, this
does not constitute a double standard because an observer in a ’Dyson Universe’ would not see any
difference from an observer in a ’Feynman Universe’. Both observers would ‘see’ a unidirectional
flow of energy. ‘Positive’ or ‘negative’ energies are, in this sense, conventional. The point is made
evident in (Kastner 2020).
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field that can be factorized, corresponding to the quantum completeness
condition (Kastner 2020, p. 13).
Although the overall process view I have presented here was meant to refer to the
absorber theory only (thus, classical electrodynamics), the mutual interaction of absorbers and emitter in the quantum completeness condition sets the ground for a
generalization to quantum electrodynamics —given that it mirrors the second clause
of the overall process view.
In general, neither of the theories considered here required the application of a
statistical argument to one time direction only. They both constructed the asymmetric operator starting from interactions between real-virtual photons and absorbers
and emitters. It is in this sense that the double-standard argument is at least quite
weakened. The asymmetry of time emerges from the very formalism of the theories,
despite the time symmetry of the laws.
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